HR 6022 Introduced – CFATS Propane Exception

Last month, Rep Burlison (R,MO) introduced HR 6022, the Propane Accessibility and Regulatory Relief Act. The bill would exempt ‘from any CFATS regulation’ “any propane tank with a capacity of up to 126,000 pounds of propane.” No funding is authorized by this legislation.

Moving Forward

Neither Burlison, nor his sole cosponsor {Rep Latta (R,OH)} are members of the House Homeland Security Committee to which this bill was assigned for primary consideration. This means that there is probably not sufficient influence to see this bill considered in that Committee. Latta is, however, a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee to which this bill was assigned for secondary consideration. There may be sufficient influence to see the bill considered in that Committee.

Until the CFATS program is reauthorized, there is no reason for either Committee to take up this legislation. If this bill were considered, I suspect that there would be significant opposition to the bill, but it is unclear if there would be sufficient opposition to stop it from moving forward. The will, however, be enough opposition to prevent the bill from being considered under the suspension of the rules process in the House, since that process requires a supermajority for passage. This bill is not politically important enough to move forward under a rule.

Commentary

The agriculture industry has already taken significant efforts {during the regulatory process of approving the DHS chemicals of interest (COI) list} to reduce the coverage of propane as a DHS chemical of interest (COI). Instead of the normal 10,000-lb screening threshold quantity for other flammable release COI, the STQ for propane was set at 60,000 lbs. Additionally, propane stored in tanks holding less than 10,000-lbs need not be counted in determining the amount of propane that would have to be reported in a facility Top Screen.

Review - HR 1623 Introduced – CFATS Propane Exclusion

Last month, Rep Finstad (R,MN) introduced HR 1623 (no name). The bill would add certain commercial propane storage facilities to the list of facilities excluded from the reporting requirements of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. No funding is authorized by this legislation.

Moving Forward

Neither Finstad, nor his sole cosponsor {Rep Costa (D,CA)} are members of either the House Homeland Security Committee or the House Energy and Commerce Committee to which this bill was assigned for consideration. This means that HR 1623 is unlikely to be considered in either committee. I think that there would be bipartisan opposition in both committees to extending CFATS exemptions to these facilities; it would undercut the whole purpose of the program.

Commentary

It is sad, that as of this date, that this is the only bill that has been introduced this session dealing with the CFATS program. The current authorization of the program runs out on July 27^th, 2023. There has not even been a CFATS oversight hearing scheduled. I suspect that the program will be extended, but the lack of action to date would almost ensure that Congress will only be able to effect a short term extension of the program.

ISCD Updates FAQ Responses – 09-14-18

Yesterday the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) updated responses to two Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Knowledge Center web page. Both questions deal with calculating screening threshold quantities for mixtures of flammables (one is specifically for propane).

The two revised FAQs are:

#1373 When filling out the Top-Screen questionnaire, how should a facility report a mixture with multiple release-flammable Chemicals of Interest (COIs)? Does the facility need to list the entire weight of the mixture for each COI or does it only need to be listed once? The mixture is not a fuel.

#1566 How does a facility calculate the Screening Threshold Quantity (STQ) for propane in a mixture?

Flammable Mixtures

The response for FAQ #1373 was completely re-written with a completely different process from the original description.

The original response said essentially that when COI were in a mixture at more than 1% the entire weight of the COI was reported as the COI with the highest concentration; the facility did not report the weight of the other COI in that mixture. The exception to that was propane; if propane was in the mixture at less than 87.5% the next greatest COI in that mixture was reported, not the propane.

The new response also requires the checking of the NFPA flammability rating of the mixture. If the NFPA rating is 4 then the rule described above applies. If the NFPA rating is 1, 2 or 3 (and not a fuel), then only the actual weight of each COI in the mixture (present at 1% or more) would be reported.

Interestingly, no mention is made of propane in the new FAQ response.

Propane Mixtures

A relatively minor modification was made to the response to FAQ #1566. The second paragraph was expanded to provide more of the information from the FAQ response above for mixtures that contain less than 87.5% propane. It addresses the case where the NFPA rating of the propane containing mixture is 4. This response does not address the situation where the NFPA rating is 1, 2, or 3.

ISCD Publishes Propane Fact Sheet

Today the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) published a fact sheet about how propane is treated under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. It would appear that this fact sheet is yet another effort in the CFATS outreach program.

This is a one-page fact sheet (as opposed to the two-page sheets that address industry groups) so the amount of information that is provided is somewhat limited. Fortunately for DHS, the internet provides a way to pack a great deal of information into that one page via links to various information sources.

Propane Concentration

There is one link to an often over looked piece of information related to propane, the Federal Register notice outlining the special status of propane when looking at the mixture rule. Appendix A clearly states that the ‘Minimum Concentration’ for propane is 1%, the same as all other flammable release DHS chemical of interest (COI). But, the Federal Register Notice from March 21, 2008 clearly states that:

“Since DHS intends the COI propane to refer to products containing at least 87.5 percent of propane, as well as other release-flammable COI, it follows that the release-flammable mixtures rule does not apply to such products. In fact, it would not make sense to apply the release-flammable mixtures rule to the combination of chemicals that constitute the COI propane because that would largely negate the intended effect of the 60,000 pound STQ and the special STQ counting rule for the COI propane.[6] By contrast, the release- flammable mixtures rule does apply to products that are a combination of less than 87.5 percent propane and other release-flammable COI, since such mixtures are not themselves the COI propane.”

This oddity means that if you have 60,000 lbs of a commercial product that is only 87.4% propane and 13.6% butane, then the standard 1% mixture rule would be in effect and both propane and butane would have to be reported on a Top Screen at 60,000 lbs. If the product were stored at less than 60,000 lbs but more than 10,000 lbs (the STQ for butane), then only butane would have to be reported on the Top Screen as the total amount stored. But, again with ‘standard commercial propane’, only the propane has to be reported on the Top Screen.

Another Propane Oddity

There is one odd piece of information that is not directly referenced in the fact sheet, the odd way that propane STQ is calculated. For any other flammable release DHS chemical of interest, the STQ is calculated by adding up the total amount of the COI that is stored on the facility or used in processes at the facility. For propane, in another move to appease the agricultural community, only propane that is stored in tanks containing more than 10,000-lbs needs to be counted towards the 60,000-lb STQ.

CFATS Outreach

One thing that is not clear from the publication of these outreach fact sheets on the CFATS Knowledge Center is how ISCD expects these fact sheets to get to the facilities that are not presently covered under the CFATS program but probably would be if they submitted a Top Screen. This is, after all, the whole purpose of the outreach program; get the word out to facilities that are required to submit a Top Screen.

For the industry fact sheets, I would suspect that ISCD is counting on (and has almost certainly asked) the various professional organizations that support the covered industries to forward the fact sheet to their members. While the same technique may be used here I would guess that ISCD is going to request that covered CFATS facilities that ship propane forward this fact sheet to their customers that hold inventories over 60,000-lbs in 10,000-lb or greater tanks.

There is an easier way to conduct this outreach effort, ISCD could always require facilities that ship COI in greater than STQ quantities to provide ISCD with a list of those customers. Then ISCD could directly contact the facilities that have not yet submitted Top Screens and require them to do so under 6 CFR 27.200(b). The authority to request a list of customers is already provided in 27.200(a):

“… the Secretary may, at any time, request information from chemical facilities that may reflect potential consequences of or vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack or incident, including questions specifically related to the nature of the business and activities conducted at the facility; information concerning the names, nature, conditions of storage, quantities, volumes, properties, customers, major uses, and other pertinent information about specific chemicals or chemicals meeting a specific criterion….” [emphasis added]

The fact that ISCD has, as of yet, not decided to take this rather drastic step is probably a matter of consideration of the business needs of the current CFATS facilities. It is, however, just a matter of time if we continue to see chemical release incidents at facilities that were, in retrospect, obviously required to submit Top Screens. Congress can politically withstand only so many West Fertilizer type incidents with ISCD saying; “Nope, never heard of them.”

Bills Introduced – 11-13-14

Yesterday was the second day of the lame duck session and all sorts of stuff has to be addressed by this Congress; including the FY 2015 spending bill. With that said, there were 22 bills introduced yesterday including just one that may be of specific interest to readers of this blog:

HR 5705 To modify certain provisions relating to the Propane Education and Research Council. Rep. Latta, Robert E. [R-OH]

According to a press release from Latta’s office this bill will modify the Propane Education and Research Act (15 USC 6401 et seq) to help the propane industry avoid pricing spikes and to avoid misinterpretation of the training program requirements of the original act by the Department of Commerce. It will be interesting to see what other things may be included.

NOTE: Readers will note that the link to the bill no longer goes to the old Thomas.LOC.gov web site. That site is being phased out and the new Congress.gov site will be the source of information. It looks like the new site is slower to post bills, so these ‘Bills Introduced’ posts will be coming out later in the day than normal. For those that like the old Thomas.LOC site it will be up through at least a portion of next year.

Bills Introduced – 02-25-14

Yesterday both the House and Senate were in the Capitol and a total of 27 bills were introduced, one of which might be of specific interest to readers of this blog:

HR 4076 Latest Title: To address shortages and interruptions in the availability of propane and other home heating fuels in the United States, and for other purposes.Sponsor: Rep Shuster, Bill (D,PA)

This bill would extend the 30-day limit on transportation emergencies to allow the DOT Secretary to continue to suspend certain transportation safety regulations to allow for the transportation of propane into areas of the country hit by the current local shortage and low temperatures. Since this was introduced by the Chair of the House Transportation Committee I assume that this will see quick action.

Propane Revisited

It has been a while, but let’s look at a recent chemical incident as very briefly reported at KHQ.com. A propane explosion caused a reported $1 million dollars in property damage at a construction site in Mukilteo, WA when a valve was knocked off a tank when it was being moved.

How much propane did it take to produce a ‘300-foot blast zone’? It only took about 300 gallons or about 2,000 lbs. It doesn’t take much flammable gas to provide a really significant explosion when the conditions are right. That is why DHS set the screening threshold quantity (STQ) for flammable gasses at 10,000 lbs; about five times as much as was involved in this explosion.

OOPS. I should have said all flammable gasses except propane. At the urging of the propane industry, and more importantly the agriculture industry, DHS set the STQ for propane at 60,000 lbs. This means that all but the largest commercial propane tanks and the wholesale tanks at distributors are presumed to not be a threat to homeland security if successfully attacked by terrorists.

While politics certainly had a part to play in the DHS decision on the listing of propane, one must also assume that in a twisted sense reality also had a great deal to play in that decision. I have not seen reliable figures on how many tanks holding 10,000 lbs or more exist in the United States, but I would surely bet that it was more than the 40,000+ number of facilities that did submit Top Screens to the CFATS program.

That means that we could have had more than 80,000 Top Screens submitted with a similar doubling of the about 4,000 facilities going into the site security planning process. And you think that DHS has had problems processing site security plans now? OMG!

Of course the tank at this facility could have been designed to hold 60,000 lbs of propane, the article doesn’t say. One would like to think that you pretty much empty a propane tank when you move it, just to prevent this type of accident. You also reduce the cost of the crane that has to lift it if you lighten the load. So it is possible that this sight could actually have been covered by CFATS.

OOPS. Wrong again. You see it was a water treatment facility. So, even if it did have a 60,000 lb propane tank on site, it would not have been covered by CFATS. Nor would it have been covered by the much weaker EPA regulations that don’t require security plans. The EPA is concerned with protecting the purity of the drinking water (a very important concern to be sure) not with protecting the public from terrorist attacks on the chemicals on site.

Oh well. I guess the good people of Mukilteo, WA will just have to hope that their water facility management can provide adequate anti-terrorism security without federal oversight.

Gas Bombs

It appears that the folks at PublicIntelligence.net are back functioning again and have recently published another interesting intelligence document, this one from the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center. The Maryland Fusion Center produced this ‘Officer Awareness Bulletin’ on Trash Bag (Balloon) Bombs last May; the document is marked ‘Unclassified/For Official Use Only’.

Security Warning: Government employees and contractors; under the Obama Administration’s WIKI Leaks doctrine, you may be subject to disciplinary action up to and including dismissal if you are caught reading the FOUO document without specific authorization.

The Bulletin describes the use of trash bags filled with a lighter-than-air flammable gas as an improvised explosive device. They note that acetylene is a commonly used gas for these IEDs. Its wide flammability range and ease of ignition make it more effective than the other commonly available flammable gas, propane. Acetylene gas bag bombs can self-ignite due to static electric accumulation and discharge while propane bombs would typically require some sort of flame producing detonator. Note: self-igniting bombs are very difficult to control.

They report two specific instances where these devices have detonated, producing personal injuries and relatively minor property damage. It notes that these were described on-line as early as 1985 (okay, ‘on-line’ is a stretch, my term not the Fusion Center’s) in the hacker e-zine Phrack. I actually played with a couple of these ‘devices’ in the early 70’s so this is not something really new.

Because of the small amount of explosives that can be ‘packed’ into these ‘devices’ (trash bags are not really pressure vessels), these are not very effective IED’s except in confined spaces where the overpressure effects can be maximized. It is difficult to attach anti-personnel projectiles to these balloons; it doesn’t take much to weigh them down and trash bags are very easy to tear. In short, these IED’s are not very effective weapons. I will give the Maryland Fusion Center credit; the Bulletin does not overhype the potential dangers of these devices.

Because there are a number of YouTube® videos showing these things making impressive looking explosions; lots of noise and flash; law enforcement types certainly need to know about the potential dangers associated with these devices. From a security perspective I suppose that these things could be used as distractive devices or even as initiators of secondary fires and explosions in flammable environments, but the difficulty in timing the detonation greatly reduces their potential effectiveness in these applications. If someone has access to appropriate detonators there are much more effective IED explosives readily available.