Reader Comment – CFATS Termination

Yesterday, a reader left a comment on a slightly-older blog post about the Chemical Sector Security Summit. Beyond asking about how the CFATS program termination will affect the CSSS, CMD commented on both the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program and the CFATS program. The comment is well worth reading.

Termination and CSSS

Technically, the CSSS is not a CFATS meeting, it is run out of a different shop in CISA. The Office of Chemical Security (that ran the CFATS program) has been a major force in the CSSS programing, and I do not expect that to change. OCS still has responsibility for the ChemLock program and eventually standing up the ANSP. I am expecting to hear some word about changes to the program based upon the CFATS termination. And, I expect that the program will probably be reinstated, and there will be at least informal discussions about how that could work at the CSSS.

ANSP

As I noted [removed from paywall] a couple of months back, the rulemaking for the Ammonium Nitrate Security program remains on the active Unified Agenda. This means that we may (probably not) see a notice of proposed rulemaking in September, the latest forecast date.

Keep on Keeping Chemical Security

CMD made this comment about ongoing chemical security measures:

“On the other hand, all those associations and companies who seem to think the failure of CFATS means they can't properly secure their facilities is hogwash. Keep doing what they've been doing, just because they don't have some inspector from DHS telling them that what they are doing is right doesn't mean they shouldn't keep doing it...”

In a perfect world, this would remain true, but this is a far from perfect world. In many cases the justification for the high levels of spending on security measures was that the spending was required by regulation. With that justification removed, some of those facilities will cut back their spending.

I expect that facilities with release hazard COI (flammable, explosive, and toxic) can readily see why security measures are justifiable even without the CFATS program. Some parts of site security programs will still be questioned, but basic physical security measures will very likely remain.

Facilities with precursor (chemical weapon and explosive precursors) chemicals will have a harder time justifying security measures. Theft of these chemicals will not have a larger impact on the facility, so there is no business case for most of the security measures required in site security plans under the program. Stopping terrorists from having access to these chemicals is a very large part of the mission of the CFATS program.