This is another in a series of posts addressing the recent request
for information (RFI) from the EO 13650 Working Group. That RFI addressed
requirements in §6(a) of the Improving Chemical Safety and Security Executive
Order (EO
13650) for the Working Group to “develop options for improved chemical
facility safety and security that identify improvements to existing risk
management practices through agency programs, private sector initiatives,
Government guidance, outreach, standards, and regulations”. Earlier posts in
the series include:
While EPA, OSHA and NPPD are the major players in the
Working Group, two other agencies also have various roles to play in the
chemical safety and security realm; the Coast Guard and the ATF. They also have
areas for potential improvements identified in this RFI. In this post we will
take a look at those two agencies.
Coast Guard
The Coast Guard is responsible for chemical safety and
security in and around maritime shipping; this includes some port facilities.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA,
46 USC Chapter 701) governs the security of port facilities. The major goal
of the Coast Guard security activities revolves around the prevention of
maritime transportation security incidents (TSI).
There is only one comment in the RFI about possible changes
in the Coast Guard programs (pg 5):
• The Coast Guard is working with
NPPD and other elements within the Department of Homeland Security to seek
input on improving the safety and security of the nation’s maritime critical
infrastructure.
MTSA covered port facilities are currently exempted from
coverage under the DHS CFATS program. There had been an attempt at formulating
a rule for those exempt facilities to at least submit a Top Screen under the
CFATS program so that there would be a better understanding of what the
potential terrorist chemical threat was at these facilities, but that has
apparently been abandoned.
ATF
The ATF is responsible for the enforcement of federal
explosives laws that deal with explosives in commerce. This includes licensing,
storage and record keeping. That jurisdiction does not include precursors to
explosives (such as ammonium nitrate, which is a precursor to the commercial
explosive ANFO).
The Working Group has identified six areas of potential
improvements that the ATF could make to promote the safety and security of
chemicals related to commercial explosives. They are (pgs 5-6):
• Developing and encouraging best
practices related to safety and security of precursor materials used in the
explosives manufacturing and operational processes, to include ammonium
nitrate;
• Examining potential applications
of quantitative risk assessment tools to explosives-related industry
operations;
• Continued partnering with
industry to develop means to account for bulk materials and ammonium nitrate;
• Effective implementation of
outreach programs to identify and report suspicious and unsafe behaviors
associated with unregulated explosives and precursor chemical materials;
• Means for mitigating duplicative
Federal qualification and inspection requirements; and
• Unsafe making of explosive
materials by unregulated persons.
Agencies Absent from
RFI
There are three other agencies that have important chemical
security and safety regulatory roles that were not included in the RFI; DHS’s
Transportation Security Agency (TSA), DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Material
Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Department of Agriculture. TSA is
responsible for regulating the secure transportation of various hazardous
chemicals, while PHMSA is responsible for the safe shipment. The Department of
Agriculture is responsible for regulating the use of a large number of
hazardous chemicals in the agricultural setting.
There is no mention of why the chemical safety and security
programs of these three agencies were not included in this RFI.
Suggestions
The Coast Guard should resume their project to incorporate
Top Screen data submissions in the management of their port side security
program under MTSA. They should also consider using the CFATS Security
Vulnerability Assessment Tool to more accurately assess the chemical security
hazards at such facilities.
The ATF should also consider the use of Top Screen data for
identifying facilities producing or storing explosives precursor chemicals for
use in their out-reach campaign.
The biggest hole in the chemical security process is the
security of chemicals in transit. While establishing effective and economically
sensible security measures will be difficult, an effort needs to be made to
move forward in this area. Concepts that deserve to be looked at include:
• TSA needs to complete its
security training regulations for bulk chemical transportation by rail;
• Tracking of all toxic inhalation hazard
(TIH) bulk chemical shipments;
• Establishing automatic
notification systems for accidents involving TIH bulk chemical shipments; and
• Mandating federal reporting of transport
theft/diversion of chemical precursors to chemical weapons or explosives.
Public Comments
This is a reminder that the whole purpose of this RFI is to
get public feedback on these proposed ideas. The RFI requests the public to
respond to these specific proposals for areas of improvement. That response
should address the following (pg 9):
• Examples of where implementation
of the same or similar options has been successful;
• Information or data that would
characterize the positive impacts the options might have, including additional
benefits;
• Potential limitations or
unintended consequences of the options described;
• Methods for implementing the
options, including methods for potentially increasing benefits or reducing
costs; or
• Alternatives to the options that
could achieve substantially the same result.
Comments need to be submitted by March 31st,
2014. They may be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulatons.gov; Docket
#OSHA-2013-0026).
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