I’m hearing interesting rumblings from those in the CFATS
field that as more and more small chemical facilities are getting visited by
DHS Chemical Security Inspectors (CSI, oh that hurts; maybe CBS should sue for
copyright infringement) a new ‘security issue’ is being found with increasing
regularity. While these facilities appear to be doing a yeoman’s job at
actually securing the chemicals on site, they are having problems documenting
their security procedures.
The Problem
As DHS moves into the site security plan authorization and
approval process in the Tier 3 and Tier 4 facilities, they are encountering a
large number of small facilities, frequently with less than 10 employees on
site and no corporate EHS&S support. The Security Manager at these types of
facilities is frequently the same person that handles all of the other
regulatory compliance issues for the facility along with another full time job
related to chemical production or distribution.
This routinely means that while security measures might be
employed, there is little time for preparing all of the documentation that goes
into supporting a real security plan. There are dozens of written procedures
and processes that the CSI need to be able to see when they arrive on site to
verify that the facility understands its security program and is properly
implementing all of the necessary support requirements that are part and parcel
of the physical security investments that have been made.
For example, there might be a bright new 10 foot security
fence with razor wire topper and an automated gate that opens only to employee
ID cards, but there needs to be a document that describes the processes that
support that fence. That barrier plan document would include a description of:
• Who/what the fence was designed
to keep out;
• How the fence is kept under
observation to ensure that no one cuts or climbs over it;
• How often the fence is inspected
for physical integrity;
• Who is responsible for ensuring
that defects are repaired;
• What is done while a defect is
awaiting repair to compensate for the deficiency;
• How the employee ID cards are
issued and controlled;
• Etc.
Each and every security measure that a facility employs
needs this sort of documentation that can be shown to a visiting inspector
(along with supporting records that show that required periodic actions are
being taken). Without that documentation, the DHS cannot really tell if a
facility is really properly secured.
CSAT Tool Lacking
It looks like the original intent of the developers of the
Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) was to provide an on-line data entry
tool that would allow much of this type of documentation to be bypassed, making
the job of security managers much less complicated. Unfortunately, by the time
DHS got around to implementing the Site Security Plan (SSP) portion of the tool
it became painfully obvious that there was not enough time, money or support
available to prepare an SSP tool that could do more than ask some general
questions about a very complicated series of security topics.
I understand that suggestions have been made that DHS
Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD, the folks that run the CFATS
program) provide an on-line series of templates for the various supporting
plans and documents that may be needed by a facility to support their SSP. For
some fairly obvious reasons, that has not been done.
First off, ISCD is already stretched pretty thin doing what
it is already required to do; authorize, approve and inspect 3000+ site
security plans. We can argue whether or not they should have developed such
templates as part of the original SSP tool development process, but that is
water under the bridge and the current management team was not in charge of
that process. At this point in time they don’t have the time, money or
personnel to accomplish that type of template development.
I am hearing rumors that a variety of facilities that have
already been authorized and approved have offered to allow some of the
documents that they have produced to be used as templates (after filing off the
appropriate nameplates and serial numbers, of course). This is quite heartening
and a positive sign of how well the industry accepts their general responsibility
for chemical security in general.
Unfortunately, the §550 bugaboo once again rears its ugly
head; “the Secretary may not disapprove a site security plan submitted under
this section based on the presence or absence of a particular security measure”.
ISCD has, from its very inception taken this congressional restriction very
seriously (too seriously in my opinion, but then again, I don’t have to go back
to Congress every year of reauthorization either). One just has to look at the
repeated weasel wording in the Risk-Based
Performance Standards guidance document to see how seriously the Department
takes this requirement.
There is no way that ISCD is going to provide templates for
SSP support documents for fear of running afoul of this restriction.
Additionally, the Department lawyers would vociferously argue against providing
such templates for fear having to defend ISCD against legal complaints when
facilities that used such templates were found wanting in their SSP plan
implementation. Templates would have to be generally enough written that a lot would
still depend on how the various blanks were filled in. Besides, chemical
facilities covered under CFATS are so diverse that it is unlikely that a single
template, no matter how generally written, would cover all situations.
Industry Support
It looks like Congress, reading the full language of the §550
authorization, actually thought that there would be a viable solution to this
issue. We can see this in the language related to alternative security plans
(ASP). They thought that the various areas of the chemical industry would come
up with generic security programs tailored to the specific requirements and
security issues facing that industry segment.
Unfortunately, to date only one ASP has been developed that
is in wide spread use and that is the one that was introduced just over a year
ago by the American Chemistry Council (ACC). The ACC’s
ASP is much closer to being an actual site security plan template than is
the SSP tool in CSAT. It is still, however, falls short of the actual policies
and procedure documents that need to be in place at all CFATS covered
facilities. And there is a good reason for this; the ASP document once
submitted and authorized/approved by DHS cannot be changed without approval of
DHS.
Policies and procedures supporting the ASP need to be living
documents that can be changed and modified to fit changing circumstances. As
long as those changes don’t materially modify the processes approved by DHS
there should be no need to burden the ISCD folks with a change approval
request. So the data submitted to the DHS in the ASP needs to cover much of the
same information as would found in the policy and procedure documents, but not
in quite so much detail. (NOTE: Finding the acceptable limits of that detail is
what is taking so much time in the SSP authorization and approval process.)
In any case, it would be helpful if the various chemical
industry support groups would help the smaller companies in their organizations
by developing template documents for many of the security policies and
procedures that facilities would have to have in place to support their SSP.
ASP Approvals
While I am on the topic of ASPs, I heard a very interesting
comment from the field the other day about why DHS is not pushing the ACC ASP.
Now Director Wulf has made an official
statement in support of the use of the ACC ASP, but there is nothing on the
DHS CFATS web sites specifically mentioning the ACC ASP, and there is certainly
no link to the ASP on the DHS sites. Some are questioning this lack of support.
The comment I heard this week is that the reason for this
lack of support is that the cost of the design and maintenance of the current
CSAT tool would be hard to justify if there were wide spread adoption of the
ACC ASP. While I would not be surprised to hear that there were individuals
associated with the CSAT development that might have their feeling hurt to hear
that their SSP tool was less than adequate (AND IT CERTAINLY IS THAT), I do not
think that is why the current management team at ISCD has not made their
support for the ACC ASP more widely known.
First off, any federal bureaucrat has to be very careful
about how they endorse a commercial product. While the ACC ASP is certainly
free-of-charge for use the ACC and its affiliated companies are commercial enterprises,
so Director Wulf has to be careful in that respect. Also, as other ASPs
hopefully come into use failure to publicly recognize and support those with
the same alacrity that they supported the ACC ASP could lead them into
political problems, so a measured approval is probably politically prudent.
There should be, however, a link on the SSP homepage to any
and all ASPs that have been approved by DHS. If there is only one such link
because only one such program has been approved by ISCD, then so be it. This
should serve as an incentive for other organizations to develop their own
industry specific templates.
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