With the Senate possibly getting ready to take up HR 2810,
the FY 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) the amendment process
started in earnest last week. While a significant number of amendments were
submitted on Wednesday, I did not see any of potential specific interest to
readers of this blog until
Thursday. Those amendments included:
• SA 427. Mr. Brown - collaboration
between federal aviation administration and department of defense on unmanned
aircraft systems (pg s4455);
• SA 435. Mr. Rounds - report on
progress made in implementing the cyber excepted personnel system (pgs
s4456-7);
• SA 437. Mr. Rounds - sense of
congress on establishing an award program for the cyber community of the
department of defense (pg s4457);
• SA 461. Ms. Cantwell - collaboration
on cybersecurity of industrial control systems for critical infrastructure (pg
s4465);
• SA 488. Ms. Heitkamp - sense of
congress on use of test sites for research and development on countering
unmanned aerial systems (pgs s4474-5);
• SA 525. Mr. Whitehouse - United
States-Israel cybersecurity cooperation (pgs s4526-7);
• SA 557. Mr. Gardner - mandatory Sanctions
with respect to Iran relating to significant activities undermining United
States cybersecurity (pgs s4533-4);
• SA 559. Mr. Gardner - comptroller
general of the United States report on department of defense critical
telecommunications equipment or services obtained from suppliers closely linked
to a leading cyber-threat actor (pg s4534);
• SA 575. Mr. Nelson - protecting
critical infrastructure against cyber attacks from foreign governments (pgs s
4538-9);
• SA 613. Ms. Cortez Masto - department
of defense cyber workforce development pilot program (pg s4564);
• SA 623. Mr. Warner - department
of defense cyber workforce development pilot program (pgs 4568-9);
• SA 655. Ms. Klobuchar - prohibition
on use of federal funds for joint cybersecurity initiative with Russia (pg s
4574);
• SA 663. Mrs. Shaheen - prohibition
on use of software platforms developed by Kaspersky lab;
• SA 666. Mr. Brown - cybersecurity
cooperation with Ukraine (pg s4579);
• SA 686. Ms. Warren - report on
significant security vulnerabilities of the national electric grid (pg s4587);
• SA 700. Ms. Harris - pilot
program on integrating into the department of defense workforce individuals
with cybersecurity skills whose services are donated by private persons (pg
s4590);
• SA 712. Mr. Portman - plan to
meet demand for cyberspace career fields in the reserve components of the armed
forces (pg s4597);
• SA 713. Mr. Portman - department
of defense integration of information operations and cyber-enabled information
operations (pgs s4597-8);
• SA 725. Mr. Cassidy - report on cyber capability
and readiness shortfalls of army combat training centers (pg s4604).
Industrial Control Systems
Three of these amendments specifically address (or at least
include) industrial control system security issues.
Sen. Cantwell’s (D,WA) SA 461 would require DOD, DOE, and
DHS to provide representative to a new Center of Excellence focusing on “cybersecurity
of industrial control systems for critical infrastructure” {(b)(1)}. No funding
nor further details are provided.
Sen. Nelson’s (D,FL) SA 575 is a ‘sense of Congress’
statement. It starts with a very bold and broad statement of the threat: “Authoritative
evidence and testimony to Congress indicate that the United States Government
cannot prevent cyber attacks by determined and capable adversaries from
reaching critical infrastructure in the United States and that, absent major
efforts to identify and eliminate vulnerabilities in the most critical nodes of
the most critical infrastructure, such attacks would succeed in causing
unacceptable damage to the United States” {(a)(1)}. It does require a report to
Congress that would include “an analysis of cyber vulnerabilities in the most
critical nodes of the most critical infrastructure” {(c)(1)} and a listing of
potential design solutions. Again, no funding is provided.
Sen. Warren’s (D,MA) SA 686 would require another report to
Congress on “the significant security vulnerabilities of the national electric
grid that are susceptible to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities” {(a)(1)}
and their effect on DOD. While control systems are not specifically mentioned
in this amendment it does use the 6 USC 1501 definition of ‘security
vulnerability’ that is based upon that section’s ICS-inclusive definition of ‘information
system’. Again, no funding is provided.
Moving Forward
There is a possibility that the Senate will move forward to
consider HR 2810 before they start their summer recess later next month. Those
chances were decreased, however, when Sen. McCain (R,AZ; Chair of the Senate
Armed Services Committee) returned to Arizona to undergo treatment for his
newly diagnosed cancer.
Even if the bill does come to the floor for debate and
amendment, there is no telling if/when any of the above amendments would be
considered.
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