Today the Homeland Security Committee added a note to their
web page for their Wednesday markup hearing (that
I discussed this weekend) reporting that Rep. Meehan (R,PA) will be
offering another set of substitute language for HR 4007. Since there is not an
official version of the bill as marked up by Meehan’s Subcommittee it is
difficult to sort out the ‘small’ changes in the language. The big changes are
easy to see.
Personnel Surety
This bill continues to try to deal with industry complaints
about the personnel surety program under development by DHS. The wording gets
more confusing and it seems the only intent of the new wording is to eliminate
the personnel surety program. The legislation spends much more time explaining
what DHS cannot do than it does defining what should be accomplished by the
program.
The one positive new addition in this portion of the bill is
a requirement for DHS to “to expedite the development of a common credential
that screens against the terrorist screening database on a recurrent basis and
meets all other screening requirements of this title” §2101(d)(3)(C)(i).
Unfortunately this is a far cry from a legislative mandate for a CFATS
equivalent of the MTSA TWIC. Only a clear legislative mandate will make this a
program that will be accepted by the entire chemical industry.
One of the objections that the Democrats have always had
with all of the personnel surety programs discussed to date for CFATS is the
lack of a redress process for personnel that believe they have been incorrectly
identified as having terrorist ties. New language has been added to this bill
to address that concern, kind of. The new language requires the Secretary to
establish a personnel surety program that provides redress to an individual “who
believes that the personally identifiable information submitted to the Department
for such vetting by a covered chemical facility, or its designated representative,
was inaccurate” §2101(d)(3)(A)(iii). This completely ignores that possibility
of being incorrectly identified as having terrorist ties due to an error on the
part of the Government.
Rail Facility
Exemption
DHS has long maintained that the responsibility for
regulating the chemical security of rail facilities lies with TSA. This was
specifically addressed in the pre-amble to the CFATS interim final rule in the
Federal Register (72 FR 17688-17745)
(see page 17699 for that discussion). Apparently, someone has had some concerns
with the final sentence in that discussion:
“DHS may in the future, however,
re-evaluate the coverage of railroads, and would issue a rulemaking to consider
the matter.”
In any case §2104(c)(1), Rail Transit, makes it explicitly
clear that any rail facilities regulated under 49 CFR 1580 will not be affected
by the new CFATS regulation. Those facilities would certainly include designated
‘rail secure areas’ for all railroad hazmat shippers handling rail sensitive
materials {§1580.107(a)(2)}
and for all railroad receivers in high threat urban areas receiving rail
sensitive materials {§1580.107(a)(2)}.
Then §2104(c)(2) goes one step further and exempts all
railroad facilities as defined in 1580.3 as being exempt from requirements to
submit a Top Screen. That definition states:
“Rail facility means a
location at which rail cargo or infrastructure assets are stored, cargo is
transferred between conveyances and/or modes of transportation, where
transportation command and control operations are performed, or maintenance
operations are performed. The term also includes, but is not limited to,
passenger stations and terminals, rail yards, crew management centers,
dispatching centers, transportation terminals and stations, fueling centers,
and telecommunication centers.”
This would specifically exempt most crude oil train loading
facilities from CFATS regulations. This is even though the security at those
facilities is not regulated by TSA since crude oil is not a rail sensitive
material as defined in §1580.100(b).
Other Exemptions
Removed
All language exempting other facilities from the CFATS
coverage has been removed from this bill. This means that the following
facilities would be required to submit a Top Screen to DHS if they had one or
more of the 300+ DHS chemicals of interest (COI) listed in Appendix A to 6 CFR
Part 27 at or above the screening threshold quantity set for that chemical in
that Appendix:
• MTSA covered facilities;
• Public water systems;
• Treatment works;
• DOD owned facilities; and
• NRC regulated facilities
The language maintaining the current CFATS statutory exemption
for these facilities had been found in the definition of ‘Covered Facility’ in
what is now §2101(f)(1). There is no trace of that language there, or anywhere
else in the bill. This is certainly a sweeping addition of responsibility for
the folks at the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD). It is
particularly surprising given the new exemption for rail facilities that are
not covered by any security scheme.
Still Missing
This bill is still missing any language that would allow it
to be considered successfully in the Senate. There is no mention of employee
participation or inherently safer technology. Without even the most stripped
down language addressing these areas there is no way that this bill, no matter
how quickly it is passed in the House, would ever begin to see debate in the
Senate, much less pass a cloture vote.
Democrats will certainly offer such language in Wednesday’s
hearing. It will be interesting to see if they can craft language that will be
acceptable to the Republican majority on the panel. If they cannot, then this
bill will be effectively dead.
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