This is part of a continuing series of blog posts discussing
President Obama’s recently signed executive order on “Improving Chemical Facility
Safety and Security”. The initial post in the series was:
Existing Programs
There are a number of chemical safety and security programs
already in place at the federal level. The White House press
release that accompanied the initial publication of the Executive Order
outlines some of those programs and I am including some that the White House
ignored/missed. The federal chemical safety and security programs include:
• EPA’s Risk Management
Program (RMP);
• EPA’s Emergency Planning and Community Right
to Know Act (EPCRA);
• OSHA’s Process Safety
Management (PSM) standard;
• OSHA’s Chemical
Plant National Emphasis Program (NEP);
• DHS/NPPD’s Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program;
• DHS/NPPD’s Ammonium Nitrate
Security Program (ANSP), under development;
• DHS/CG’s Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) program;
• DOJ/ATF’s Federal explosives regulations;
• DOC’s Chemical weapons convention
program;
• DOT’s HAZMAT rail shipping security
requirements; and
• DOT’s HAZMAT truck shipping
security requirements.
Additionally, there are a couple of programs that deal with
chemical security issues as part of their larger security program (and are specifically
exempted from the CFATS program).
• EPA’s Water treatment facility
security program;
• EPA’s Waste water treatment
facility security program;
• DOE’s Nuclear weapons security
programs;
• NRC’s Nuclear power plant
security program;
• DOD’s Facility security programs;
All of these programs operate completely independently of
one another, with little or no communications between program administrators.
Many chemical facilities fall under multiple programs that require completely
separate record keeping and reporting requirements.
On the other side of the equation, there is little if any
information sharing between the different programs. Not only is there no
mechanism for coordinating efforts, but even if there were the information
collection and retention systems are not designed to share information between
programs. It is not even clear that the different organizations have the
capability to search the information data bases of the other organizations.
This is further complicated by the fact that OSHA and the
EPA typically administer many of their programs through administrators of state
programs. Those programs will share specific information with the associated
federal program, but typically no more than is absolutely necessary.
Chemical Facility
Safety and Security Working Group
Section 2 of the Executive Order establishes the Chemical
Facility Safety and Security Working Group, referred to throughout the EO as
the Working Group. Three agencies will co-chair the Working Group; the
Department of Homeland Security, The Department of Labor and the Environmental
Protection Agency. The head of each of the agencies (or their designated
representative at the Assistant Secretary level) will act as the co-chairs.
Representatives from a similar level at the following
agencies will fill out the membership of the Working Group.
• The Department of Justice;
• The Department of Agriculture;
and
• The Department of Transportation.
To aid them in their efforts, the Working Group will consult
with {§2(b)}:
• The Council on Environmental
Quality;
• The National Security Staff;
• The Domestic Policy Council;
• The Office of Science and
Technology Policy;
• The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB);
• The White House Office of Cabinet
Affairs; and
• Such other agencies and offices
as the President may designate.
The Working Group will report to the President through the
Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality and the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.
Improving
Coordination
One of the main reasons for the establishment of the Working
Group is to improve the coordination of the various chemical safety and
security programs at the federal level. Section 4 of the EO outlines three
specific actions the Working Group is supposed to undertake to improve that
coordination. They include:
• Deploying a pilot program,
involving the EPA, Department of Labor, Department of Homeland Security, and
any other appropriate agency, to validate best practices and to test innovative
methods for Federal interagency collaboration regarding chemical facility
safety and security within 45 days {§4(a)}.
• Creating comprehensive and
integrated standard operating procedures for a unified Federal approach for
identifying and responding to risks in chemical facilities (including during
pre-inspection, inspection execution, post-inspection, and post-accident
investigation activities), incident reporting and response procedures,
enforcement, and collection, storage, and use of facility information within
270 days {§4(b)}.
• Determining what, if any, changes
are required to existing memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and processes
between EPA and CSB, ATF and CSB, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and CSB for timely and full disclosure of information within 90
days {§4(c)}.
Fortunately, the activity with the shortest time frame was
actually begun last Tuesday. An interagency working group put together a pilot
program called the ‘Effective Chemical Risk Management Project, Federal Region
2’ (ECRM2). The team held their first meeting last Tuesday. It consisted of
representatives from:
• EPA Region 2 – Co-Chair
• USCG District 1 – Co-Chair
• DHS (OIP) Region 2
• TSA Region 2
• ATF Region 2
• OSHA Region 1
• DOT (PHMSA) Region 2
• NJDEP (NJ Dept of Environmental
Protection)
• NYS DEC (NY Dept of Environmental
Conservation)
• NYC OEM (NYC Office of Emergency
Management)
It will take longer than 45 days to see significant action
from this group, but it is certainly a first start. Besides the EO only calls
for the group to be stood up in 45 days and that has effectively been done. It
would be interesting to see if the other two deadlines are also met.
2 comments:
Perhaps I'm overlooking it, but I fail to see a mention of the independent federal Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, which is patterned after the NTSB. Is that an intentional oversight?
Phil: I did not include the CSB since it is not a regulatory program. Likewise NTSB has chemical investigatory responsiblity for accidents involving chemical transportation.
Both organizations are very important to the chemical industry but are not regulatory in nature.
CSB is mentioned in the EO so I'll have more on it later.
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