The current authorization for the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program expires on December 18th,
2018. Sometime within the next year, Congress will most likely be taking up
some form of reauthorization of the program. While we might expect to see
simple inclusion of extension language in the DHS spending bill, it would be
more efficient if Congress took up a standalone reauthorization bill that
updated the program. This is the first in a series of posts that looks at what
I would like to see included in such a bill. It should come as no surprise to
readers of this blog that I would like to see cybersecurity addressed in some
detail.
Definitions
I might as well start out this discussion by providing
realistic definitions of cybersecurity that address the differences between
security in information technology and operations (control systems) technology.
Readers of this blog will recognize that these definitions have
been proposed here in other contexts.
6 USC 621 is amended by adding at the end:
(15) The term ‘information system’ has the meaning given the term in
section 3502 of title 44;
(16) The term ‘control system’ means a discrete set of information
resources, sensors, communications interfaces and physical devices organized to
monitor, control and/or report on physical processes, including manufacturing,
transportation, access control, and facility environmental controls;
(17) The term ‘cybersecurity risk’ means:
(A) threats to and vulnerabilities of information, information systems,
or control systems and any related consequences caused by or resulting from
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, degradation, disruption, modification, or
destruction of such information, information systems, or control systems,
including such related consequences caused by an act of terrorism; and
(B) does not include any action that solely involves a violation of a
consumer term of service or a consumer licensing agreement;
(18) The term ‘cybersecurity incident’ means an occurrence that
actually, or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority:
(A) the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information on
an information system,
(B) the timely availability of accurate process information, the
predictable control of the designed process or the confidentiality of process
information, or
(C) an information system or a control system;
Incident Reporting
There are currently no regulatory requirements for CFATS
facilities to report cybersecurity incidents. The closest current regulations
come is in 6 CFR 27.230(8) is a requirement to ‘deter cyber sabotage’ or the
more general requirement. There is a strong suggestion in the Risk Based
Performance Standards (RBPS) guidance document that {Metric 8.5.4; pg 80}: “Significant
cyber incidents are reported to senior management and to the DHS’s US-CERT at www.us-cert.gov.” To date, there is no public
record that any such reports have been made.
I think that this suggestion should be a requirement of the
CFATS program and further strengthened. I propose that the following amendment
to 6
USC 622:
(f)
Cybersecurity Incident Reporting
(1) The Secretary will revise 6 CFR 27.230(15) to include requirements
for the reporting of cybersecurity incidents or suspected cybersecurity
incidents. Those revisions will address:
(A) Reporting cybersecurity incidents related to information systems to
the DHS US-CERT or successor organization;
(B) Reporting cybersecurity incidents related to control systems to the
DHS ICS-CERT or successor organization;
(C) Insuring that information provided to US-CERT or ICS-CERT in such
reports will be protected under provisions outlined in 6
USC 23;
(D) Requiring US-CERT or ICS-CERT to provide copies of the final
reports on such incidents to the head of the agency designated for the
enforcement of the CFATS regulations. Anonymized information about such
incidents will be further shared with CFATS covered facilities as deemed
appropriate.
(2) The Secretary will revise 6 CFR 27.230(15) to ensure that
significant cybersecurity incidents will be reported to the FBI.
Control System Vulnerabilities
There are no provisions in the current CFATS regulations or
the RBPS Guidance documents that address the identification and mitigation of
control system vulnerabilities. To correct that missing element of control
system security I would propose the following additional amendment to 6 USC 622:
(g)
Control System Vulnerabilities
(1) The Secretary will revise 6 CFR 27.230(8) to address the
identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities in control system identified
in facility site security plans. The revision will address requirements to:
(A) Identify critical control system components that effect the
storage, use, or movement of DHS chemicals of interest identified in the
facility tiering letter;
(B) Maintain a list of vulnerability reports from ICS-CERT and/or the
vendor concerning those components;
(C) Conduct a risk assessment of those reported vulnerabilities; and
(D) Maintain a record of the outcome of those risk assessments that
includes if/when appropriate mitigation measures were implemented.
(2) The Secretary will require ICS-CERT, or successor organization, to
identify control system security advisories and alerts that could apply to
chemical facilities and notify the agency responsible for the enforcement of
the CFATS regulations when such advisories and alerts are published.
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