Drones and Chemical Plants

Recent headlines for the Ukraine War highlight a new dimension in the use of drones as a weapon. A report from UPI.com notes: “Ukraine officials say forces struck Russian chemical plant overnight”. This was part of the continuing use of uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) to strike at military targets deep in Russia by the Ukraine military. The attack reported here was on a munitions factory. Attacks at military-manufacturing targets well behind the active battlefield is nothing new and is part of long accepted military doctrine. Fires and explosions reported occurred, but there is no confirmation (actually there are denials) from the Russian government.

The headline, however, presages a potential problem that I identified in a 1988 article in Army Chemical Review, attacks against chemical manufacturing facilities releasing toxic chemicals into the environment acting as an ‘inadvertent’ chemical warfare attack. Such attacks could be used as a military terror attack in enemy rear areas without having to worry about manufacturing chemical weapons. Drones could be used to attack large water treatment facilities, for example, potentially releasing large clouds of chlorine gas.

Unfortunately, such UAS attacks need not be limited to attacks by military forces. Terrorists could conduct such attacks with relatively low-cost commercial drone attacks on any number of chemical manufacturing facilities. Currently, there is little or nothing being done to prevent such attacks, and the one program in the United States that could have possibly been used for defense of such facilities, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program ended in 2023 due to congressional inaction. Actions to revive that program are unlikely in the incoming Trump Administration, Trump after all did try to defund CFATS back in 2020.

Chemical Weapons and the Ukraine

Recent reports about the possible use of chemical weapons in an attack on Mariupol (see here for example). The specter of chemical warfare always raises humanitarian concerns, but a close reading of these reports raises the potential of another concern, unintentional chemical warfare.

Background

Back in 1988 I wrote an article for the US Army Chemical Review on “Modern Chemical Warfare – Complicated by a Long List of Toxic Chemicals”. In that article I wrote about the problems associated with warfare in and around chemical facilities. Attacks on such facilities could easily result in the release of toxic chemicals that could have unintended consequences on the battlefield. The worst result, beyond the possibility of needless deaths and injuries in a combat zone, would be one side or the other mistaking an industrial chemical release for an attack with chemical weapons.

For example, by long-standing US policy dating back to Ronald Reagan, if American forces are attacked with chemical weapons, the US could consider that an attack with weapons of mass destruction and reply in kind. The only problem with that is that the only weapons of mass destruction in our arsenal are nuclear weapons. Thus, we could see a situation arise where an attack on an industrial facility defended by US forces could result in the release of toxic chemicals and the commander on the scene could assume and report that the resulting casualties were the result of a chemical weapons attack. In the fog of war, such a report could potentially result in the release of tactical nuclear weapons.

Or, say a world leader says that “if chemical weapons are used in this conflict, we will intervene…”, then an industrial chemical release could lead to a wider conflict.

The Reported Attack

The ‘attack’ that reportedly took place was described in the BBC article like this:

“One injured man described a "sweet-tasting" white smoke covering an area of the plant after an explosion. Another said he felt immediately unable to breathe and had collapsed with ‘cotton legs’.”

Obviously, both men survived the ‘chemical attack’. Now the Russian military has had a large number of problems during this attack on Ukraine, but I would be very surprised to hear that their chemical weapons did not work. They have a long history back through the Soviet days of developing and producing chemical weapons. So, if there were a Russian chemical attack on Ukrainian forces, I would expect to hear about a large number of casualties.

The attack took place at the Azovstal metals plant outside of the city. I’m not sure what kind of metals processing takes place there, but many such plants use strong acids like nitric acid and sulfuric acid for metal cleaning. White steam clouds are released when these acids react with water or even moist air. A wide variety of industrial chemicals interfere with breathing. One of the most common is cryogenic Nitrogen. Nitrogen is not toxic, but if the concentration is too high, there would not be enough oxygen present. People would pass out but would not die if the cloud blew through the area and an adequate oxygen supply became available quickly enough.

Other industries would have different chemical hazards. An interesting look at some of the chemicals associated with different industries can be found on the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) website. This page provides a series of Industry Fact Sheets discussing what DHS chemicals of interest (COI) are used by various non-chemical industry groups. They are certainly not comprehensive lists of chemicals used, but they do show how wide spread chemical use is in modern manufacturing environments.

Conclusion

To my mind, with my background in both the military and chemical manufacturing, this attack does not sound like a deliberate chemical attack. It sounds like the inevitable result of an attack on an industrial facility that uses hazardous chemicals on a routine basis. Tossing artillery rounds indiscriminately at such a facility is asking for a chemical release that might be mistaken for the use of a chemical weapon.

Anyone defending such a facility had better be prepared to conduct defensive operations in a chemical environment, with all of the difficulties that that entails.

CRS Reports – Ukraine – Week of 3-5-22

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has been very busy this week publishing reports about various aspects of the war in Ukraine. In addition to being informative (with a wealth of links to source information), these reports are important because of the way that they inform congressional attitudes and actions.

The reports of interest this week include:

IN11886 Biological Security Engagement in Ukraine: U.S. Cooperation and Threat Reduction Programs,

IN11885 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Turkey’s Response and Black Sea Access Issues,

IN11881 Invasion of Ukraine: Russia’s Trade Status, Tariffs, and WTO Issues,

IN11883 Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants,

IF11138 Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany Halted,

IN11877 Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS), and

IN11872 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects.

CRS Reports - Russian Invasion of Ukraine – 3-5-22

This week the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published three new reports about the Russian invasion of the Ukraine:

New Financial and Trade Sanctions,

Overview of U.S. and International Sanctions and Other Responses

Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects

As with most CRS reports, there are a large number of links provided to source documents.

Reader Comment – Pipeline Security and Ukraine

A long time reader pointed me at an article over at the new International Pipeline Resilience Organization web site and asked me what I knew about the organization. First part of that is simple, I’ve never heard of them, but they appear to be a new organization. Further, I have had very little contact with the pipeline industry, so I do not recognize any of the names listed on their ‘Leadership’ page. I do find it interesting that a large portion of their leadership comes from a single large law firm.

The article, though, that I have some thoughts on.

First off, nothing really new here except for the brief mentions about the benefits of joining their organization. The ‘increased cyber threat’ from Russia is a common thread seen in most of the messaging from most of the thought leaders in cybersecurity. The refrain goes that Russia has been aggressive in their cyber activities in stealing information and getting footholds in systems from the federal government to critical infrastructure long before their military crossed into Ukraine. And there were certainly a wide variety of cyber attacks against the Ukraine before the physical attacks started. So, we must (the conventional wisdom goes) expect that the Russians will attack our critical infrastructure.

I am sorry, but I have to take a contrarian stand here, the last thing Putin wants to see now is a really pissed off USA and/or NATO. He bit off more than he can conveniently chew and was obviously surprised at how well, NATO, the European Union, and the United States responded in a coordinated manner in exercising their individual and combined economic muscle in response to the Russian invasion. That combined with the strong nationalistic response from the citizens of the Ukraine, the unexpected leadership shown by large portions of the civilian government of the Ukraine, have all made the mission of the Russian armed forces much more difficult than expected.

 

Putin realizes that the last thing he needs to see at this point is an introduction of NATO forces into the conflict. Even just a NATO air campaign to remove Russia’s air superiority would almost certainly give the Ukrainian military the final tool it needs to repel the Russian forces, or worse yet, capture large portions of the stalled Russian equipment sitting in the mud of the steppes. This realization on Putin’s part is almost certainly a major reason for his threats about nuclear escalation. A significant cyberattack on critical infrastructure in NATO would be the final spur that would drive movement of NATO forces eastward.

So, we can ignore the cybersecurity ‘threat’ from Russia, right? Sorry, nothing in Eastern Europe is ever that simple. What we really have to concern ourselves with is the reaction of the masses in Russia. As the sanctions begin to take hold and Russians start to hear more from their disillusioned soldiers about the conditions in Ukraine (lack of food and fuel really hurts military morale), Putin is going to have to start worrying about an uprising back home. Putin’s concern about this possibility may be what has driven his keeping most of his military forces at home.

If that threat becomes real, then Putin might decide that he needs a NATO incursion into Ukraine to justify his actions. Again, the easiest way to encourage that response would be to execute a limited cyberattack on Western interests. And non-catastrophic cyberattacks on gas and fuel pipelines would be an effective target for such attacks. So, do not stop working on improving your cybersecurity posture.