Monday, August 21, 2017

Chlorine Incident Kills Two

This weekend there was an unusual incident in Mississippi where an auto accident involved a rural water treatment works. It resulted in the breach of a chlorine gas cylinder and the death of the two occupants of the car. As is usual, the details about the accident are sketchy, but with the help of Google Maps® and some industry knowledge, we can ferret out some lessons.

The Facility


The news article reports that two people were in a stolen car driving down a rural road when the “car slammed into the utility station, rupturing a large tank of chlorine”. In rural America, the only kind of ‘utility station’ that houses chlorine gas is a local drinking water pumping station. Searching Google Maps we can find that utility station here, on the west side of the road.

Looking at it on Street View®, we see a large, white, horizontal tank within a chain-link fenced enclosure. There is a small box-like structure, a pipe, a well-pump and an electric service pole with a nearby electrical panel.

I suspect that the reporter thought that the large white tank was a chlorine tank, but that is certainly not the case. First off, that tank is way too large; it would contain multiple years’ worth of chlorine gas for a facility this size. Second, chlorine gas is delivered in portable cylinders. For a facility of this size, that is typically a 50-pound cylinder that looks somewhat like a welding-gas cylinder. Two such cylinders will be found in the white box to the right of the tank; the one in current use and the backup for when the first is emptied. By the way, that large tank is a water tank, providing the pumping station with surge capacity.

The Accident


Looking at the map, I would guess that the car was proceeding north on Palmer Creek Drive, probably at a high-rate of speed. Instead of making the curve to the right, it continued straight and hit the large water tank. As part of the collision either the chlorine control box, or more likely the chlorine gas line from the box to the water system was damaged, releasing a small yellowish green cloud of chlorine into the atmosphere. It is not clear (and will not be until the autopsies are complete) if the chlorine gas, the injuries from the collision of a combination of the two caused the deaths of the occupants of the car.

There were chlorine gas related injuries to ‘several responding deputies and at least one fire fighter’. The Street View data is from 2013 and I cannot see any chlorine gas warning signs. It is quite possible that deputies responding to the accident did not know about the chlorine gas at the facility and approached the scene too closely. Fortunately, the small cloud would have dispersed enough to leave it a less-than-deadly concentration that they walked into, so the injuries were reportedly fairly minor.

Local residents were instructed to shelter-in-place in an abundance of caution. Again, with the small amount chlorine gas present, there was almost certainly no more danger at nearby residences than would be found in sniffing at the top of an open household bleach container.

Commentary


Since the incident happened on Saturday night it was almost certainly a joy-riding accident. If it had happened twelve hours later, there would have been a very remote chance of it being an attack. There is a church located next to the treatment works it would have been remotely possible that the incident was an inept attempt to gas the congregation.

It would have been fairly easy to accomplish that type of attack by entering the facility with a pair of bolt cutters and a pipe wrench. But, again, releasing the chlorine gas at the facility would have resulted in a less than deadly gas cloud at the church, even if the breeze was blowing in the correct direction.

Of course, an even more effective attack could have been executed by removing the gas cylinders from the facility and then piping the connection into any sort of facility air-handling equipment that the attackers desired. Depending on the size of the facility, a lethal concentration of chlorine gas could possibly be introduced fast enough to cause some deaths. A large number of serious injuries and panic could certainly be an expected result.


There are no requirements under either the EPA water facility security regulations or the DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards for physical security of the chlorine tanks at facilities of this sort; the facilities are just too small to make regulations cost effective. As is fairly typical, the padlocked gate on the chain-link fence and a padlock on the chlorine control box are the only security measures in place. Even if video surveillance or intrusion detection devices were in place, the response time to such rural locations is long enough to allow perpetrators to successfully leave the facility.

Saturday, August 19, 2017

Bills Introduced – 08-18-17

Yesterday, both the House and Senate met in pro forma sessions. There were ten bills introduced, including one in the Senate. Senate rules do not normally allow for bill introductions during pro forma sessions, but an exception was made in this case. Interestingly, that is one bill that may be of specific interest to readers of this blog:

S 1761 An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2018 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. Sen. Burr, Richard [R-NC]


As is usual with authorization bills, I will be watching this for cybersecurity mentions.

Thursday, August 17, 2017

ICS-CERT Publishes an Advisory and Three Updates

Today ICS-CERT published a medical device security advisory for products from Philips. Three previously published industrial control system security advisories for products from Siemens (2) and Marel were updated with new information.

Philips Advisory

This advisory describes two vulnerabilities in the Philip DoseWise Portal (DWP) web application. The vulnerability was self-reported by Philip. ICS-CERT is reporting that Philip will be supplying a new product version later this month to mitigate the vulnerability.

ICS-CERT reports that an uncharacterized attacker could remotely exploit these vulnerabilities to gain access to the database of the DWP application, which contains patient health information (PHI). Potential impact could therefore include compromise of patient confidentiality, system integrity, and/or system availability.

NOTE: the Philips security page notes that the discovery of these vulnerabilities was based upon the findings of a customer submitted complaint and vulnerability report.

Marel Update

This update provides additional information on an advisory that was originally published on March 4th, 2017. The new information includes:
• Clarification of affected equipment;
• Adds a notice of an upcoming (10-1-17) update for the Pluto based systems;
• Explains that the M3000 terminal based products reached the end of their supported life in 2012;
• Added a new improper access control vulnerability to the advisory; and
• Added a link to the recently published Marel security notification

Comment: In the original advisory, the stand-alone statement “Marel has not produced an update to mitigate these vulnerabilities” seemed to indicate that Marel was not being cooperative. It now seems more that they were being slow to move forward and perhaps did not understand the need to communicate with ICS-CERT. Either that, or the publication of the ICS-CERT advisory was a slap in the corporate face that woke Marel up and got them to work on the vulnerability. I cannot tell which (properly so) from the ICS-CERT publication. In either case mitigations appear to be on the way.

It might be helpful if ICS-CERT had some sanction available that could provide some sort of intermediate push between doing nothing and publishing a zero-day that could put system owners at risk. The goal is to get a mitigation in place as soon as practicable and ICS-CERT has no authority to provide impetus to require recalcitrant vendors to do something.

PROFINET 1 Update

This update provides additional information on an advisory that was originally published on May 9th, 2017 and updated on June 15th, 2017, on June 20th, 2017, on July 6th, 2017, and again on July 25th, 2017. The update provides new affected version information and mitigation links for:

• STEP 7 - Micro/WIN SMART: All versions prior to V2.3;
• SIMATIC Automation Tool: All versions prior to V3.0; and
• SINUMERIK 808D Programming Tool: All versions prior to V4.7 SP4 HF2

PROFINET 2 Update

This update provides additional information on an advisory that was originally published on May 9th, 2017 and updated on June 15, 2017, and again on July 25th, 2017. The update provides new affected version information and mitigation links for:

• SIMATIC CP 1543SP-1, CP 1542SP-1 and CP 1542SP-1 IRC: All versions prior to  V1.0.15,
• SIMATIC ET 200SP: All versions prior to  V4.1.0,
• SIMATIC S7-200 SMART: All versions prior to V2.3,
• SINUMERIK 828D – V4.5 and prior: All versions prior to V4.5 SP6 HF2

Missing Siemens Updates and Advisories


ICS-CERT has yet to publish update or advisory for the following TWITTER® announcements from Siemens:

An advisory has been updated: SSA-286693: Vulnerabilities in Laboratory Diagnostics Products from Siemens; Aug 7th, 2017;


A new advisory has been published: SSA-131263: SMBv1 Vulnerabilities in Mobilett Mira Max from Siemens Healthineers; Aug 7th, 2017

NHTSA Sends Automated Vehicle Guidance to OMB

Yesterday the DOT’s National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) sent their Voluntary Guidance on Automated Driving Systems document to the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review. Guidance documents are not normally described in the Unified Agenda, so there is no public indication about what DOT will be including in this guidance document.


NHTSA hosted a series of public discussions on the topic last year. They also published an automated vehicles technology guidance document and a vehicle-to-vehicle notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) last year. The later document did include cybersecurity requirements.

Wednesday, August 16, 2017

Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018

The House Rules Committee announced today that is working on massive, multi-department spending bill to be considered when the House returns from summer recess. It is a move to cut short the spending process so that there may be a chance to pass a government spending bill before the September 30th deadline. The Rules Committee is calling for submission of amendments by 10:00 am on August 25th.

The combined bill is a complete re-write of HR 3354, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018. The draft language incorporates most of the language from that bill and:

HR 3268 – Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3267 – Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3280 – Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3355 – Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3358 – Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3362 – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018; and
HR 3353 – Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018

The House has already passed a combined spending bill for the other four spending bills not covered above. That bill, HR 3219, included the following spending bills:

• The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2018;
• The Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2018;
• The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018; and
• The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018.


Combining eight spending bills into one big package could greatly reduce the amount of time required on the floor of the House for debate. I expect the Rules Committee would come up with a structured rule, with a few hundred floor amendments. The bill would almost certainly be passed in the House in a single week. The big question is whether or not the Senate would be allowed to take up the giant bill. Depending on what riders make it into the House passed version, I could almost expect to see an unusual amalgam of liberals and conservatives combining to block the moderate majority from considering and passing the bill.

ICS-CERT Publishes Two Advisories

Yesterday the DHS ICS-CERT published a medical device security advisory for products from BMC Medical and 3B Medical (one advisory). They also published a control system security advisory for products from Advantech

BMC Medical Advisory


This advisory describes an improper input validation vulnerability in the Luna continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) therapy machine produced jointly by BMC Medical and 3B Medical. The vulnerability was reported by MedSec. Newer versions (after July 2017) have had the problem corrected; ICS-CERT reports that the company’s do not plan on providing mitigation measures for ‘older’ (before July 2017) machines.

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker with adjacent network access could exploit the vulnerability to cause a crash of the device’s Wi-Fi module resulting in a denial-of-service condition affecting the Wi-Fi module chipset. This does not affect the device’s ability to deliver therapy.

NOTE: Buyers of CPAP devices should take careful note of the lack of post-production cybersecurity support demonstrated for this brand of devices.

Advantech Advisory


This advisory describes a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the Advantech WebOP operator panels. The vulnerability was reported by Ariele Caltabiano (kimiya) via the Zero Day Initiative. ICS-CERT reports that Advantech was unable to verify the validity of this vulnerability. (NOTE: this obviously means that no mitigation measures appear to be forthcoming.)

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker with uncharacterized access could use publicly available exploits to exploit this vulnerability to cause the target device to crash and may allow arbitrary code execution.


NOTE: There are a large number of ‘pending’ vulnerability reports on Advantech products currently listed on the ZDI web site.

Tuesday, August 15, 2017

ISCD Updates CFATS Knowledge Center

Today the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) updated the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Knowledge Center by adding a link to a new CFATS fact sheet for colleges and universities and revised four frequently asked questions (FAQ) (according to the ‘Latest News’ blurb posted today on the Knowledge Center).

Colleges and Universities


The Colleges and Universities brochure is an update of a tri-fold brochure that was originally published in December 2010. The new brochure provides a brief overview of the CFATS program including a very brief description of the Top Screen reporting requirements. There is more detail in the new version and provides a number of important links to CFATS documents.

The one major shortcoming of the brochure is that, while it briefly describes chemicals of interest (COI) categories and explains that the list can be found in ‘Appendix A of the CFATS regulation’ there is no link to list of COI that is provided on the CFATS landing page, nor are the CFATS regulations actually listed (6 CFR 27).

New FAQs


The four ‘revised’ FAQ’s are:





The revised #1274 removes the mailing address [Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, ATTN: CSAT, Department of Homeland Security, Building 5300, MS 6282, PO Box 2008, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6282] and the messenger service delivery address [Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, ATTN: CSAT, Department of Homeland Security, Building 5300, MS 6282, 1 Bethel Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6282] from the modes of contact for the CFATS Help Desk. I have no idea whether or not those old addresses are still good; but if they are, ISCD does not apparently want them used.

The revised #1288 adds regulatory references [§27.203(b) and §27.204(a)(2)] for the answer and a link to just the first reference. I have provided the link to the second.

FAQ #1606 is actually a new FAQ number, but the question and answer are very similar to an older FAQ (#1662) which is no longer on the current FAQ list (.PDF download). The new FAQ does not include any information (which was included in #1662) about a requirement to be CVI (Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information – the protocol for protecting the sensitive but unclassified information associated with the CFATS program) trained to be able to view/download the letter. Nor does the new FAQ mention that an Adobe Reader will be necessary to open the letter. NOTE: #1662 was still on the current FAQ list as of 8-4-17; the last time changes were made to the FAQ list.


FAQ #1785 is also a new FAQ number. There was an earlier article on the CFATS Knowledge Center (#1610) that addressed some of this information, but that article was prepared in 2010 and included copious descriptions of the old tiering process that was supplanted by CSAT 2.0 and the new Risk Assessment process. That article was removed sometime in early April of this year. The new FAQ very briefly mentions the tiering process and notes that facilities will be notified via the Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) that a tiering notification letter is available. It then briefly describes how to access that notification letter; and this time that discussion does include a mention of the CVI training requirements.
 
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