Wednesday, July 15, 2026

Review - CSB Updated the Status of 6 Investigation Recommendations – 7-10-26

Yesterday, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) updated their Recent Recommendation Status Updates page, closing three recommendations with acceptable action. These actions left 120 of 1047 recommendations open. Additionally, the CSB updated the open status of three recommendations. The CSB took these actions on July 10th, 2026. The previous update was published on June 9th, 2026. 

The three recently closed recommendations are: 

  • Remote Isolation of Process Equipment - 2024-01-H-R1 - American Petroleum Institute (API), 
  • Pryor Trust Fatal Gas Well Blowout and Fire - 2018-01-I-OK-R3 – API, and 
  • Husky Energy Superior Refinery Explosion - 2018-02-I-WI-R14 - API 


For more information on the investigation responses, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/csb-updated-the-status-of-6-investigation-0cb - subscription required. 

Tuesday, July 14, 2026

Review – 4 Advisories and 1 Update Published – 7-14-26

Today CISA’s NCCIC-ICS published four control systems security advisories for products from Rockwell Automation and ABB (3). 

Advisories  

Rockwell Advisory - This advisory describes a missing authentication for critical function vulnerability in the Rockwell 1715-AENTR EtherNet/IP Adapter. 

ABB Advisory #1 – This advisory describes four vulnerabilities in the ABB T-MAC Plus product.  

ABB Advisory #2 – This advisory discusses an incorrect resource transfer between spheres vulnerability in the ABB Ability Edgenius. This vulnerability is listed in the CISA KEV catalog. 

ABB Advisory #3 – This advisory describes an uncontrolled search path element (for loading DLLs) vulnerability in the ABB Advant Master Online Builder. 

Updates  

Inductive Automation Update #1 - This update provides additional information on the Ignition advisory that was originally published on December 18th, 2026. 


For more information on these advisories, and a list of 11 other Rockwell advisories published today, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/4-advisories-and-1-update-published-714 - subscription required. 

CISA Adds 2 Sonic Wall Vulnerabilities to KEV Catalog – 7-14-26

Today, CISA announced that it had added two vulnerabilities in the Sonic Wall SMA1000 Appliance Work Place interface. Sonic Wall disclosed the two vulnerabilities earlier today; noting that they had "investigated multiple cases indicating the active exploitation of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.” Sonic wall has a new version that mitigates the vulnerabilities and provides indicators of compromise in their advisory. 

The two reported vulnerabilities are: 

  • Server-Side request forgery - CVE-2026-15409, and 
  • Code Injection - CVE-2026-15410 

CISA has directed federal agencies to apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk guidance, and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements”. They were also told to follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines. A compliance deadline of July 17th, 2026, has been established. 

CSB Announces Woodland Pulp Investigation Update – 7-14-26

Today, the Chemical Safety Board announced that they had published an update on their investigation of the January 2026 fatal hydrogen sulfide release from a process sewer at the Woodland Pulp mill in Baileyville, Maine during a unit shutdown. The incident killed two personnel doing work unrelated to the shutdown; 10 other personnel were exposed to hydrogen sulfide gas during the incident. The CSB announced their investigation of the incident on February 9th and added the incident to the list of ongoing investigations on March 6th, 2026. 

The Investigation Update provides: 

  • A short incident summary,  
  • Background information about the history of the plant and its operation, and 
  • A description of the incident timeline. 

From a safety perspective the Updates notes that (pg 10): 

  • There was no system for controlling or accounting for personnel present in the Kraft Mill building, or their locations, during the unit shutdown. 
  • “There was no system providing Kraft Mill building ventilation during either normal operations or shutdowns. 
  • “There were no stationary hydrogen sulfide detectors or alarms in the Bleach Plant area of the Kraft Mill, and the company did not provide or require personnel to wear clip-on type hydrogen sulfide monitors.” 

The investigation continues. 

Review – Bills Introduced – 7-13-26

Yesterday, with both the House and Senate back in Washington, there were 42 bills introduced. None of those bills will receive additional coverage in this blog:  

Space Geek Legislation 

I would like to mention one bill under my limited Space Geek coverage in this blog: 

HR 9651 To authorize the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to conduct a pilot program for investment in infrastructure projects at NASA Centers, and for other purposes. Haridopolos, Mike [Rep.-R-FL-8]    


For more information on these bills, including legislative history for similar bills in the 118th Congress, as well as a mention in passing of a bill to address mass comments on regulations, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/bills-introduced-7-13-26 - subscription required. 

 
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