COVID19and CFATS

The ‘novel corona virus’ (COVID19) that is currently slowing down in China is starting to appear more frequently on the world stage. While it is way too early to predict its effect on the United State, the impact in China certainly provides a worst-case scenario that bears consideration. DHS and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (ISCD) are not yet talking publicly about potential security implications of COVID19, but security managers should start thinking about how a worst-case scenario could affect their operations.

To be clear COVID19is not directly a security issue, the virus is not going to ‘attack’ chemical facilities and release toxic agents into the air. But large numbers of personnel out with the virus or hiding out at home attempting to avoid the virus, or, worst-case, being sent-home by the government to stop the spread of the virus could have potential effects on facility security plans. And there are various wacko groups here in the United States that could be counted upon to try to take advantage of the situation to attack the ‘oppressive, illegal government operations’ trying to stem the spread of the disease.

Facility Shutdowns

We are already starting to see supply chain effects in the United States from the shutdown of many manufacturing facilities in China. This combined with the movement of much basic chemical manufacturing to China over the last 20 years or so is beginning to have some effect on chemical manufacturing in the United States. As stockpiles of chemicals sole-sourced from China begin to dry up we are going to begin to see chemical manufacturing facilities slowing and even stopping production in the US.

While many companies will use this as an opportunity to catchup on maintenance and upgrade activities, more will begin to reduce work weeks or even shut the front gates until the supply reopens. There will even be a number of companies that will go under because of the supply chain issues. As these plants sit idle, the lack of a work force on site will reduce the number of eyes that are on the lookout for suspicious activities. Facilities will need to increase their internal guard-force patrolling to off-set this reduction of eyes-on-scene.

Security managers probably need to start talking with their guard companies about ensuring adequate coverage during sickouts. And conversations with local law enforcement agencies about increased security patrolling during reduced guard-force coverage would also be a good idea.

Closed Facilities

As facilities close due to bankruptcy or lack of business there is seldom any incentive to get rid of existing chemical inventories. In instances where facilities close with inventories of DHS chemicals of interest, specific interest should be made to properly sell or dispose of these inventories.

ISCD should take special interest where CFATS covered facilities close abruptly. Chemical inspectors should visit the site to ensure that the COI inventory is no longer on site. Where it remains on site, ISCD is going to have to figure out how to ensure that those inventories receive adequate security pending their disposal. We do not need a repeat of the Cook Slurry Company closure or the abandoned hydrofluoric acid tank. And congress might want to think about providing authority to take specific types of action at abandoned CFATS facilities when they get around to reauthorizing the program (that will be a future blog post).

Potential Threat Increase

If security issues due to manpower problems are not a big enough concern, there is a potential for an increased threat of attacks against facilities that have theft/diversion security issue COI on hand.

The whole issue of mandatory quarantines raises some interesting legal issues about freedom of assembly and habeas corpus. While this has not yet caused any problems with the isolation of returned travelers, any expansion of quarantines within the country is certain to upset people in the sovereign citizen movement and right-wing militias. The fringes of both groups are well known for employing violence to make their political statements.

With their increased frustration about the denial of liberties and the increased confusion in the communities as we potentially approach the China case, there is going to be an increased interest on the part of these groups for employing weapons of mass destruction as part of their ‘protests’. This puts facilities that house theft/diversion COI at an increased threat of attack when they are potentially having to address internal security issues due to reduced manpower.

Again, security managers are going to have to start thinking about these issues now and talking with their security companies and local law enforcement about the issue. ISCD is also going to have to think about some proactive engagement with the National Guard Bureau about the issue. Talking about this potential problem early is going to be the key to staying ahead of the issue.

Moving Forward

We are well ahead of the potential problems describe here, but they could happen sooner rather than later. It is not clear that DHS is going to be allowed to engage in any advanced planning on these issues as the Administration appears to be more concerned with preventing stock market problems than really addressing the medical issues at hand. We can only hope that advanced security planning will be allowed to proceed at the federal level.

But security managers are going to have to take a hard look at how this potential epidemic could effect their security posture and start thinking and talking about how they could deal with these issues before they actually arise.

Eliminating CVI in CFATS Reauthorization Bill?

I am hearing rumors that a CFATS reauthorization bill currently being drafted might include provisions that would eliminate the Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) program from the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The CVI program is authorized under 6 USC 623 and regulated under 6 CFR 27.400 and a detailed guidance document here. The CVI program protects security information about facilities in the CFATS program from public disclosure.

There have been complaints in Congress over the years that the presence of the CVI program interferes with facilities sharing information with emergency responders. Not having seen the specific wording of possible CVI removal provisions, I can only suppose that these provisions would be an attempt by congressional staffers to remove such impediments to information sharing.

CVI Background

The CVI program is one of the most unusual Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) programs in the Federal government. Most CUI programs limit the Federal Government’s sharing of information provided to the government by the private sector or developed in house by government agencies. The CVI program, on the other hand, requires both the covered private sector organizations and the government to protect the covered information regardless of who initiates the information.

Information developed by covered facilities that is considered to be CVI (and thus protected from disclosure) includes all submissions made by the facility to DHS through the CFATS Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT), copies of security vulnerability assessments and site security plans, and the working papers supporting those documents. Certain of those supporting documents are exempted from CVI classification; specifically, any records that are required to be maintained by other regulatory programs including chemical inventory information and emergency response plans are exempted from CVI protections.

Disclosures of CVI information can only be made to personnel who have received CVI Certification and have a verified ‘need-to-know’ the specific information. The ‘need-to-know’ requirements are outlined in §27.400(e) and specifically includes State and local officials.

CVI and Emergency Response Planning

Emergency response planning for chemical releases is covered briefly in the CFATS regulations as part of the Risk-Based Performance Standard #9 {§27.230(a)(9)}, but both the regulation and the CFATS RBPS Guidance document make it clear that those requirements are only response plans for security breaches, not accidental chemical releases. Even then, the CFATS planning process envisions inclusion of law enforcement personnel in preventing the attack or arresting the perpetrators, NOT fire or emergency medical technicians responding to the affects of the potential attack. That chemical emergency response is already covered under EPA regulations.

Law enforcement personnel working with facility personnel to develop security response plans at a CFATS covered facility would be expected to be covered by CVI rules including CVI training and certification requirements. Emergency medical technicians and fire fighters participating in planning for chemical releases (either accidental or deliberate) would be covered under the EPA regulations and would not require CVI clearances.

Members of a Local Emergency Response Committee (LEPC) would not require CVI certification to receive chemical inventory data from local chemical facilities covered by the CFATS program because the LEPC notification requirements are covered under the EPA regulations and are exempted from CVI classification {§27.405(1)}.

Continued Need for a CVI Process

The purpose of the CVI program is to ensure that critical security information about a CFATS covered facility is not made publicly known and thus become available to nefarious personnel who could use that information in the planning and execution of an attack on a chemical facility. The mere knowledge of the existence of an inventory of items on the DHS chemicals of interest (COI) list is not critical safety information. That information is generally already publicly available through the EPA (a discussion of the EPA’s limiting of the sharing of that information is an entirely separate topic).

I suppose that the CVI program could be replaced with another of the existing CUI programs, probably the DHS Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program. That would also protect the information originating at the facility level from disclosure by Federal, State and local governments. What it would not do, however, is to establish standards for facility personnel to protect the required information. Without information protection requirements like those in the CVI program, it would be easy enough for attackers to get the information that terrorists need to circumvent the security procedures at CFATS covered facilities.

Rather than abolishing the CVI program, Congress might want to make clear that certain information will be freely shared with LEPCs, local law enforcement, fire departments and hospitals. Last year I suggested language for that information sharing that operates within the bounds of the CVI program. This would be in addition to any information sharing already required between facilities and LEPCs and fire departments by EPA regulations.

CFATS Subcommittee Hearing – 03-12-19

Today the Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Innovation Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee held a hearing on “Securing Our Nation's Chemical Facilities: Stakeholders Perspectives on Improving the CFATS Program” (video here). The Subcommittee heard from a panel of labor and safety advocates as well as a representative of the American Chemistry Council (ACC).

Witnesses

Today’s witnesses included (link to prepared testimony):

• Mr. John Morawetz, International Chemical Workers Union Council;

• Dr. Mike Wilson, Ph.D, MPH, BlueGreen Alliance;

• Pamela Nixon, People Concerned About Chemical Safety; and

• Kirsten Meskill, BASF

As I mentioned in an earlier blog post, there was a fifth witness originally scheduled to be on the panel. There was no indication today why Randy E. Manner, Manner Analytics, was not present at the hearing.

Expected Coverage

As expected, based upon previous hearings and the change in leadership in the House, much of the questioning today addressed four topics:

• Voluntary ‘best practices’;

• Information sharing;

• Employee involvement; and

• Whistleblower protections

The ‘new’ term ‘best practices’ has apparently replaced the more controversial ‘inherently safer technology (IST)’ that was used extensively in the chemical safety and security discussions in the earlier Democratic lead House. All of the questioners and panel members (even to an extent Meskill) generally agreed that the sharing of ‘best practices’ related to actions that facility could take to reduce their chemical risk was a good idea. There were no concrete ideas (or even suggestions) how those ‘best practices’ could be implemented at other facilities. There was a general agreement that DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (never named in the hearing) should share what information that it did have.

The ‘information sharing’ bit was mainly about how and what CFATS facilities should share with local first responders, emergency planners and local communities to help respond to the release of chemicals or chemical incidents resulting from terrorist attacks, weather emergencies or accidents. Again, there was a general agreement that that information sharing was important and should be expanded. Ranking Member Katko (R,NY) made the point that other regulatory programs had more expansive information sharing requirements where concerns should more probably be addressed. Katko made a vague point about the CVI requirements for first responders.

Employee involvement in safety and security planning has long been a priority for Democrats. The point was made many times by Committee members and panelists that line employees would have valuable insights that should be included in identifying security vulnerabilities and planning for site security plans. Meskill made the point that they included employees at all stages of the security (and safety) planning and implementation process but agreed that she could not speak for all CFATS facilities.

The Democrats again have long had concerns about the whistleblowing protections provided to employees. Member concerns about protecting employees from retaliation due to their reporting security (and safety) problems at facilities. Interesting, none of the panel members could provide any information on the problem when questioned. Katko pointed out (in the only second round of questioning in the hearing) that the CFATS Tip Line provided a way that employees could anonymously report problems at covered facilities (including the lack of initial notification to ISCD).

Cybersecurity

The one new (and unexpected to me) topic that came up a number of different times was cybersecurity. Langevin (D,RI), Rice (D,NY) and Jackson-Lee (D,TX) all had questions about cybersecurity issues. Langevin questioned cybersecurity training (particularly in control rooms); Rice asked about cybersecurity standards in CFATS and Jackson-Lee announced that she would be introducing the Frank Lautenberg Chemical Facility Cybersecurity. No detailed responses were available from any of the panel members.

Commentary

In an earlier set of blog posts I identified those items that I though should be addressed in any legislation reauthorizing the CFATS program. Two of those posts are appropriate (in my opinion) responses to some of the questions raised today. Those include:

• Cybersecurity;

• Best practices (IST); and

• Information sharing

There are a couple of things that still need to be addressed here. First is Katko’s comments about the applicability of Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) requirements to first responders. ISCD has long maintained that first responders entering a facility in response to an actual emergency situation are not required to be CVI qualified; actual emergency response does not rely on access to CVI controlled information. Emergency planning is something else entirely. There are requirements (§7.02) outlined in the CVI Guidance manual for providing access to CVI information to State and local officials, including emergency response planners. That guidance ends by explaining:

“State, local, and tribal officials, including first responders, must have access to any information that is necessary to plan for and respond to an emergency event at a chemical facility [emphasis added]. It is equally important that this information is available in a form that is readily accessible and easily disseminated. Accordingly, to the extent possible, facilities should provide information to State, local and tribal entities in non-CVI form. In many cases, a facility can provide a product that contains all of the necessary operational and facility-specific information and excludes CVI.”

Katko also made a point that should be remembered by everyone involved in the CFATS reauthorization process; the CFATS regulations are not the only federal rules that require chemical companies to coordinate emergency response planning information with local authorities. Facilities could easily find the necessary information for emergency response planners in their already required information provided to local fire departments and Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs).

There are some exceptions to the EPA reporting requirements that apply to CFATS facilities. Most chemicals on the DHS list of chemicals of interest (COI) that triggers CFATS reporting requirements that are not on the EPA’s Risk Management Program list of covered chemicals are covered by CFATS because they can be used for preparing improvised explosives or improvised chemical weapons. While these chemicals are not generally as much of an off-site hazard as the RMP covered chemicals, the emergency response planning is more of a law enforcement issue than fire department response planning. This would make for some interesting information sharing requirements that are not specifically outlined in any existing regulations.

The other interesting thing that came out of this hearing was the new Committee interest in cybersecurity issues. Richmond’s Subcommittee should probably hold another hearing (maybe two) specifically about cybersecurity issues. This is going to be a complex set of issues and a wide variety of experts and stakeholders are going to have to be involved in the efforts to address it.

One thing that the Committee crafters are going to have to deal with in writing cybersecurity requirements is that the CFATS program is a risk-based program that prohibits DHS from requiring specific security measures. This is due to the recognition that each of the very wide variety of covered facilities (from a number of different chemical and non-chemical manufacturing facilities) require differing security measures to protect against terrorist attacks. This remains true for the varying information and control system technologies that will be found in these facilities.

OSHA PSM and Emergency Response Planning

This is part of a continuing look at the public comments that have been posted to the docket for the OSHA Process Safety Management program advance notice of proposed rulemaking. Earlier posts in the series include:

• Public Comments on OSHA PSM ANPRM – 03-09-14

• Public Comments on OSHA PSM ANPRM – 03-09-14

• ICS and OSHA PSM

• Public Comments on OSHA PSM ANPRM – 03-22-14

• OSHA PSM Enforcement

• Public Comments on OSHA PSM ANPRM – 03-29-14

In Saturday’s post I mentioned that a “commenter noted that natural gas transmission and distribution facilities are already required to maintain close coordination with local emergency response authorities under 49 CFR 192.615”. That comment by the American Gas Association (AGA) points to one of the few places in Federal Regulations that provides specific requirements for the type and scope of emergency planning that must be undertaken by a chemical facility. As such, I thought that it would be a good idea to look at those requirements in some detail.

Emergency Planning

Section 192.615 outlines the requirements that every gas pipeline operator must adhere to for the establishment of emergency plans. Subparagraph (a) outlines the requirements for establishing a written plan for responding to gas pipeline emergencies. Subparagraph (b) establishes the requirements for communicating that plan to the employees of the gas pipeline operator. And subparagraph (c) addresses the requirements for coordinating with police, fire and other public officials.

Written Plan

Subparagraph (a) requires each operator to “establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting from a gas pipeline emergency”. The plan must address:

• Receiving, identifying, and classifying notices of events which require immediate response by the operator;

• Establishing and maintaining adequate means of communication with appropriate fire, police, and other public officials;

• Prompt and effective response to a notice of each type of emergency;

• The availability of personnel, equipment, tools, and materials, as needed at the scene of an emergency;

• Actions directed toward protecting people first and then property;

• Emergency shutdown and pressure reduction in any section of the operator’s pipeline system necessary to minimize hazards to life or property;

• Making safe any actual or potential hazard to life or property;

• Notifying appropriate fire, police, and other public officials of gas pipeline emergencies and coordinating with them both planned responses and actual responses during an emergency;

• Safely restoring any service outage;

• Beginning incident investigations under §192.617, if applicable, as soon after the end of the emergency as possible; and

• Actions required to be taken by a controller during an emergency in accordance with control room management regulations under §192.631.

Now the scope of the pipeline emergency plan may be a bit more expansive than one would expect to see at more typical chemical facilities. This is inherent in the fact that by their very nature, gas pipelines are mainly off-site facilities. Many of them run through or near inhabited areas which may significantly expand the scope of a gas pipeline incident.

This is further reflected in 192.615(a)(3) which defines the types of emergencies for which the pipeline written plan must provide a ‘prompt and effective response’. The four specific emergencies specified are:

• Gas detected inside or near a building;

• Fire located near or directly involving a pipeline facility;

• Explosion occurring near or directly involving a pipeline facility; and

• Natural disaster.

Employee Communications

Just having a written plan is not sufficient. This section of the pipeline safety regulations maintains that pipeline operators must share the written plan with their employees in a fairly specific manner. Section 192.615(b) requires operators to:

• Furnish its supervisors who are responsible for emergency action a copy of that portion of the latest edition of the emergency procedures;

• Train the appropriate operating personnel to assure that they are knowledgeable of the emergency procedures and verify that the training is effective; and

• Review employee activities to determine whether the procedures were effectively followed in each emergency.

While it is not specifically mentioned in the subparagraph (b) requirements the training must not only address what actions must be taken, but training needs to insure that each of the personnel have the capability to identify emergencies at the earliest opportunity and to be able to discriminate between the different types of emergencies to determine which action in the emergency plan should be taken.

The last requirement is often overlooked in emergency planning. After each incident where any portion of the emergency plan is put into operation, an after-action review (AAR) needs to be undertaken to ensure that not only were the employees’ actions correct with respect to the plan requirements, but also that the plan requirements were appropriate to the incident in question.

A natural extension of the AAR {again not specifically mentioned in §192.615(b)} is the need to revise the emergency plan based upon the lessons learned in the AAR.

Community Coordination

Since many gas pipeline incidents or accidents can have an immediate and devastating impact on the local community, close coordination between the gas pipeline operator and the local emergency response community is very important. This is reflected in the actions specified in §192.615(c). This subparagraph establishes the requirement for a pipeline operator to “establish and maintain liaison with appropriate fire, police, and other public officials”. This liaison is required in order to:

• Learn the responsibility and resources of each government organization that may respond to a gas pipeline emergency;

• Acquaint the officials with the operator’s ability in responding to a gas pipeline emergency;

• Identify the types of gas pipeline emergencies of which the operator notifies the officials; and

• Plan how the operator and officials can engage in mutual assistance to minimize hazards to life or property.

While the scope of the area that the operator is responsible for coordinating with local officials for emergency response actions is much larger than for most chemical facilities because of the length of most gas pipelines, the same reasons exist for making such coordination exist for any facility that houses or produces hazardous chemicals.

OSHA PSM Implications

In considering the current OSHA PSM standard and evaluating how well that standard addresses the requirement for emergency planning and community coordination, OSHA would do well to take a good hard look at §192.615. With very little modification to the wording in this portion of the Pipeline Safety Regulations, OSHA would have a fairly comprehensive set of requirements for PSM covered facilities upon which to base their emergency planning operations.

More Details on the 135 Day EO 13650 WG Update

The EO 13650 Working Group update document that I mentioned this morning deals with Section 3 of the Executive Order on Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security. This section deals with improving coordination State, local and tribal authorities; including planning for and responding to incidents at chemical facilities.

The 7 page document published today address six areas that will make it easier for the federal government and facility owners to coordinate with these authorities that should be able to be the most responsive because of their proximity to the chemical facilities. Those areas are:

• Expand engagement of the chemical regulated community in the local emergency planning process.

• Improve training and protection for first responders, including a comprehensive implementation and compliance strategy for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response regulations.

• Provide further technical assistance to State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), Tribal Emergency Response Commission (TERCs), Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs), and Tribal Emergency Planning Committees (TEPCs) preparedness activities¹.

• Identify and coordinate funding sources for LEPCs//TEPCs to sustain planning activities.

• Increase use of electronic reporting and data management.

• Improve public participation in LEPC/TEPCs emergency response planning and access to information about chemical facility risks.

There are a lot of good ideas for actions that could be taken before the end of this year (the short term) and things to consider for the longer term. Listing them all would make this post as long as the WG document, so I’ll concentrate on the ideas that I think will do the most to strengthen the role of LEPCs in the emergency response planning effort.

Missing Element

The one action that is missing from this discussion is, in my opinion, the most critical thing that EPA can do with regards to LEPCs is to do an audit to ensure that every regulated chemical facility (PSM, RMP and CFATS at a minimum) has at least one active LEPC that it can partner with in the emergency response planning process. Without an active LEPC most of the small to medium chemical facilities will be unable to develop an effective emergency response effort. The Working Group should consider developing an MOU between EPA and FEMA to utilize local FEMA contacts to help identify the core elements that would allow a new or revitalized LEPC to be stood up in those communities without an effective emergency planning organization.

Short Term Efforts

“During authorization and compliance inspections of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) covered facilities, verify that emergency plans for security incidents are developed and coordinated with local law enforcement and first responders as required.” (pg2) The CFATS Risk-Based Performance Standard guidance document only mentions LEPC in passing in RBPS #9 (pg 86). This needs to be revised to provide more incentive for CFATS facilities to participate in the LEPC planning process. OSHA and EPA could require LEPC coordination in the PSM and RMP programs, DHS has been handicapped by Congress by being prohibited from requiring any specific activity in the facility site security plan.

“Develop and disseminate additional information for industry members, explaining roles and responsibilities in community emergency response planning and facility safety and security.” (pg 3)  The EPA has a fairly extensive web site (here for example) outlining the rules associated with the Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). Unfortunately, for all of its vaunted accessibility, the internet and its web sites are still a relatively passive form of communication; the community has to come looking for you. Pushing information to regulated facilities may help to overcome the information deficit.

“Develop guidance to assist LEPCs/TEPCs in developing chemical facility emergency response plans that will promote the inclusion of all relevant community stakeholders (i.e., first responders, community residents, community groups, schools, industry, utilities, etc.).” (pg 4) Guidance, training and exercises are the key to any effective emergency response plan. Unfortunately the way that many LEPCs are currently organized there is little in the way of emergency planning expertise to guide that process. Additional guidance and training will go a long way to making these LEPCs more effective.

A Long Way to Go

Most of the short term items listed in this Working Group document can be done without any assistance or authorization by Congress. The longer term problems associated with making the chemical emergency planning process work properly are not going to be able to be resolved by the Working Group. The biggest single problem with the LEPC process is the lack of federal money supporting the effort.

The crafters of EPCRA were faced with a classic regulatory problem how to establish an effective program without having to pay for it. Congress took the easy way out, they made the establishment of the LEPCs a State responsibility. Then they made it clear that the program should be run with emergency response personnel (as part of their normal duties) and volunteers, eliminating the need to fund salaries.

The West Fertilizer explosion and the Freedom spill have made it clear that emergency planning for chemical safety and security incidents is still not taking place with anywhere near the regularity envisioned in the grand vision of EPCRA.

As I have mentioned a number of times over the years of writing this blog (here for example) that the local emergency response planning effort will require at least one trained professional to oversee the effort. The only organization that has that kind of mandate is FEMA. I really think that the LEPC effort should be expanded and moved out of State control and into FEMA’s bailiwick. This is the only way that effective chemical emergency response planning is going to get into the areas where it is going to be needed.

The Freedom Spill – Why?

While the folks directly affected by the spill are worried about where they are going to get their clothes washed and take a bath, the bigger question is why did this happen? Why did an industrial chemical get into a city water distribution system? The Chemical Safety Board is scheduled to have a team arrive tomorrow to start their investigation.

The investigation will probably take much less time than normal; investigating a leak where everything is still together is a lot easier than reconstructing explosions and fires. If there isn’t another conflict with DOJ on crime scene vs chemical incident scene investigation we should see something in a couple of months.

But, given the news reports that I’ve seen, access to Google Maps and a little knowledge of process chemistry I think I can piece together a pretty fair picture of what probably happened.

The Facility

Looking at the facility on Google Maps, it is clear that it is (as news reports have noted) that this is a chemical storage facility, not a chemical manufacturing facility. There are 10 large storage tanks clearly visible within the facility, three smaller tanks and a number of much smaller storage containers. The 13 identifiable tanks all appear to be within a brick wall that probably serves as the primary spill containment. The area encircled by the brick wall is certainly large enough to contain spills of all of the tanks at the facility.

It is also obvious that the facility is very close to the Elk River with not much more than a chain link fence separating it from the river’s high water mark. There appears to be a barge loading/unloading facility at the water’s edge. The rail line that can be seen along the eastern boundary of the facility is no longer connected to anything beyond the property.

There is a tank truck loading facility between the large tanks and the perimeter fence. Tank trucks come in the north gate at the facility, get loaded and depart through the south gate near the administrative building.

The Spill

At some time on Thursday morning a tank containing Crude MCHM started leaking. From news reports the leaking tank was a 48,000 gallon tank so it was one of the ten large tanks. Most facilities do not have leak detection equipment for their bulk storage tanks unless there is potential for catastrophic consequences and the Crude MCHM certainly does not fit into that category.

Most leak detection regimes rely on preventive maintenance programs to prevent large leaks and small leaks are typically detected by employees working in the vicinity of the storage tanks. With the Freedom Industries leak being as much as 5,000 gallons (about what an over-the-road chemical tank truck carries) this was a fairly large leak. It will be interesting to see what the CSB says about the source of the leak.

Containment Failure

The news report sited above says that the containment overflowed. That does not seem to be possible. The three foot brick wall around the tank farm should have been more than high enough to contain the entire contents of one of the tanks, much less 5,000 gallons.

Ken Ward reported that the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) has ordered Freedom to empty all of their tanks at the site because the containment was not adequate to hold a spill. I suspect that the brick wall has cracks in it near the foundation that would allow any pooling liquid to leak out. This would have been obvious to the facility maintenance team every time that it rained and water collected within the containment area.

No Spill Response

The third part of any spill containment plan also failed in this instance. Any time a major leak is detected in a tank farm, one of the things that has to be done immediately is to check to ensure that the spill is being contained by the containment barrier. Any leaks in that barrier need to be controlled with mobile spill control equipment. News reports indicate that the WVDEP inspectors saw no such efforts being made when they showed up at the site.

The Water Company Response

News reports from WSAZ indicated during the initial response on Thursday that the water company felt that their inlet treatment system would deal with the relatively low amount of contamination (I have seen figures of 41 ppm for this spill) in the river water used to feed the water treatment plant. This is certainly true for a wide variety of contaminants that such facilities typically see.

This is not a chemical that the water company is required to test for, so there was no method of identifying this chemical in their water readily available on site. There are literally tens of thousands of industrial chemicals and testing for their presence in water can be quite difficult for a well-equipped water testing laboratory. Very few water treatment facilities can afford such facilities and most rely on out-side labs for non-routine testing. On site labs only test for those chemicals identified by State and federal environmental regulations; Crude MCHM does not show up on those lists.

According to news stories water system samples were sent to an outside lab for analysis even though the treatment facility thought that their system would remove the chemical upon intake. When that proved not to be the case, the emergency ‘no contact’ order was issued even though there is no clear indication that there was (or was not for that matter) any hazard associated with the level of contamination in the system.

Emergency Planning

There have been the inevitable complaints about the lack of a plan to deal with this particular problem. Particularly in the wake of the West Fertilizer tragedy last summer questions have been asked about whether or not Freedom Industries had fulfilled their community notification responsibilities. Ken Ward reported yesterday that the appropriate Tier II forms had been submitted to State and local agencies.

So why wasn’t there a plan in place to deal with this? Why would there be? Emergency planning folks get flooded with Tier II documents, particularly in an area with a large chemical industry like this area in West Virginia. Local emergency planning committees (LEPC) required by EPA regulations are largely voluntary groups with little or no local funding and certainly no federal funding beyond the odd grant or two.

If there is any actual emergency response planning done by these committees (and the Federal government does not actually require any planning to take place otherwise they would be forced to pay for it) it will be concentrated on the most hazardous chemical facilities in the area. In the Charleston, WV area that would include places that make chemicals that will kill people at concentrations of MCHM seen in the current water supply or cause truly catastrophic explosions or fires.

And there is no requirement for anyone to talk to a local water treatment facility in any of this emergency planning. They are not an emergency response organization.

From responses that we have seen to other chemical incidents in the area, I suspect that the chemical response planning and training in the Charleston, WV area is probably some of the best in the country. It didn’t include a response to this type of incident, mainly because it was too low on the potential consequence ladder.

Safe Levels of MCHM Set

Ken Ward reports today that the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ASTDR), part of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had determined a ‘safe level’ of MCHM in drinking water, 1 ppm. This is a calculated value not a tested value. It is from an authoritative source so the local water company will be off the hook for any liability for potential injures from up to that level of contamination in the water supply once things are started back up.

I suspect that they will try to take the levels lower than that, just to be on the safe side. On the other hand, people are getting fed up about not being able to wash themselves or their clothes, and local businesses are being hurt by the necessary closures because of the lack of water. I’m sure the management of the water company is really happy to see this number.

HR 3410 Introduced – EMP Planning

As I noted in an earlier blog post Rep. Franks (R,AZ) introduced HR 3410, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (CIPA), which would require DHS to consider electromagnetic pulse (EMP) incidents in its critical infrastructure emergency planning process.

Section 2(a) of the bill would amend the Homeland Security Act by adding a definition of EMP to 6 USC §101, adding a new section to Title V requiring the Secretary to include EMP incidents in national planning scenarios, and adding a new section to Title III that would require DHS S&T to conduct research on mitigating the effects of EMP events.

The definition would specifically include natural and manmade EMP events. Given the fact that a large scale EMP event (natural or a deliberate attack) would be as devastating to a modern technological society as a full scale nuclear attack (I know, no direct physical destruction, but the simultaneous termination of EVERY ELECTRONIC DEVICE within range of the event would have immediate and long term catastrophic consequences) I suppose that DHS ought to be looking at this. It should rank right up there with planning for a post-nuclear holocaust or the explosion of the Yellowstone super-volcano dome.

Responding to the use of a smaller scale EMP device directed at critical infrastructure, is of course a slightly different situation. Still the technical sophistication required to make an effective weapon based upon this technology probably makes the use of such a weapon by terrorists slightly less likely than their employment of a nuclear weapon.

I suppose that a rational consideration of the extent of the threat explains the lack of authorization of new spending to support the research requirements of this bill.

Since this bill does not actually require anyone to do anything other than come up with yet another bureaucratic plan, this plan would not face significant opposition if it made it to the floor of the House. I would be surprised, however, if this bill made it out of committee due to lack of consideration rather than any actual opposition.

Waxahachie Fire – Lessons for Emergency Response Planners

The recent fire at the Magnablend chemical facility in Waxahachie, TX was an impressive spectacle that fortunately had relatively little lasting impact on the local community beyond the destruction of the facility. Even with the evacuation of some local schools and businesses there appears to have been little immediate danger to the community; due in large part to the efforts of local firefighters.

Emergency Planning

Any emergency planner with responsibility for preparing for a response to a fire at a chemical facility, from the facility to State level, should be reviewing the news reports, particularly the photo and video reports, to learn lessons that can be applied to their emergency planning process. It is always better to learn lessons from incidents in other jurisdictions than to have to learn them on the fly in a live incident.

The Facility

According to the Magnablend web site the ‘Texas Liquid Facility’ at Waxahache is a liquid blending facility with a 24,000 sq ft warehouse, 30 mixing tanks of up to 10,000 gallons, a 7 car rail spur and an indoor truck loading station. Since this is a custom chemical blend facility there will be a wide range of chemicals in the facility and the actual mix of chemicals will probably vary widely.

Aerial photographs of the incident from the local NBC affiliate show that the facility is relatively isolated with lots of open areas around the facility. The nearest facility to the plant is Navarro College, about 200 meters away from the buildings at the Magnablend facility. In this incident the college was upwind of the fire.

Spreading Flammable Liquids

There are lots of lessons to be learned from this fire but one of the most important is that water spreads chemical fires. Picture 19 of the 28 photos in the slide show on the NBC affiliate web site clearly shows the fire spreading upwind along a small water course between the burning facility and Navarro College. The lack of fire-fighting equipment in the picture shows that this particular flame front has gotten around the fire line.

There is an interesting video on YouTube® showing the fire following a flow of water out of one of the buildings on site. The water is clearly contaminated with some unidentified chemical. The water flows out of the building and within seconds the fire follows behind it. In this video the contaminated water flows under a parked ladder truck and the flames engulf the truck at the end of the video. The fire truck was probably destroyed.

Fighting Chemical Fires with Foam

The fact that water frequently spreads burning liquids is well known in the fire-fighting community. Many communities with large chemical facilities or fuel storage facilities have foam based fire-fighting equipment just because of this problem. To be effective fire-fighting foam must be applied to the liquid surface.

Unfortunately, with the fire in this instance being inside of a building this complicates the effective employment of foam. With foam being a relatively limited asset in most cases, fire-fighters will be reluctant to use it if it cannot be employed effectively if they have it available.

Why Use Water?

With the known problems of water spreading flaming liquids, why would fire departments still use water to fight a chemical fire? If foam cannot be employed effectively, the only other available alternative is to let the fire burn itself out; consuming the available flammable liquids. This tactic is frequently used at chemical storage facilities where there are isolatable large storage tanks on fire. This works well when the storage tank walls are intact or the tank is alone in a diked area that will contain the contents in case of a tank collapse.

The problem in a warehouse situation or a facility with lots of smaller tanks is that allowing the fire to burn out risks exploding containers sending flaming debris beyond the fire line. Each container; pails, drums, totebins and tanks; becomes a potential explosive device as flames heat the contents to their boiling point. With the exception of storage tanks, these containers do not typically have pressure relief devices so the pressure builds in the container until the container catastrophically fails producing an explosion.

Drums are a particular problem in this situation. Drums frequently fail where the side walls are joined to the base of the drum. This causes the drum body to launch like a rocket. Since many chemicals are easily ignitable at their boiling point, the drums fly through the air spewing fire from their base. Typically there are still flaming chemicals in the drum when it lands, a potential source for spreading the conflagration.

To prevent these dangerous explosions fire-fighters use water to keep the contents of the containers below their boiling point. Unfortunately this takes large quantities of water and ware houses are seldom diked to contain this amount of water; there are too many requirements for vehicles and materials to enter and leave the warehouse to make this practicable.

Emergency Planning

Every chemical facility is going to present a different hazard for fire-fighters. Frequently, those hazards will vary greatly from area to area within a given facility. Emergency planners need to take this into account when formulating their plan for responding to a fire at chemical facilities.

First and foremost there must be a formal emergency response planning effort made for every chemical facility, particularly those facilities with significant quantities or varieties of chemicals on site. Where fire-fighting foams will be needed to fight the chemical fires the type of foam must be identified and adequate quantities need to be readily available as does the equipment for its employment.

Where foam employment will not be practicable for one reason or another the decision process for deciding whether or not water will be employed needs to be identified in advance. The pros and cons need to be clearly identified so they can be weighed in the balance of the actual situation on the scene.

Finally, if the possibility of using water at chemical-facility fire exists then planners need to clearly analyze the run-off situation. Knowing that water flowing out of the facility will contain a mixture of chemicals; some of which will be flammable, toxic or both, planners need to ensure that they have a plan in place for containing the consequences of that run-off. And those consequences may include the spread of fire along the water flow.

Emergency Response Planning – Communications

Earlier this week I proposed a new structure for Federally mandated emergency response planning for regulated industries like natural gas and hazardous material pipelines. I suggested that FEMA should be the agency that would be responsible for the coordination of emergency response planning between the regulated private entity and the potentially responding Federal, State and local response agencies. FEMA would have offices at county, State and regional levels to effect this coordination. I would like to take a look at how that might work, starting today with communications requirements.

Current Pipeline ERP Requirements

Currently 49 CFR 192.615 establishes the requirements for emergency response planning for natural gas and other hazardous material (except oil and fuel) pipeline operators. It specifically lists {§192.615(a)(3)} four types of incidents that must be addressed in the ERP:

• Gas detected inside or near a building.
• Fire located near or directly involving a pipeline facility.
• Explosion occurring near or directly involving a pipeline facility.
• Natural disaster.

Interestingly there is no requirement for pipeline operators to address a loss of pipeline pressure in their plan. This is the one indication that the operator would have in their system that there was a potentially dangerous leak. Nor is there a requirement to address an overpressure situation. Three of the remaining incidents listed would require that an outside agency contact the pipeline operator to initiate their response.

The ERP required in this regulation outlines what the operator would do in the event of one of these incidents occurring. With the exception of the first and last incident, the only real response required from the pipeline operator is to shut down the flow through the pipeline. In the two remaining incidents leak detection and pipeline repair are the types of actions that most people would expect pipeline operators to include in their emergency response plan.

The problem is that things like emergency evacuations, fire fighting, emergency medical care and police services are not in the purview of the pipeline operator, but would form the largest part of any emergency response plan. The current regulation only requires the pipeline operator to provide a liaison to the agencies that would conduct that emergency response planning. There are no requirements for communications in the current emergency planning regulations.

Routine Communication Requirements

Under the proposed ERP program each pipeline operator would be required to provide details about the location of transmission pipelines, large volume distribution pipelines and above ground pipeline facilities to each affected 911 operation. The information would be provided in a format compatible with the geospatial information system (GIS) used in the 911 operation.

Pipeline operators would be required to provide all 911 facilities supporting areas that any of their pipeline traverses with a 24-hour emergency contact number. Pipeline operators with distribution pipelines would be required to provide each customer with the same 24-hour emergency contact number. For high-risk or high-consequence pipelines there would be a requirement for a dedicated line between the operator’s control room and each affected 911 facility.

Pipeline operators with transmission (as opposed to distribution) pipelines in populated areas would be required to notify all property owners within a reasonable distance of the pipeline of the location of that pipeline and the 24-hour emergency contact number for that operator’s control room. Notification would be by mail and would include a brochure that would describe emergency actions people should take in the event of a distribution pipeline leak, fire near the pipeline, or regionally likely natural catastrophe (earthquake, hurricane, tornado, etc).

The notification would include provisions for the property owner to register as an ‘at risk’ facility (hospital, nursing home, school, daycare, or person with restricted mobility) that might need special assistance in the event of a pipeline incident. The notification would also provide for registration of property owners in an emergency notification program that would allow for the operator to contact affected property owners by phone, email or text message in the event of an emergency.

Pipeline operators would be required to provide 24 hour emergency contact information to the County, State and any regional FEMA Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) that could be affected by an incident associated with one of their pipelines. They would also be responsible for identifying an emergency response liaison officer that would be responsible for working with the affected FEMA ERCs. The operators would be required to provide the appropriate FEMA ERC with all of the information provided to local 911 facilities as well as a list of all self-identified at risk facilities in the area covered by that FEMA ERC.

Emergency Communication Requirements

In the event of any of the emergency situations listed in §192.615(a)(3) (and we would add loss of pipeline pressure and pipeline over-pressure incidents to the list), which ever party (pipeline operator or 911 service) received notification of the incident would immediately notify the other. The 911 service would be responsible for notifying the FEMA ERC. The emergency communications protocols established in the appropriate emergency response plan would be established.

Pipeline personnel designated as emergency response personnel would be required to communicate with the 911 dispatch by radio when they were activated as part of an ERP. Pipeline service personnel supporting emergency response personnel would be required to maintain communications with the pipeline control room (or designated pipeline emergency response center) and the supervisor of the pipeline emergency response personnel.

Once an incident command post was established, the pipeline operator would be required to provide a communications team to the command post that would allow for communications with all pipeline personnel working in the area and maintaining direct communications between the command post and the operator’s control room. The operator’s liaison and the county FEMA ERC would be expected to be at the command post to provide assistance and information to the incident commander. The FEMA ERC would establish communications with State, regional and national response facilities.

Communications Exercises

To ensure that the communications protocols established in this requirement actually work, there would be a requirement for routine communications exercises. Facilities with a required dedicated line to 911 services would be required to do (and document) a daily check of that line with a separate daily check initiated by the 911 service. All of the remaining pipeline control rooms would be required to document a weekly contact check with each of their supported 911 services.

Every vehicle owned by a pipeline operator that could be required to maintain communications with 911 dispatches in the event of a pipeline incident would be required to conduct a weekly communications check with each 911 dispatch to which it might be required to communicate. Whenever possible, that check should be made from within the covered area of the 911 service.

On a monthly basis the pipeline operator would verify communications with those people registered as wanting to be notified in the event of an emergency. The communication will be clearly identified as a test and would request an acknowledgement of receipt of the test message.

On an annual basis each covered pipeline operator would be required to report the communications exercises to the appropriate county FEMA ERC. In the event of any failure in communications with an 911 service or 911 dispatch, the report would include a description of the corrective action taken and the amount of time that the communication channel was known to be non-functional.

Other Regulated Industries

Many of the requirements for pipeline emergency response communications will be unique to that industry due to the nature of their distribution system and the continuous flow of hazardous materials through their lines. Other regulated industries would have similar requirements tailored to the nature and distribution of the risk associated with that facility.

Railroads for instance would be required to notify each FEMA ERC that had routes used to transport ‘rail security sensitive materials’ of the type hazardous materials included in that designation that were shipped on line as a designated route “posing the least overall safety and security risk” under the PHMSA rail routing rule. They would also be required to establish similar communications protocols with 911 services along those routes.

High-risk chemical facilities and RMP-covered facilities would be required to notify the affected FEMA ERCs and establish liaisons with the affected county FEMA ERC. Facilities would be required to provide mail notification to all property owners within the affected area described in the appropriate regulations. All covered facilities would be required to maintain communications with the local 911 service with Tier 1 and 2 CFATS facilities being required to maintain dedicated lines.

Detailed communications standards similar to those described above for the pipeline operations could be developed for any facility that the Federal government decided merited requiring the maintenance of an emergency response plan. The guiding principal would be that the private entity posing the risk would be required to notify the local FEMA ERC of the risk and establish an ERP liaison with the FEMA ERC. Provisions for emergency communications, and testing of those communications protocols, between the private entity and the local 911 service would be a necessary part of any ERP.