Showing posts with label SSI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SSI. Show all posts

Friday, March 19, 2021

Reader Comments – SSI and Contractors

Long-time reader and frequent cogent commentor Laurie Thomas left a comment on my recent blog post about the introduction of HR 1871. That bill would bill would require the TSA to review procedures and guidelines for the use of the Sensitive Security Information (SSI) designation of information. Laurie points out that government contractors would certainly be affected by changes in the SSI program. Her comment is certainly worth reading, particularly by the staff at the House Homeland Security Committee responsible for this legislation.

Just a reminder to anyone concerned about changes to the SSI program, TSA is VERY slow to make changes to the program. There has been a rulemaking in place since 2004 when TSA published the interim final rule establishing the program. According to the Fall 2020 Unified Agenda, the final rule was expected to be published in August of this year, but that has slipped so many times it is no longer an even aspirational forecast.

Wednesday, March 17, 2021

HR 1871 Introduce - Transportation Security Transparency Improvement

Last week Rep Bishop (R,NC) introduced HR 1871 (GPO version not yet published, this is link to the Committee Print of the bill), the Transportation Security Transparency Improvement Act. The bill would require the TSA to review procedures and guidelines for the use of the Sensitive Security Information (SSI) designation of information.

SSI Review

Section 2(a) of the bill would require TSA to {§2(a)(1)}:

• Ensure clear and consistent designation of ‘‘Sensitive Security Information’’, including reasonable security justifications for such designation;

• Develop and implement a schedule to regularly review and update, as necessary, TSA Sensitive Security Information Identification guidelines;

• Develop a tracking mechanism for all Sensitive Security Information redaction and designation challenges;

• Document justifications for changes in position regarding Sensitive Security Information redactions and designations, and make such changes accessible to TSA personnel for use with relevant stakeholders, including air carriers, airport operators, surface transportation operators, and State and local law enforcement, as necessary; and

• Ensure that TSA personnel are adequately trained on appropriate designation policies.

Additionally, TSA would be required to conduct an outreach program to affected stakeholders “that regularly are granted access to Sensitive Security Information to raise awareness of the TSA’s policies and guidelines governing the designation and use of Sensitive Security Information” {§2(a)(2)}.

Moving Forward

As I previously reported, this bill is being considered by the House Homeland Security Committee on Thursday. I see nothing in this bill that would engender any organized opposition. I expect that it will receive broad bipartisan support in Committee. The bill would almost certainly be considered by the full House under the suspension of the rules process.

Commentary

The TSA’s SSI program is one of the sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information protection programs established after the 9/11 attacks. As with any information restriction program, it has been subject to criticism for over classification and abuse of classification over the years. Periodic reviews of these types of programs are certainly necessary.

The other portion of this bill dealing with security at ‘last point of departure airports’ (and I am not expanding this blog to cover that nightmare) includes both a ‘report to Congress’ requirement and an prevention of judicial review statement. Neither apply to the SSI provision.

I find it odd that there is no report to Congress provision in Section 2(a). The whole point of conducting a review is to establish accountability. This would be easy to correct by striking §2(b)(2) and adding a new §3:

“Section 3 – Report to Congress - Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration shall prepare a report for the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the guidelines described in Section 2. A copy of the Report will be posted on the Transportation Security Administration’s web site.”

Saturday, December 19, 2015

New TSA SSI Web Page

Back in August I did a blog post about the disappearance of the old TSA web site covering the Sensitive Security Information program. Every week since then I have been checking the old site URL hoping that the TSA had finally gotten a handicapped friendly version of the site back up. Today I decided, after striking out once again, to go look for the site and I found it.

Unfortunately, the new site is very vanilla with little real information. It does have links to two (here and here) relatively generic .PDF handouts about the program. It does not even have a working link to the section of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR 1520) that sets out the standards for the program.

It would be more helpful if it had a user manual outlining the program requirements like the Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) program or a detailed web site with details about the program like the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program does. I suppose that TSA is relying on the details in the CFR being enough, but if that is the case, they ought to at least provide links to each of the portions of the program in §1520; like this:

Section 1520.1 - Scope.
Section 1520.3 - Terms used in this part.
Section 1520.5 - Sensitive security information.
Section 1520.7 - Covered persons.
Section 1520.9 - Restrictions on the disclosure of SSI.
Section 1520.11 - Persons with a need to know.
Section 1520.13 - Marking SSI.
Section 1520.15 - SSI disclosed by TSA or the Coast Guard.
Section 1520.17 - Consequences of unauthorized disclosure of SSI.
Section 1520.19 - Destruction of SSI.

I do not know how long this ‘new’ site has been operational; the TSA does not date their web pages.

Saturday, August 29, 2015

SSI Program Information and Accessibility

Part of the work that I do to keep up to date on programs that I write about here on this blog is to periodically check a number of web sites to see what changes have been made. One of the web sites that I check every Saturday is the web site for the TSA’s Sensitive Security Information (SSI) program. I’m not providing the link (okay I will) to that site since it no longer exists and hasn’t for three weeks now.

It was an information packed site. It provided links to program documents, explanations of terms, training requirements; all sorts of good information that anyone dealing with SSI would like to have handy to make sure that they were compliant with the regulations.

The first weekend that it was down (and I’m not talking about a standard 404 error message, but a nice pretty TSA ‘Page Not Found’ message) I wrote it off as one of those glitches that periodically happens on the internet. The second week I fired off a request to TSA asking about what was going on with their SSI web site. This week I got a very nice email from the SSI folks. It explained that:

“TSA recently deployed a new website which could only contain 508-compliant material. The SSI Program is currently working with Public Affairs to convert our programmatic content so that it is 508-compliant and may be loaded to the site.”

For those of you who do not readily understand government speak the term ‘508-compliant material’ refers to the requirements of §508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC 794d) as amended in 1992 by §509 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992 (PL 102-569). In short the Federal government is required to provide equal access to information to people with disabilities. In this particular instance I would presume that that means people who cannot see the information on the web pages.

Now TSA information on the internet is hard enough to access for people with perfect vision, I can only imagine how hard it would be to find anything TSA related if I were visually impaired. So I whole heartedly endorse anything that makes access to this information easier for anyone, particularly those with physical disabilities.

What I find hard to understand, however, is how TSA could have deployed a new disability friendly web site without ensuring that all of the content was §508 compliant first. That does not make any sense to me.

Because of that inexcusable oversight we have gone at least three weeks now without information being available on this critical security program. The average small to medium business does not have professionals on staff that are fully up to speed on each and every Federal security program and it is sites like this currently missing site that made it possible for such enterprises to have some hope of complying with Federal mandates.

The SSI program is especially important when it comes to companies sharing security information with the Federal government. It is only possible for companies to protect security information that they share from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act if they properly request that the information be considered SSI. If an organization does not properly request SSI information protection of data shared with the government then it is not protected.

Without this site being available, the average small to medium company is not going to have a reasonable way of knowing how to protect their transportation security related information from public disclosure when it is shared with a Federal government agency.


There is currently no information available on how long it is going to take the TSA to convert their SSI program information to a §508 compliant format. In the meantime, the friendly email I received did provide an email point (SSI@tsa.dhs.gov) of contact for anyone needing information on SSI program needs. Of course, that isn’t a very large office and too many information requests will prevent them from doing their other SSI related work. It sure would be nicer if the web site had not been taken down.

Wednesday, July 22, 2015

FRA Notifies Railroads that SERC Notifications Will Continue

The DOT’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) announced today that it was sending a letter to railroads that they were going to continue to require railroads to make notifications to “State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) and Tribal Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs) of the expected movement of Bakken crude oil trains through individual states and tribal regions”. That requirement comes from an Emergency Order issued in May 2014 affecting all trains carrying more than million gallons of crude oil from the Bakken oil fields.

Conflict with OMB

The HHFT final rule issued by Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) in May actually contained provisions that cancelled the reporting requirements from the Emergency Order effective March 31st, 2016; the day before the railroads were to have completed their route selection requirements under the revised 49 CFR 172.820.

The FRA had notified the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of their intent to continue this reporting requirement until a new regulation on Oil Spill Response Planning could codify the requirements when they sought routine approval of the information collection request (ICR) supporting this reporting requirement. OIRA only approved the ICR thru March 31st of next year noting that:

“Per the joint PHMSA-FRA HHFT final rule (RIN 2137-AE91), the information collection requirements in the May 7, 2014 emergency order remain in effect until March 31, 2016. OMB is therefore approving this collection until that date. FRA may submit a request to continue this collection after soliciting public comment per the PRA's [Paperwork Reduction Act; specifically 44 USC 3506(c)] requirements.”

This does not mean, that the extension of the ICR will not be approved, but it does mean that the railroads will have another political opportunity to derail the effort.

Rail Routing Information is SSI

Because of the changes that the HHFT final rule made to §172.820 the routing information of highly-hazardous flammable trains (HHFT) is protected as Sensitive Security Information (SSI) under 49 CFR 15 and 49 CFR 1520. And the crude oil trains covered in the Emergency Order are certainly covered under the HHFT definition.

One of the reasons that railroads had objected to sharing the information required in the Emergency Order was that it was specifically not protected under SSI procedures. This left the public dissemination of that information up to the discretion of the local agency and the State rules that governed information sharing. And, as the railroads feared, much of that information was released to the public; making it accessible to people that might attempt to disrupt the flow of those trains.

The wording of §172.820(h)(2) makes it clear that the protected information is limited to the routing information not the volume or type of oil carried or the frequency with which the trains would traverse the selected routes. A close reading of the regulation would seem to indicate that the routing information does not actually become SSI until the first time that the railroads complete their route analysis under §172.820(c). That won’t officially be done until April 1st, 2016.

The FRA could have adopted the position in today’s letter to the railroads that for the purpose of moving forward with the continued notification and updates to SERTS that the routing portion of the information provided could be classified as SSI under authority of §172.820(c), thus pre-empting State and local sunshine act or freedom of information act laws for that information. Thus, SERTS would be required to only share that information with personnel with a need to know which would certainly include local emergency response and emergency planning agencies. The FRA obviously chose not to do so, adhering to the tightest interpretation of the rule.


This will have to be an issue that FRA addresses when they go back and re-submit the ICR for and extension of the reporting requirement past March 31st, since after that date the routing information is clearly protected from public disclosure under the banner SSI.

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

NARA Sends CUI NPRM to OMB

Yesterday the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs announced that the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) had submitted a draft of its notice of proposed rulemaking for the establishment of its Controlled Unclassified Information program. The requirements for this long overdue rulemaking were set forth in EO 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information.

According to the latest Unified Agenda entry for this rulemaking (RIN: 3095-AB80) that EO established “an open and uniform program for managing information requiring safeguarding or dissemination controls pursuant to and consistent with law, regulations, and Government-wide policies, excluding information that is classified under Executive Order 13526, or the Atomic Energy Act, as amended”.

The only details we have available about this proposed rulemaking at this date also come from that entry in the Unified Agenda. It notes that the NPRM would provide “guidance to agencies on safeguarding, disseminating, marking, and decontrolling CUI, self-inspection and oversight requirements, and other facets of the program”.

As I have noted in earlier posts on this EO this NPRM could potentially affect a number of chemical security related programs including CFATS (CVI), transportation security (SSI), and voluntary security information submissions to the government (PCII).


There is no telling how long it will take this rulemaking to percolate through OIRA. It is supposed to take just a couple of months, but in practice it can take years depending on the perceived political consequences of the rulemaking. Given the length of time that it has taken NARA to craft the NPRM, I expect this will be a lengthy process.

Wednesday, January 15, 2014

TSA Publishes 30-day SSI Check ICR

Today the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) published a 30-day ICR notice in the Federal Register (79 FR 2679-2680) for their program to vet personnel seeking access to Sensitive Security Information Information (SSI; 49 CFR Part 1520) during court proceedings. Section 525 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 (Public Law 109-295) required DHS to establish procedures for the use of SSI during Federal civil court proceedings, including {§525(d)} the conduct of a threat assessment of court personnel (including lawyers and expert witnesses) who might need to have access to the SSI information.

Change in Burden Estimate

TSA has made a rather substantial change to the burden information in this notice from the 60-day ICR notice published last summer. The earlier notice projected 120 requests for vetting with a burden estimate of 120 hours. This notice projects 127 requests with a burden estimate of 343 hours. The summary of this notice notes that:

“A correction has been made in this notice to the number of burden hours per respondent from 1 to 2.7 hours. The increase in burden hours is based on historical data collected over the past three years.” 

Actually the burden estimate is probably excessive. The currently approved form (download link) would only take a couple of minutes to complete unless an applicant had some adverse information that would have to be explained ‘on a separate sheet of paper’.

Public Comment


TSA is soliciting public comments on this ICR. Comments should be submitted directly to the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (oira_submission@omb.eop.gov). Comments should be submitted by February 14th, 2014.

Friday, August 16, 2013

TSA Publishes SSI Threat Assessment 60-day ICR Notice

Today the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) published a 60-day ICR renewal notice (78 FR 50076-50077) for their threat assessment program for allowing the use of Sensitive Security Information (SSI; 49 CFR Part 1520) during court proceedings. Section 525 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 (Public Law 109-295) required DHS to establish procedures for the use of SSI during Federal civil court proceedings, including {§525(d)} the conduct of a threat assessment of court personnel (including lawyers and expert witnesses) who might need to have access to the SSI information.

The procedures established require TSA to conduct a threat assessment that includes:

• A fingerprint-based criminal history records check (CHRC);
• A name-based check to determine whether the individual poses or is suspected of posing a threat to transportation or national security, including checks against terrorism, immigration, or other databases TSA maintains or uses; and
• A professional responsibility check (for attorneys and court reporters)

Burden Estimate

The table below shows the current estimated burden estimate for the renewal of this ICR along with the previously approved burden estimate. The time estimate is the time necessary for individuals to provide the required information necessary for TSA to conduct the various background checks.


This Notice
Previous Notice
Responses
120
180
Burden Hours
120
480
Cost Burden
0
0

[Corrected typo in the 'this notice' column changing '100' to '120' in both response and burden hour lines, 1-15-14 5:00 am CST]
There is no explanation for the decreased number of annual responses required, but presumably it is based upon recent history. Nor is there an explanation for why there is a drastic reduction in the amount of time necessary to provide the information (from 2 hours and 20 minutes to one hour). Looking at the previously approved TSA Form 2211, I don’t see how anyone would have taken an hour to complete the form, much less 2 and 2/3rds hours. Perhaps the additional time included the time to get fingerprinted.

Public Comments

The TSA is soliciting public comments on this ICR renewal notice. Such comments need to be sent to TSA PRA Officer (TSAPRA@dhs.gov). Again as I noted this morning, there are no provisions explained in this notice for using the Federal eRulemaking Portal for submission of comments. Interestingly, there is a docket for this ICR at www.Regulations.gov; Docket # TSA-2013-0001-0012 and there are already two comments posted there.

Monday, January 7, 2013

HR 68 Introduced – CFATS Changes


As I mentioned earlier Rep. Jackson-Lee (D,TX) introduced HR 68, the Chemical Facility Security Improvement Act of 2013. The GPO site does not yet have a copy of this bill posted but the Library of Congress Thomas site does. While that is not an official publication, it is good enough to tell us that the language of HR 68 is exactly the same as the two earlier versions that I mentioned (HR 225-112th Congress, and HR 261 111th Congress).

The links above go to earlier blog posts where I describe the political shortcomings of the bill and everything in those posts still apply to this version. I’ll avoid repeating myself here and just provide a summary of what the bill does.

SSP Approval


Section 2(a) of the bill prohibits the Secretary from spending any money on the approval of a CFATS site security plan unless the facility meets local security standards set by any State or local government agency. Instead of saying that the Secretary can’t approve a site security plan unless it meets local standards, it essentially prohibits any DHS action on a site security plan (including presumably accepting the submission of the site security plan) unless the facility meets local standards.

Hmm… I just thought of something. This might be a good way to essentially opt out of the CFATS process. If a facility doesn’t meet local standards, the regulatory authority of the folks at ISCD would be suspended.

Program Changes


Section 2(b) of the bill makes a number of seemingly innocuous word changes (delete this and add this type of thing) to the §550 CFATS authorization language that would mandate some substantial changes to the program. It would eliminate the Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) program and place CFATS under the

The first would insert the words “from terrorist attack” in two places that would clarify the ‘threat’ from which the covered facilities would be at high-risk. This seems simple enough, but it seems to me that the only purpose would be to remove facilities from CFATS coverage that are only at risk of having DHS chemicals of interest (COI) stolen from the site to be used to make weapons of mass destruction for use in a terrorist attack. Theft isn’t exactly a terrorist attack.

Section 2(b)(1)(C) would remove the phrase that has provided the most problems for the folks at ISCD; “the Secretary may not disapprove a site security plan submitted under this section based on the presence or absence of a particular security measure”. This change would allow Department to tell facility owners exactly what security measures would be required for site security plan approval. It would also allow for the dismembering of the risk-based performance standards.

Section 2(b)(2) would change the way that information submitted to DHS was protected by the Government from public disclosure. It would eliminate the Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) program and put the CFATS program under the data protection of the sensitive security information (SSI) set forth in §1520.5 of 49 CFR. It would also eliminate the protection from any data submitted to DHS that wasn’t actually part of the site vulnerability assessment (SVA) or site security plan (SSP) submission. Information provided separately to DHS in response to questions about the program would not be specifically protected.

Finally §2(b)(3) would eliminate the phrase “nothing in this section confers upon any person except the Secretary a right of action against an owner or operator of a chemical facility to enforce any provision of this section”. This does not provide an affirmative right for citizen lawsuits, but it is certainly intended to open the door for their use.

Moving Forward


This bill did not see any action in either the 111th or 112th Congresses and I don’t believe that even a single hearing will be held on this bill.

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Another Attempt to Block CSB with Security Claims

The Chemical Safety Board just posted a press release on their web site outlining an emergency recommendation they are making to CITGO about an emergency response issue found during their investigation of the July 19th, 2009 explosion and fire at CITGO’s Corpus Christi refinery. As part of this recommendation CSB intended to release footage of two internal surveillance cameras that showed the events that led up to the explosion and fire. According to the CSB press release:
Chairman Bresland said, however, that the company had raised objections [sic] to the CSB’s release of the video, saying that doing so would “raise substantial issues of national security” and would “only sensationalize this unfortunate accident.” The CSB subsequently received affirmation from the Department of Homeland Security [sic] that the video did not fall under certain classifications requiring protection from disclosure. Chairman Bresland said, “We found this claim disturbing and believe that it is contrary to the intent of a recent law passed by Congress, following similar secrecy claims by Bayer CropScience in Institute, West Virginia. This law, the American Communities’ Right to Public Information Act, states that national security classifications may not be used to conceal corporate errors, prevent embarrassment, or improperly delay the release of information to the public. An important part of this CSB investigation is to ensure all relevant information and visual materials regarding this accident are made available to the residents of Corpus Christi.”
I am very happy to be able to report that the TSA responded promptly (one day turnaround) to the CSB request for a ruling on the security issue. Reading the TSA letter (CSB provided a link to the letter in their press release) it appears that TSA has been thinking through this type issue and has identified some reasonable internal guidelines for making these decisions. I am not sure that this is as clear a violations of the ‘intent’ of §561 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (PL 111-83) as Chairman Bresland claims. It certainly goes against the mandate of the Chemical Safety Board to communicate the causes of such events to the local community and the chemical industry. I still maintain that the §561 provisions are inadequate to protect the CSB’s disclosure mandate. Congress needs to make absolutely clear that:
The CSB mandate to collect information about chemical accidents gives them automatic clearance for receiving SSI and CVI information; That CSB should be given full release authority on information obtained in their investigations, that in the opinion of the Chairman, that bears on the root cause of the accident or interfered with the effective response to the incident; and That TSA and ISCD should provide investigators to all CSB investigations at sites covered by security rules issued by those organizations to advise the CSB on security matters during the investigation.
It is only through a clear congressional statement of this sort in specific legislation that CSB will not have their urgent recommendations delayed while they have to get clearance for information release from the Department of Homeland Security.

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

S 1274 Status Update – 07-21-09

The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held an Executive Session yesterday afternoon at which they marked-up S 1274, a bill to prevent the re-occurrence of the efforts of Bayer CropScience to limit the discussion of information related to their fatal accident last year by excessive claims of coverage as Sensitive Security Information. The bill was ordered to be reported favorably with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. There was no discussion and the substitute language is not currently available. When the Committee report is made available, I’ll take a look at what changes have been made. I’m still not sure why Sen. Rockefeller (D,WV), the sponsor of this bill, is proceeding with this legislation as he was able to get identical provisions added to the Senate version of HR 2892, the DHS FY2010 Budget. Of course that bill has not yet passed, or even come out of conference committee. He may just be covering his bets.

Monday, July 13, 2009

SSI Language in Senate Version of HR 2892

The Senate included a number of new amendments when they passed the DHS FY 2010 budget last week. Adding these amendments to HR 2892 ensured that each house will have to consider the bill one more time after the conference committee works out the differences between the two versions of the bill. Friday afternoon the GPO still did not have the version of the bill passed in the Senate available on their web site so it is difficult to tell exactly what was included in the bill, but two things seem to be clear, the CFATS extension remains intact and Senators Rockefeller and Byrd (D, WV) managed to get Sensitive Security Information (SSI) clarifying language (Senate Amendment 1401) added to the Senate’s version of the bill (thanks to Ken Ward for pointing this out in his blog). SSI Clarification This amendment adds the same language to three different sections of 49 USC; §114(r), §40119(b), and §70103(d). The language is identical to that found in S. 1274 that had been introduced by Sen. Rockefeller. That language reads:
“(3) Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be construed to authorize the designation of information as sensitive security information (as defined in section 15.5 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations)-- “(A) to conceal a violation of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; “(B) to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; “(C) to restrain competition; or “(D) to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of transportation security, including basic scientific research information not clearly related to transportation security.”
The intention of this language is to prevent a repeat of the situation that happened earlier this year when Bayer CropScience applied the SSI label to huge quantities of information requested by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) in their investigation of the deadly accident at the Bayer CropScience facility last year. In the end Bayer relented and admitted they were attempting to control the public release of information to avoid having a public discussion about the safety and security of their methyl isocyanate (MIC) production and storage. This language should make it clear that the intention of the SSI ‘classification’ is not to protect a facility like Bayer CropScience from public scrutiny of their potential effect on the health and safety of the surrounding communities. Unfortunately, from the House testimony it is clear that Bayer knew that much of the information that they were marking as SSI should not have been marked that way. Thus, it is not clear that this would have prevented the SSI classification fiasco seen earlier this year. Short of adding some sort of punitive language to these clarifications, I don’t see how this amendment to the DHS budget is going to solve the underlying problem. The Underlying Problem The problem wasn’t really that Bayer was inappropriately classifying the information (though they were certainly doing that), but that there were no provisions in the regulations for the Chemical Safety Board’s use of SSI information. The Coast Guard was quick to point out that the CSB certainly had a ‘need to know’, but it would have helped if that had been codified in the regulations. The CSB has a statutory mission of investigating chemical related accidents and disseminating information from those investigations to prevent similar incidents at other facilities. This caused a problem in this case because CSB did not have any guidance on what SSI information that it could disclose while fulfilling its reporting mission. The CSB was afraid that it would run into legal problems publicly disclosing security information. Ultimately, the CSB did get Coast Guard approval for the specific information they would provide in their public meeting, but there are still questions about how to deal with potential legitimate SSI in the final report. Suggested Solution What is needed is for the SSI rules {and the Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) rules} to be amended to specifically provide for the handling of ‘classified’ data in CSB investigations and for SSI/CVI handling rules to be built into the CSB rules. This will probably have to be handled as stand alone legislation rather than trying to incorporate it into some spending bill; the CSB is funded under the EPA budget bill, while the Coast Guard is funded under the DHS budget. First, and maybe most importantly, CSB needs to be added to the list of agencies to which disclosure of mandated information means that that information automatically removed from either SSI or CVI protection. Other agencies on the current lists include EPA, and OSHA. The intent is to insure that facility security information does not become justification for avoiding other regulatory responsibilities. Next provisions need to include a requirement for CSB to formally notify DHS of the initiation of all formal investigations. DHS would then be required to determine if the facility in question was a covered facility under MTSA, CFATS, or a variety of TSA administered security programs. DHS would be required to notify the CSB of the facility’s covered status and to provide liaison officers from the appropriate agencies. The CSB investigation team and supporting staff would be authorized to ask for (and receive) any documentation that they deem appropriate to their investigation. During the investigation they would be required to protect all appropriately marked documents in accordance with the appropriate regulations. All notes made from appropriately marked ‘controlled’ documents would include identification of the source document and security markings. When the same information is found in an uncontrolled document, the information cite should reference the uncontrolled document and not mention the classification from the controlled source. If at any point during the investigation, it becomes evident that the accident was the result of a deliberate attack rather than a process accident, CSB would cease to be the lead agency in the investigation. The properly protected and controlled documents could then be turned over to the new agency lead or remain with the CSB personnel still supporting the investigation. In any case, all security information would still be protected in accordance with the appropriate regulations. In writing their final report on a chemical accident, CSB would strive to avoid mention of security measures, unless, in their opinion, those security measures directly contributed to the cause of the accident or hindered the response to the accident. In any case, the final report would not be classified. Security measures that contribute to the cause of a serious chemical accident or result in additional deaths, serious injuries, or property damage because they hindered the emergency response to that accident require a public discussion to prevent similar occurrences at other facilities. While security measures may be compromised, the results of a severe chemical accident will do more to compromise security while they endanger the public health and safety. A classified annex could be prepared to allow CSB investigators (and or DHS liaisons) to comment on any security measures that might cause issues in other instances, but do not pose an imminent danger. Like wise, the classified annex could also be used to point out short comings in the security program at the covered facility. In either case DHS should ensure that such a classified annex be given the widest possible distribution within the chemical facility security community so that other facilities can correct similar problems at their facility. The Importance of Security and Safety While there will be the inevitable discussion about which is more important, safety or security, it must be remembered that as far as high-risk chemical facilities are concerned they are two sides of the same coin. The purpose of both is to protect employees at the facility and their neighbors in the community from the threat of exposure to the consequences of an unplanned release of hazardous chemicals. An unsafe facility is a security risk; a severe accident will compromise security measures. An insecure facility is an unsafe facility; a chemical release will do the same damage whether it is caused by an accident or a terrorist attack. The safety and security communities must come together and work as a team to protect the greater community.

Monday, June 22, 2009

Reader Comment – 06-22-09 – S 1274

Michael A. writes about today’s blog on S 1274: “One thing at a time. This is aimed at something very specific and something lots of Senators can easily get onboard with. Now as long as it's not overloaded with amendments.... ;) He makes a good point. This is simple and straightforward legislation and because it is obviously targeted at Bayer CropScience this should have little problem passing if it makes it to the floor. I suspect that it stands a much better chance of being added to the DHS budget bill. That will avoid all of the unpleasantness of committee hearings and such. I don’t like the ‘one thing at a time’ approach. It can cause significant confusion. This is a pretty good case in point. If this bill passes because it is the ‘Bayer’ bill and nothing else is done about the other places where SSI provisions exist, we will see the same type action take place again. Only it may not be as big a deal as MIC and Institute, WV with all of the attendant publicity that that entailed. Or it may not be a government agency like the CSB that gets hit with the limitations and threats of law suits. In those cases not enough people may notice. In any case the time to solve the problem is now while everyone’s memory is clear and sharp about the problems that this situation caused. Just solving this for Bayer CropScience will do no good, after-all they have promised to sin no more.

Thursday, April 16, 2009

Security and Safety

Anyone that worked with me while I was a process chemist in a specialty chemical manufacturing facility knows that I have always been passionate about process safety. And readers of this blog know of my passion for security. So, it should be no surprise that I am very concerned with the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) vs. Sensitive Security Information (SSI) controversy surrounding next week’s public meeting on the Bayer CropScience fatal process accident that happen last summer. Two opinion pieces yesterday, one at USAToday.com and the other at Pubs.ACS.org, paint this as a conflict between security and community-right-to-know (CRTK). I think that this is a major mistake. In the context of counter terrorism operations, security and CRTK are part and parcel of the same operation, just like security and safety. They all contribute to a piece of the puzzle to prevent a successful terrorist attack. Assume it was a Terrorist Attack Let me use the Bayer incident as an instructional aid. Let’s assume that the accident was not an accident, but actually a well planned and executed terrorist attack. Assume for a moment that the ‘process upset’ that caused the explosion had been deliberately engineered and had been just a little bit larger in size. The nearby MIC tank, instead of escaping damage, would have (in our assumed incident) been punctured by flying debris. A cloud of methyl isocyanate would have been released to the atmosphere and spread to the adjacent community. The resulting panic, injuries and deaths would have made this a very successful attack. However, if CRTK had been an integral part of the security plan for the installation, there would have been automated systems around the tank and process area to detect the slightest release of MIC. As the first sensor detected the leak, an automatic alarm would have been sent to facility and community first responders. As more sensors became ‘involved’ other automated sensors would have begun auto-dialing local residents and businesses warning them to begin to take appropriate measures. Weather sensors and an array of chemical sensors around the facility would have begun mapping the spread of the cloud and projecting concentrations beyond the fence line. Decisions would have been made about who would evacuate and who would shelter in place and the appropriate communications made. Local residents would have been told in advance how to shelter in place or where to evacuate and why one was better than the other in a particular situation. At the same time, other automated mitigation measures would go into action. Water and chemical sprays would start that would knock down the bulk of the cloud. Properly equipped emergency responders would arrive at the scene and make what ever temporary repairs were possible to stop further leakage. Off-site response personnel would arrive on the scene to provide assistance to the community near the facility, monitoring for exposure levels and getting people safely out of the area. In the CRTK scenario, the success of the terrorist attack would have been reduced because panic, deaths and injuries would have been greatly reduced. This is the reason that CRTK plans are an integral part of any successful counter-terrorism security plan, just as they are a critical part of any successful process safety plan. Working Together Unfortunately, the government’s safety, security, and CRTK people are not working together. They are in different agencies and working under separate mandates. In this case the security and safety people have worked out an accommodation, but the CRTK people are still wondering in the wilderness. Two agencies have worked together to the extent that one did not stop the other, but that is not actually cooperation. It is more like a temporary cease fire on the battlefield to collect the wounded. This is a high-risk chemical facility (both from a safety and security point of view). Until the CSB determines the actual cause of the incident (which may not happen for another six months, if ever) there is a remote possibility that this was a deliberate attack and not a process problem. Even if it were completely accidental or the result of an inadequate process design/operation there are security issues that will inevitably be identified in the thorough type investigation that the CSB conducts. In either case the Coast Guard, as the responsible security agency for the facility, should be working as part of the CSB team during the investigation. A Coast Guard investigator should be a working member of the team, reporting to the head CSB investigator. That forensics investigator would then be immediately available and up to speed on the investigation if evidence of sabotage or outside attack was discovered. Otherwise that investigator should be looking at how the existing security plans contributed to or mitigated the severity of the incident. Congressional Action Required When the Chemical Safety Board was formed ten years ago there was no Federal involvement with security at chemical facilities. As the C&EN article notes there are now about 10,000 facilities with federally regulated security measures. More will likely be added if/when the water facility exemption is removed this year. The mandate for the Chemical Safety Board needs to be updated to take this into account. On the other hand, Congress completely overlooked the issue of chemical safety and community-right-to-know when they mandated security measures at chemical facilities. That was a major political and technical mistake and one that needs to be corrected. It is fortunate that the Bayer issue comes up when it did. Congress is beginning to consider the reauthorization of the CFATS program next week. The hearing before the Government Oversight subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee should be just the first such hearing to look at the safety/security issue. Both the Energy and Commerce and the Homeland Security Committees need to look at this issue as part of the CFATS reauthorization. In my not-so-humble opinion, the Chemical Safety Board needs to remain the lead agency in any major accident or incident at a chemical facility; they alone have the technical expertise to get to the root cause of the accident/incident. At facilities that fall under CFATS, DHS should provide an investigator to assist the CSB by looking into security issues. For facilities that fall under the MTSA, the Coast Guard should provide that assistance. Additionally, they could provide on-going guidance to the CSB investigators about what information they receive or uncover that would be considered to be protected information under SSI or CVI rules. In any case, there should be a classified appendix to any CSB report involving a covered chemical facility that addresses the security issues that contributed to, or mitigated, the severity of the incident. That report should be given the widest possible dissemination in the security community, including other covered facilities.
 
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