QHSR Dialogue 3 Started

Earlier today DHS and the National Academy of Public Administration started the third and final public dialogue on DHS goals and objectives. These dialogues are part of the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR); taking a hard look at where the Department has been and where it is going in the next four years. The QHSR is patterned after the DOD Quadrennial Review, but the public dialogue is something unique to the QHSR. The first Dialogue had the public look at goals that were proposed by a variety of study groups from within the Department. The public was given an opportunity to rate and comment upon those goals and suggest potential objectives that would support the achievement of those goals. The study groups took the feed back from the first dialogue and refined the goals and suggested objectives that would support them. The second Dialogue provided a new public forum to rate the newly developed objectives and suggest ways that those objectives could be achieved. Once again, the information and suggestions developed in that dialogue were given to the study groups to further refine the goals and objectives. Today, as part of the last Dialogue the study groups have provided refined goals and objectives and a series of ‘outcomes’ that would support each of those objectives. Rather than have the public numerically rate each of the potential outcomes as they rated the objectives in the previous Dialogue, DHS is instead asking for comments and suggestions on how those outcomes can be achieved. Chemical Security The term chemical security is not specifically used in any of the Counterterrorism and Domestic Security Management section of the Dialogue. There are, however, a number of objectives and outcomes that are directly related to the chemical security community. The most obvious is Objective 2.2, Control Access. That objective states that terrorists “and other malicious actors are unable to gain access to dangerous materials, technologies and expertise”. There are three proposed outcomes that support that objective; outcomes that are directly related to the chemical security community. They are:

Outcome 2.2.1: Access to dangerous materials is limited to legitimate users. Outcome 2.2.2: A culture of awareness and responsibility exists within industries that manufacture, store or sell potentially dangerous materials and among experts with knowledge of their use. Outcome 2.2.3: The manufacture, storage, or transfer of dangerous materials is protected by physical, personnel, and cyber security measures commensurate with the risks.

Over the next couple of days, I will be posting some ideas to address how I think that these outcomes can become reality. The suggestions will be directed at both DHS and the chemical security community. I would hope that readers would also have, and share, ideas about these specific outcomes. As I did in the previous Dialogue, I will be limiting the discussion of these ideas to the QHSR site. That is where the comments will serve the greater purpose. That is where this discussion needs to take place if this portion of the QHSR is to succeed. I look forward to seeing your ideas and your comments on my ideas posted on the QHSR site. When you post your ideas, drop me an email or post a comment to the blog point me and the rest of our community at your ideas.