While the folks directly affected by the spill are worried
about where they are going to get their clothes washed and take a bath, the
bigger question is why did this happen? Why did an industrial chemical get into
a city water distribution system? The Chemical Safety Board is scheduled to
have a team arrive tomorrow to start their investigation.
The investigation will probably take much less time than
normal; investigating a leak where everything is still together is a lot easier
than reconstructing explosions and fires. If there isn’t another conflict with
DOJ on crime scene vs chemical incident scene investigation we should see
something in a couple of months.
But, given the news reports that I’ve seen, access to Google
Maps and a little knowledge of process chemistry I think I can piece together a
pretty fair picture of what probably happened.
The Facility
Looking at the facility on Google
Maps, it is clear that it is (as news reports have noted) that this is a
chemical storage facility, not a chemical manufacturing facility. There are 10
large storage tanks clearly visible within the facility, three smaller tanks
and a number of much smaller storage containers. The 13 identifiable tanks all
appear to be within a brick wall that probably serves as the primary spill
containment. The area encircled by the brick wall is certainly large enough to
contain spills of all of the tanks at the facility.
It is also obvious that the facility is very close to the
Elk River with not much more than a chain link fence separating it from the
river’s high water mark. There appears to be a barge loading/unloading facility
at the water’s edge. The rail line that can be seen along the eastern boundary
of the facility is no longer connected to anything beyond the property.
There is a tank truck loading facility between the large
tanks and the perimeter fence. Tank trucks come in the north gate at the
facility, get loaded and depart through the south gate near the administrative
building.
The Spill
At some time on Thursday morning a tank containing Crude
MCHM started leaking. From news
reports the leaking tank was a 48,000 gallon tank so it was one of the ten
large tanks. Most facilities do not have leak detection equipment for their
bulk storage tanks unless there is potential for catastrophic consequences and
the Crude MCHM certainly does not fit into that category.
Most leak detection regimes rely on preventive maintenance
programs to prevent large leaks and small leaks are typically detected by employees
working in the vicinity of the storage tanks. With the Freedom Industries leak
being as much as 5,000 gallons (about what an over-the-road chemical tank truck
carries) this was a fairly large leak. It will be interesting to see what the
CSB says about the source of the leak.
Containment Failure
The news report sited above says that the containment
overflowed. That does not seem to be possible. The three foot brick wall around
the tank farm should have been more than high enough to contain the entire
contents of one of the tanks, much less 5,000 gallons.
Ken Ward reported that the West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection (WVDEP) has ordered Freedom to empty all of their tanks at the site
because the containment was not adequate to hold a spill. I suspect that the
brick wall has cracks in it near the foundation that would allow any pooling
liquid to leak out. This would have been obvious to the facility maintenance team
every time that it rained and water collected within the containment area.
No Spill Response
The third part of any spill containment plan also failed in
this instance. Any time a major leak is detected in a tank farm, one of the
things that has to be done immediately is to check to ensure that the spill is
being contained by the containment barrier. Any leaks in that barrier need to
be controlled with mobile spill control equipment. News reports indicate that
the WVDEP inspectors saw no such efforts being made when they showed up at the
site.
The Water Company
Response
News reports
from WSAZ indicated during the initial response on Thursday that the water
company felt that their inlet treatment system would deal with the relatively
low amount of contamination (I have seen figures of 41 ppm for this spill) in
the river water used to feed the water treatment plant. This is certainly true
for a wide variety of contaminants that such facilities typically see.
This is not a chemical that the water company is required to
test for, so there was no method of identifying this chemical in their water
readily available on site. There are literally tens of thousands of industrial
chemicals and testing for their presence in water can be quite difficult for a
well-equipped water testing laboratory. Very few water treatment facilities can
afford such facilities and most rely on out-side labs for non-routine testing.
On site labs only test for those chemicals identified by State and federal
environmental regulations; Crude MCHM does not show up on those lists.
According to news stories water system samples were sent to
an outside lab for analysis even though the treatment facility thought that
their system would remove the chemical upon intake. When that proved not to be
the case, the emergency ‘no contact’ order was issued even though there is no
clear indication that there was (or was not for that matter) any hazard
associated with the level of contamination in the system.
Emergency Planning
There have been the inevitable complaints about the lack of
a plan to deal with this particular problem. Particularly in the wake of the
West Fertilizer tragedy last summer questions have been asked about whether or
not Freedom Industries had fulfilled their community notification responsibilities.
Ken Ward reported
yesterday that the appropriate Tier II forms had been submitted to State
and local agencies.
So why wasn’t there a plan in place to deal with this? Why
would there be? Emergency planning folks get flooded with Tier II documents,
particularly in an area with a large chemical industry like this area in West
Virginia. Local emergency planning committees (LEPC) required by EPA
regulations are largely voluntary groups with little or no local funding and
certainly no federal funding beyond the odd grant or two.
If there is any actual emergency response planning done by
these committees (and the Federal government does not actually require any
planning to take place otherwise they would be forced to pay for it) it will be
concentrated on the most hazardous chemical facilities in the area. In the
Charleston, WV area that would include places that make chemicals that will
kill people at concentrations of MCHM seen in the current water supply or cause
truly catastrophic explosions or fires.
And there is no requirement for anyone to talk to a local
water treatment facility in any of this emergency planning. They are not an emergency
response organization.
From responses that we have seen to other chemical incidents
in the area, I suspect that the chemical response planning and training in the
Charleston, WV area is probably some of the best in the country. It didn’t
include a response to this type of incident, mainly because it was too low on
the potential consequence ladder.
Safe Levels of MCHM
Set
Ken Ward reports
today that the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ASTDR), part of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had
determined a ‘safe level’ of MCHM in drinking water, 1 ppm. This is a
calculated value not a tested value. It is from an authoritative source so the
local water company will be off the hook for any liability for potential
injures from up to that level of contamination in the water supply once things
are started back up.
I suspect that they will try to take the levels lower than
that, just to be on the safe side. On the other hand, people are getting fed up
about not being able to wash themselves or their clothes, and local businesses
are being hurt by the necessary closures because of the lack of water. I’m sure
the management of the water company is really happy to see this number.
1 comment:
The block wall containment appears to be too low and too close to the tanks to prevent a high level leak from spraying over the wall, even though it may have the required capacity
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