Earlier this week Rep. Brooks (R,AL) introduced HR 3039,
the Providing Retaliation Options against Those Engaging in Cyberattacks Targeting
the United States (PROTECT) Act. The bill would require the establishment
of a ‘State Sponsors of Cyberattacks’ program similar to the ‘State Sponsors of
Terrorism’ program.
Section 3 of the bill does two things:
∙ Requires the establishment of a “List of State-Sponsors of
Cyberattacks”; and
∙ Provides
a list of potential penalties that the President is authorized to impose on
nations placed on the List.
List of
State-Sponsors of Cyberattacks
Section 3(b) requires the President to submit to Congress a
list of countries that have been designated as State-Sponsors of Cyberattacks.
There are two reasons that are given for a country being put on the list. The
first is a determination that:
“(T)he United States or a United
States person has been targeted in a malicious cyber-enabled activity originating
from, or directed by a person located, in whole or in substantial part, in a
foreign country, and such activity is reasonably likely to result in, or have
materially contributed to, a threat to the national security or foreign policy
of the United States, or harmed the economic health or financial stability of
the United States or a United States person” {§3(b)(2)}.
The second is actually a continuation of the first that
specifies particular forms that ‘harmed’ may take. These include {§3(b)(2)}:
∙ Harming or otherwise significantly compromising the provision of
services by a computer or network of computers that support the United States
or a United States person in a critical infrastructure sector;
∙ Significantly compromising the provision of services by the
United States or a United States person in a critical infrastructure sector;
∙ Causing significant disruption to the availability of a computer
or network of computers owned or operated by the United States or a United
States person;
∙ Causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic
resources, trade secrets, personally identifiable information, or financial information
of the United States or a United States person.
Once a country is identified as having met any of the above
criteria the President is required to place them on the List State-Sponsors of
Cyberattacks.
Penalties
Section 3(c) provides an extensive list of penalties that
the President is authorized to apply to countries that are on the List. The
first allows the President to impose a duty on “any article or service imported
directly or indirectly into the United States that is produced in whole or in
part in a country that is included on the list of state-sponsors of
cyberattacks” {§3(c)(1)}. It includes 18 other sanctions listed in §3(c)(2)
culminating in ordering a trade embargo or ordering a cyber counterattack.
Moving Forward
Brooks is only a member of one of the five committees (Foreign
Affairs) that have been assigned to consider this bill. He is a mid-ranking
member of the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee that will
probably be assigned initial responsibility within the Foreign Affairs Committee
for consideration of this bill. So he may have the political pull to get this
bill considered in that Committee.
It is not yet clear if there is enough anger in the Congress
over the OPM hack to drive consideration of this bill to the floor. I suspect that
if the bill were to make it to the floor, the lack of a requirement to take
action against the countries ultimately placed on the list would allow enough
members to vote in favor of the bill to obtain passage in the House. I am not
sure that the same applies to the Senate.
Commentary
This bill casts a very wide net in what countries could be
sanctioned by the President under these provisions. The lack of a definition of
“malicious cyber-enabled activity” and that term’s key in defining actions that
would place a country on the List means that just about any country could be
placed on the list, including any number of friendly allied countries.
More importantly, the United States could certainly be found
on a similar list in any country in the world since a very large percentage of the
non-state originated ‘malicious cyber-enabled activity’ in the world originates
from within our borders. Since the bill does not specify that any of the governments
of the countries listed would have to actually be involved in the designated
activities we wouldn’t have to worry specifically about the Federal governmental
malicious activities that have been exposed by people like Snowden, but those
would certainly place us high on the ‘state sponsors’ list of many countries in
the world.
A lot of definitions are going to have to be significantly
tightened up if the sanction regime that Brooks is trying to implement is to
have any significant effect on malicious cyber activity that is becoming endemic
across the globe. More importantly, we need to determine if we are going to use
these big guns to go after Nigerian bank scams or limit their use to countries
that are specifically attacking the United States.
1 comment:
Appreciate your coverage as always PJ.
You raise valid general policy concerns about the vagueness of the bill and misuse precautions. Having only read historical summaries, I wonder if Bills like this and the Monroe doctrine (for comparison) might need to be intentionally vague in order to avoid loopholes and military redtape.
By intent, I'm reading that this bill was likely intended to affect China and maybe Iran (refer:Iranian sponsored gas pipeline attacks).
Nigerian emails phishing attacks, and eastern European cyber blackmailing viruses do not seem applicable since they've long been classified as indepent or organized crime based theft (not state sponsored). Further more, not only do the funding/organizational structures differ, but so do there intents. One type is geared towards financial theft, the other towards compromising national security and military advantage. (Very few cases of Chinese sponsored credit card theft. Case history suggest OPM hack was done for information gathering of Feds(and there login credentials) in military, inteillgence and security branches.)
I hope to see continued attention on the policy deficit in cyber warfare. While you're smart to mention the tariff wars often have collateral impacts, I hope that the fear of losing cheap manufacturing resources do not slow our efforts to maintain national security and sovereignty.
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