Nearly every morning I start my computer time by looking at information from Google about what happened in my blog in the previous 24 hours. Google, and blogspot.com is a Google service, provides interesting pieces of analytical data about my blog readership. One item of particular interest is the top ten blog posts each day. As you would expect, most of those posts were from the last couple of days, but with 16 years of publishing this blog, every once-in-a-while, a blog post from ancient history rises into that list.
Today a blog post from September 18th, 2009, “CFATS Training”, appeared on the list. While the details about the CFATS training requirements may no longer be specifically required, the general discussion about the complex needs for a variety of types of chemical facility security training is still germane.
One item that did not come up in this discussion is the specific training that would be needed for off-site response forces, including police. As I have discussed on a number of occasions, most chemical safety folks have very strong feelings about firearms on site; I have actually seen a plant manager ask an FBI agent to leave his personal side arm in his vehicle while attending meetings on site. There are two basic reasons for this.
First is muzzle flash; the brief flash of flame emitted from the barrel of a firearm as the bullet leaves the barrel; such open flames are contraindicated where a flammable atmosphere might exist. By any reasonable reading of most plant safety rules, a hot work permit would be required to be issued before a firearm could be fired.
Second bullets fired from hand weapons will puncture most of the structures in a chemical facility, including storage tanks and piping. Such holes will typically result in leaks of chemicals that could be harmful to the environment and personnel in the facility. All sorts of safety processes would have to be completed before random holes could be placed in chemical process equipment.
Unless response forces are fully trained in the contents of all the fixed and moving structures in the facility, they will not be able to make a determination of what areas in the plant they need to avoid shooting into. Not to mention the fact that most people in a firefight would not have the personal fire discipline to even think about the consequences of stray bullets.
Over the years I have talked with a number of law enforcement personnel that had armed response duties for chemical facilities, and none of them were aware of the potential scope of the problems associated with such responses.
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