Friday, July 24, 2026

Chemical Transportation Incidents – Week of 6-20-26

Reporting Background 

See this post for explanation, with the most recent update here (removed from paywall). 

Data from PHMSA’s online database of transportation related chemical incidents that have been reported to the agency. 

Incidents Summary  

• Number of incidents – 572 (531 highway, 36 air, 5 rail, 0 water) 

• Serious incidents – 2 (2 Bulk release, 1 evacuation, 0 injury, 0 death, 0 major artery closed, 0 fire/explosion, 45 no release)  

• Largest container involved – 30,110-gal DOT 111A100W1 Railcar {Flammable Liquids, N.O.S.} Loose bolt on manway resulting in fume leak from residual material in tank. 

• Largest amount spilled – 2,500-gal DOT-407 Trailer {Hydrogen, Peroxide, Aqueous Solutions with Not Less Than 8 Percent but Less Than 20 Percent Hydrogen Peroxide (Stabilized as Necessary)} Venting through PRV due to overpressurization. 

• Total amount reported spilled in all incidents – 4444.7-gal 

NOTE: Links above are to Form 5800.1 for the incident described. 

Most Interesting Chemical: Cresols: Colorless to yellow liquids with a tarry odor. Flash point 178°F. Insoluble in water. Density 8.7 lb / gal. Poisonous by ingestion and skin absorption and corrosive to skin. (Source: CameoChemicals.NOAA.gov).  


INSERT UN 2076 Placard 

Review – Bills Introduced – 7-23-26

Yesterday, with both the House and Senate in session (and the House leaving for summer break), there were 111 bills introduced. One of those bills may receive additional coverage in this blog:  

HR 9908 To require the development of a comprehensive rural hospital cybersecurity workforce development strategy, and for other purposes. Houchin, Erin [Rep.-R-IN-9]    


For more information on these bills, including legislative history for similar bills in the 118th Congress, as well as a mention-in-passing of two additional cybersecurity bills, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/bills-introduced-7-23-26 - subscription required. 

OMB Approves BIS Drone Export Final Rule

Yesterday the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had approved a final rule from the DOC’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on “Streamlining Export Controls for Drone Exports”. The final rule was sent to OIRA on June 11th, 2026. The interim final rule for this rulemaking was published on January 21st, 2026. 

According to the 2026 Unified Agenda entry for this rulemaking 

“The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is easing export controls on certain civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies, which currently need a license to be exported to most countries. In particular, this interim final rule (IFR): a) allows less sensitive UAVs namely, commercial UAVs with a maximum endurance of less than one hour, for which there is broad foreign availability to be exported to most Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States (Country Group A:1) without a license; and b) allows more capable non-military UAVs namely, certain long-range cargo delivery and agricultural spraying drones to be exported to certain U.S. partners and allies (Country Group A:5) under License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA). Exports pursuant to License Exception STA are subject to notification and reporting requirements to ensure the security of the exports. BIS is making these changes pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14307 [link added], Unleashing American Drone Dominance.”” 

I will not be covering this rulemaking in any detail, but I do expect that notification of its publication in the Federal Register will be reported in the appropriate Short Takes post. 

Thursday, July 23, 2026

Review – 7 Advisories Published – 7-23-26

 Today, CISA’s NCCIC-ICS published seven control system security advisories for products from MZ Automation (2), Rockwell, Panduit, Weintek, and Johnson Controls (2). 

Advisories  

MZ Automation Advisory #1 - This advisory describes an out-of-bound read vulnerability in the MZ Automation lib60870. 

MZ Automation Advisory #2 - This advisory describes four vulnerabilities in the MZ Automation libIEC61850. 

Rockwell Advisory - This advisory describes a path traversal vulnerability in the Rockwell Automation ThinManager, 

Panduit Advisory - This advisory describes five vulnerabilities in the Panduit IntraVUE. 

Weintek Advisory - This advisory describes four vulnerabilities in the Weintek cMT3092X HMI. 

Johnson Controls Advisory #1 - This advisory describes a clear text storage of sensitive information vulnerability in the Johnson Controls XAAP Android system inspection application. 

Johnson Controls Advisory #2 - This advisory describes three vulnerabilities in the Johnson Controls C-CURE 9000 and Victor application server. 


For more information on these advisories, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/7-advisories-published-7-23-26 - subscription required. 

Review - CSB Publishes Bio-Lab Conyers Final Report

Tuesday, the Chemical Safety Board announced the publication of their final report on the September 2024 fire and toxic gas release at the Bio-Lab warehouse in Conyers, GA. As a result of that fire, 17,000 people were ordered to evacuate the area around the facility and up to 90,000 people were placed under a shelter-in-place order. Earlier in the investigation process CSB published two investigation updates about the incident; Novmeber 23rd, 2024 and May 27th, 2025. Five safety issues were identified, and seven safety recommendations were made. Closing this investigation leaves eight open CSB investigations dating back to June 2025. 

The report notes (pg 124):  

“The CSB determined that the cause of the incident was a corroded sprinkler system component that failed, allowing water to contact the stored pool-treatment chemicals (chlorinated isocyanurates) inside the warehouse, initiating a decomposition reaction and generating significant amounts of dense toxic smoke and heat that started fires, ultimately leading to the building’s destruction and closure of the site. The corrosion resulted from the corrosive environment created by stored chlorine-based chemicals in the building, an issue that was not proactively addressed.” 


For more information about the investigation, safety issues, and recommendations, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/csb-publishes-bio-lab-conyers-final - subscription required. 

 
/* Use this with templates/template-twocol.html */