This weekend there was an unusual
incident in Mississippi where an auto accident involved a rural water
treatment works. It resulted in the breach of a chlorine gas cylinder and the
death of the two occupants of the car. As is usual, the details about the
accident are sketchy, but with the help of Google Maps® and some industry
knowledge, we can ferret out some lessons.
The Facility
The news article reports that two people were in a stolen car
driving down a rural road when the “car slammed into the utility station,
rupturing a large tank of chlorine”. In rural America, the only kind of ‘utility
station’ that houses chlorine gas is a local drinking water pumping station. Searching
Google Maps we can find that utility station here,
on the west side of the road.
Looking at it on Street View®, we see a large, white,
horizontal tank within a chain-link fenced enclosure. There is a small box-like
structure, a pipe, a well-pump and an electric service pole with a nearby
electrical panel.
I suspect that the reporter thought that the large white
tank was a chlorine tank, but that is certainly not the case. First off, that
tank is way too large; it would contain multiple years’ worth of chlorine gas
for a facility this size. Second, chlorine gas is delivered in portable
cylinders. For a facility of this size, that is typically a 50-pound cylinder
that looks somewhat like a welding-gas cylinder. Two such cylinders will be
found in the white box to the right of the tank; the one in current use and the
backup for when the first is emptied. By the way, that large tank is a water
tank, providing the pumping station with surge capacity.
The Accident
Looking at the map, I would guess that the car was
proceeding north on Palmer Creek Drive, probably at a high-rate of speed.
Instead of making the curve to the right, it continued straight and hit the
large water tank. As part of the collision either the chlorine control box, or
more likely the chlorine gas line from the box to the water system was damaged,
releasing a small yellowish green cloud of chlorine into the atmosphere. It is
not clear (and will not be until the autopsies are complete) if the chlorine
gas, the injuries from the collision of a combination of the two caused the
deaths of the occupants of the car.
There were chlorine gas related injuries to ‘several
responding deputies and at least one fire fighter’. The Street View data is
from 2013 and I cannot see any chlorine gas warning signs. It is quite possible
that deputies responding to the accident did not know about the chlorine gas at
the facility and approached the scene too closely. Fortunately, the small cloud
would have dispersed enough to leave it a less-than-deadly concentration that
they walked into, so the injuries were reportedly fairly minor.
Local residents were instructed to shelter-in-place in an
abundance of caution. Again, with the small amount chlorine gas present, there
was almost certainly no more danger at nearby residences than would be found in
sniffing at the top of an open household bleach container.
Commentary
Since the incident happened on Saturday night it was almost
certainly a joy-riding accident. If it had happened twelve hours later, there
would have been a very remote chance of it being an attack. There is a church
located next to the treatment works it would have been remotely possible that
the incident was an inept attempt to gas the congregation.
It would have been fairly easy to accomplish that type of attack
by entering the facility with a pair of bolt cutters and a pipe wrench. But,
again, releasing the chlorine gas at the facility would have resulted in a less
than deadly gas cloud at the church, even if the breeze was blowing in the
correct direction.
Of course, an even more effective attack could have been
executed by removing the gas cylinders from the facility and then piping the
connection into any sort of facility air-handling equipment that the attackers
desired. Depending on the size of the facility, a lethal concentration of
chlorine gas could possibly be introduced fast enough to cause some deaths. A
large number of serious injuries and panic could certainly be an expected
result.
There are no requirements under either the EPA water facility
security regulations or the DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards for
physical security of the chlorine tanks at facilities of this sort; the
facilities are just too small to make regulations cost effective. As is fairly
typical, the padlocked gate on the chain-link fence and a padlock on the
chlorine control box are the only security measures in place. Even if video
surveillance or intrusion detection devices were in place, the response time to
such rural locations is long enough to allow perpetrators to successfully leave
the facility.
2 comments:
Patrick - very interesting incident. Thank you for bringing this to our attention. It looks like it has nation-wide applicability.
Patrick, water treatment and supply facilities are exempt from CFATS...
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