Last month Sen. Murkowski (R,AK) introduced the Protecting
Resources on the Electric Grid with Cybersecurity Technology (PROTECT) Act of
2019. The bill would provide energy cybersecurity investment incentives.
Incentives
Section 2 of the bill would amend the Federal Power Act (16
USC Chapter 12) by adding a new §219A, Incentives for Cybersecurity
Investments. The new section begins by defining two new terms {new §219A(a)}:
• Advanced Cybersecurity Technology – any technology,
operational capability, or service, including computer hardware, software, or a
related asset, that enhances the security posture of public utilities through
improvements in the ability to protect against, detect, respond to, or recover from
a cybersecurity threat (as defined in 6 USC 1501).
• ADVANCED CYBERSECURITY TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION –
information relating to advanced cybersecurity technology or proposed advanced
cybersecurity technology that is generated by or provided to the Commission or
another Federal agency.
Subsection (b) would require the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to “conduct a study to identify incentive-based, including
performance-based, rate treatments for the transmission of electric energy
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission that could be used to encourage”:
• Investment by public utilities in advanced
cybersecurity technology; and
• Participation by public utilities in cybersecurity
threat information sharing programs.
Subsection (c) would require FERC to establish a rule
providing for “incentive-based, including performance-based, rate treatments
for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce by public
utilities for the purpose of benefitting consumers by encouraging” the same
investments and participation describe above. FERC may also include in that
rulemaking additional incentives for {§219A(d)}:
• Defense critical electric infrastructure (as defined
in section 215A(a)) and other facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission that are critical to public safety, national defense, or homeland
security, as determined by the Commission; and
• Facilities of small- or medium-sized public utilities
with limited cybersecurity resources, as determined by the Commission.
Subsection (g) would provide protection against disclosure
of advanced “cybersecurity technology information that is provided to,
generated by, or collected by the Federal Government under subsection (b), (c),
or (f)” by considering the information to be critical electric infrastructure
information (CEII) under 16
USC 824o-1.
Grant Program
Section 3 of the bill would require the Department of Energy
to establish the Rural and Municipal Utility Advanced Cybersecurity Grant and
Technical Assistance Program to “to provide grants and technical assistance to,
and enter into cooperative agreements with, eligible entities to protect
against, detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity threats” {§3(b)}.
The following types of entities would be eligible to apply for such grants or
assistance {§3(a)}:
• A rural electric cooperative;
• A utility owned by a political subdivision of a
State, such as a municipally owned electric utility;
• A utility owned by any agency, authority,
corporation, or instrumentality of one or more political subdivisions of a
State; and
• A not-for-profit entity that is in a partnership
with not fewer than 6 entities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
DOE would be required to prioritize grants and technical
assistance by giving priority to an eligible entity that, as determined by the
Secretary {§3(d)(2)}:
• Has limited cybersecurity resources;
• Owns assets critical to the reliability of the bulk
power system; or
• Owns defense critical electric infrastructure (as
defined in 16 USC 824o–1(a).”
The bill would authorize $50 million per year for the next
four years for this grant/assistance program.
Information provided to FERC or collected by FERC under this
program would be protected from public disclosure, but would not specifically
be considered CEII.
Moving Forward
Murkowski is the Chair of the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee to which this bill is assigned for consideration. Her
cosponsors include Sen. Manchin (D,WV) who is the Ranking member of the
Committee, and three other influential members of the Committee. This bill will
almost certainly be considered in Committee and the bipartisan sponsorship
would seem to indicate that the bill will receive significant bipartisan
support in the Committee.
The big problem facing this bill is getting it to the Senate
floor for consideration. There is just too much going on during the remainder
of the year for this to be considered under the normal process. I do not
suspect that this will be able to be considered under the unanimous consent
process; too many Senators would see this bill as an ideal vehicle to add their
own pet energy projects.
There may be a relatively short window next year that this
bill could be considered before the election silly season gets into full swing.
Commentary
I am glad to see that Murkowski’s staff used the §1501
definition of ‘cybersecurity threat’ in their definition of ‘advanced
cybersecurity technology’ since that definition relies on the ICS inclusive definition
of ‘information system’. Having said that, the definition of ‘cybersecurity
threat’ is still grossly lacking when it comes to energy system security since
it relies on the IT triad of “availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an
information system”. It does not specifically address the potential physical consequences
of a cyber-attack on electric grid cyber assets.
I have
addressed this definitional issue is some detail. Unfortunately, I doubt
that my entire proposed solution will be attempted in this bill. Instead I
would suggest the addition of the below listed definitions and the deletion of
the reference to §1501 in the existing definition.
(5) the term ‘control system’
means a discrete set of information resources, sensors, communications
interfaces and physical devices organized to monitor, control and/or report on
physical processes, including power production, electric transmission or
distribution, access control, and facility environmental controls;
(6) the term ‘cybersecurity
threat’ means:
(A) threats to and
vulnerabilities of information, information systems, or control systems and any
related consequences caused by or resulting from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, degradation, disruption, modification, or destruction of such
information, information systems, or control systems, including such related
consequences caused by an act of terrorism; and
(B) does not include any action
that solely involves a violation of a consumer term of service or a consumer
licensing agreement; and
(7) the term "information
system" has the meaning given that term in section 3502(8) of title 44.
The other problem with this bill is the inclusion of the
protection of information under the provisions of CEII. While a great deal of
the information addressed in this bill could well fit under the CEII
designation, I question how much information provided in the rate filings under
§219A(f) should receive that protection. The public deserves the right to see
why rates are being changed. With that in mind I would re-write subsection (f):
(f) SINGLE-ISSUE RATE FILINGS.
(a) The Commission shall
permit public utilities to apply for incentive based rate treatment under the
rule issued under this section on a single-issue basis by submitting to the
Commission a tariff schedule under section 205 that permits recovery of costs
and incentives over the depreciable life of the applicable assets, without
regard to changes in receipts or other costs of the public utility.
(b) Data submitted to the
Commission to justify the rate change will include a sensitive annex listing
computer hardware, software and services that will constitute the advanced
cybersecurity technology justifying the incentive based rate treatment in (a).
The sensitive data will be protected as critical electric infrastructure
information (CEII) under 16
USC 824o-1.
(c) The information in the
sensitive annex will include a detailed listing of costs and the depreciable
life of the computer hardware, software and services described in (b). A
summary of the costs and depreciable life of those assets will be included
under the listing of ‘advanced cybersecurity technology’ in the public
information provided to the Commission.
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