Review - SLTT cUAS Authority IFR - Detect, Identify, Monitor, and Track

This is the second in a series of blog posts about the interim final rule (IFR) published last week by DHS and DOJ on “Counter-UAS [cUAS] Authority for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement and Correctional [SLTT] Agencies”. This post will look at the first of two cUAS authorities provided by the IFR. 

Previous posts include:  

• DHS/DOJ Publish SLTT cUAS Authority IFR – IFR Overview 

NOTE 1: All links to 6 USC 624n are provided to the updated version of that section available on Law.Cornell.edu since the federal government does not currently have a publicly available version that has been updated for the SAFER SKYS Act {TITLE LXXXVI of the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (PL 119-60, 139 STAT. 1938)}. 

NOTE 2: All links to the regulatory language proposed in this rulemaking will be to the proposed DHS language under 6 CFR Part 124. That language will be virtually identical to the proposed DOJ language under 28 CFR Part 124. 

Detection and Warning Overview 

The preamble to the rule discusses the source authorities for the SLTT certification to detect, identify, monitor, and track UAS. Those authorities allow SLTT individuals, subject to the training and certification requirements of §124.5, “to ‘detect, identify, monitor, and track’ UAS or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by means of interception of or other access to a wire communication, an oral communication, or an electronic communication used to control the UAS or unmanned aircraft”. Such actions are subject to the requirement to: 

• Use systems or technologies that are included on a list of authorized technologies,  
• Comply with specific privacy protections, and 
• Comply with Federal oversight, audits, coordination, and compliance requirements. 

The detection and warning provisions of the rule will generally be found in the following proposed CFR sections: 

• The Detection and Warning Certification requirement of §124.5(c),  
• The detection and warning policy provisions of §124.6(g),  
• The authorized technology requirements of §124.7,  
• The C-UAS Operations Plan requirement of §124.8,  
• The operational conditions of §124.12, and  
• The privacy and data handling requirements of §124.14. 

For more details about these provisions of the NPRM, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/sltt-cuas-authority-ifr-detect-identify - subscription required. 

Chemical Transportation Incidents – Week of 6-6-26

Reporting Background 

See this post for explanation, with the most recent update here (removed from paywall). 

Data from PHMSA’s online database of transportation related chemical incidents that have been reported to the agency. 

Incidents Summary  

• Number of incidents – 566 (523 highway, 37 air, 6 rail, 0 water) 

• Serious incidents – 7 (3 Bulk release, 1 evacuation, 2 injury, 0 death, 0 major artery closed, 5 fire/explosion, 54 no release)  

• Largest container involved – 27,960-gal Railcar {Acetone} 3 of 6 manway bolts not tool tight 

• Largest amount spilled – 500-gal Truck {Combustible Liquid, N.O.S.}  Tank overloaded, spilled during filling. 

• Total amount reported spilled in all incidents – 2315.9-gal 

NOTE: Links above are to Form 5800.1 for the incident described. 

Most Interesting Chemical: Phosphorus Pentasulfide, Free from Yellow and White Phosphorus: A greenish yellow solid with an odor of rotten eggs that may paralyze the sense of smell at hazardous concentrations in air. Density 2.04 g / cm3. It is used for making lube oil additives, insecticides, flotation agents, safety matches, blown asphalt, and other products and chemicals. (Source: CameoChemicals.NOAA.gov).  

Review – Bills Introduced – 7-9-26

Yesterday, with the House and Senate meeting in pro forma session, there were 42 bills introduced. One of those bills will receive additional coverage in this blog: 

HR 9624 To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2027 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [Rep.-R-AR-1]   

For more information on these bills, including legislative history for similar bills in the 118th Congress, as well as a mention in passing of 10 bills that would transfer programs out of the Education Department, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/bills-introduced-7-9-26 - subscription required. 

3 Advisories Published – 7-9-26

Today CISA’s NCCIC-ICS published three control system security advisories for products from Schneider (2) and Open PLC. 

Advisories  

Schneider Advisory #1 - This advisory describes a use of hard-coded credentials vulnerability in the Schneider Electric Easergy MiCOM Px40 Series Intelligent Electronic Devices. 

Schneider Advisory #2 - This advisory describes seven vulnerabilities in the Schneier Electric PowerChute Serial Shutdown UPS management system. 

OpenPLC Advisory - This advisory describes an external control of file name or path vulnerability in OpenPLC v3.