News reports are becoming much thinner on the Air Products
attack in France as the investigation continues in the somewhat slower and
tedious information collection phase.
A TV station in Allentown, PA (the home of Air Products) is reporting
that the facility in France is now open and operational. There is no word about
how much actual damage occurred or whether it has been repaired. I assume that
this is more about the investigators being done with the scene.
Another news
report describes Salhi’s actions as he was detained; “He was overpowered by
a firefighter as he was trying to prise open a bottle of acetone in an apparent
suicidal bid to destroy the factory.” This provides another indicator that
there was not a bomb detonation involved in the attack.
The investigation into possible IS links continues. News
reports this weekend indicated that Salhi had sent a selfie of him and the
beheaded body to an unknown contact. USAToday is
reporting today that that contact was Sebastien Younes in Syria. This
includes unconfirmed reports that Younes is claiming to have encouraged Salhi
to initiate the attack.
That USAToday report also notes that: “Air Products
officials have said Salhi had an entry badge for the site in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier,
near Lyon, and had never caused problems in the past.”
Commentary
The questions continue about how a man with suspected ties
to radical jihadists was given routine access to what we in the United States
would probably consider a high-risk chemical facility. I don’t know what sort
of vetting process companies in France have for checking for potential
terrorist ties, but I would assume that that would have to be done through the
French authorities.
High-risk chemical facilities in the United States that are
covered under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program
are supposed to include vetting all employees and unescorted visitors for
terrorist ties as part of their site security plan. Unfortunately, there is
currently no way to do that as the CFATS personnel surety program (PSP) has
been tied up by political wrangling between the folks at DHS and the
regulated community.
So, with no way to vet people for potential terrorist ties
there is no way to know how many Salhi’s are currently routinely entering
high-risk chemical facilities in this country.
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