With just a little over two weeks left before the end of the
comment period on the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Material Administration
(PHMSA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that would allow the rail
transportation of liquified natural gas (LNG), there have only been 76
comments posted
to the Docket. The vast majority of those comments have been from
individual who are generally opposed to the NPRM, but the opposition does not
seem to be an organized letter writing campaign.
Five of the comments submitted to date do not fall into the
private citizen comment category (note: all links are .PDF download links):
Port
of Brownsville, Texas (in opposition to a local LNG facility, not about LNG
by rail);
The fifth comment was my comment that I posted here
back in October.
Not Enough Safety Data
Three of the commenters (ignoring the Brownsville comments) above
made frequent mention that PHMSA and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
have not completed a variety of safety tests currently planned and/or underway
related to the shipment of LNG by rail. These tests include:
• Puncture resistance testing for
DOT 113C120W railcars;
• Pool fire testing for DOT
113C120W railcars;
• FRA testing of an alternative ‘LNG
tender’ design; and
• FRA testing of an alternative ISO
tank design;
Additionally, the NTSB notes that the limited data on
crashes involving DOT 113 railcars in other cryogenic service does not provide
a large enough statistical universe to offer an reliable predictive data about
the potential safety of LNG shipments, especially if the size of the fleet
increases as projected.
The VOB comment expresses concerns about the adequacy of emergency
response information that is available for a large-scale release from a multi-unit
LNG train.
NOTE: The PHMSA LNG by rail special
permit did include a training special condition for the shipper to provide
emergency response training to all emergency response agencies that could be
affected between the authorized origin and destination.
Operational Controls
The NTSB comments include a lengthy discussion about the
operational controls that should be part of the LNG by rail rulemaking. They
recommend:
• Rail route security assessments
in accordance with 49
CFR 172.820;
• Speed restrictions – 40 mph in high-threat
urban areas, 50 mph elsewhere;
• Enhanced breaking requirements –
ECP, 2-way end-of-train devices, or distributed power systems;
• LNG railcar placement – more than
5 cars away from locomotive or occupied equipment to protect train personnel in
event of derailment.
NOTE: The special permit did include an enhanced breaking
equipment special condition.
Commentary
It is interesting that there have been no comments submitted
to date from any of the environmental or transportation safety advocacy groups
that we have seen with earlier NPRMs for crude oil shipments for instance. I am
particularly surprised that there have not been any letter writing campaigns
organized by these organizations. Such campaigns have little effect on
regulatory agencies (particularly in a Republican Administration), but they do
have a positive effect on monetary contributions to those organizations.
One issue that none of the commenters to date (myself
included) have raised is the peculiar vulnerability associated with double-shell
railcars used in the shipment of cryogenic liquids. The annular space between the
two shells has the air evacuated to very-low pressure (vacuum) levels. This is
used to help prevent environmental heat from raising the temperature (and the
resulting pressure) in the internal tank in much the same way that a vacuum thermos
bottle keeps one’s coffee hot.
PHMSA has touted this double shell design as an additional
way of preventing leaks of the LNG during an accident; a puncturing object would
have to pass through the outer shell, the annular space and the inner shell for
a leak to occur. Except….. During an accident where the outer shell is
punctured, environmental air enters the annular space and heat-transfer
immediately begins. In the event of a pool fire in the vicinity (not even
necessarily with ‘flame impingement’ on the car), the heat transfer is much
higher than normal.
In a relatively short amount of time (depending on
environmental conditions) the interior tank pressure is going to raise above
the pressure set for the pressure relief valve and the tank car will begin to
vent. If the PRV were equipped with an ignition device, an impressive flame
would accompany the screaming sound of quickly escaping natural gas. Without a
flaring device on the PRV, a gas cloud would form that would continue to expand
until it reached some other ignition source. In a best-case scenario the cloud
would burn back to the PRV which would then become an unintended flare device.
Oh yes, and the local air temperature would increase significantly and the heat
transfer rate would increase.
If the heat transfer rate were high-enough the pressure
would continue to rise even with the PRV venting. At some point the pressure in
the tank could rise to the point where the rupture disk would release large
volumes of natural gas into the environment. Because of the larger opening of
the rupture disk, the burn-back of the vapor cloud could potentially result in
the flame burning back into the confined space of the rail car where detonation
would likely result.
This is one of the reasons that PHMSA’s special condition of
requiring remote pressure monitoring of each railcar is so important; important,
however, only if the information on rising pressure levels can be provided to
emergency responders in a timely manner. Fires in and around LNG railcars should
aggressively fought to help keep the LNG cars in a safe temperature/pressure
situation, but only until pressures start to approach the PRV release pressure.
Then fast evacuations of firefighting personnel are the main priority.
Determining how high the pressure can reach before safe
evacuations should be ordered is one of the reasons that DOT needs to test
these railcars to failure in fire situations in both puncture-free and loss-of-vacuum
situations. And why the pressure monitoring needs to be conducted on both the
annular space and the inner tank.
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