This is another in a series of blog posts about S 3405,
the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2018,
which would reauthorize the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)
program for five years. The other blog posts in the series include:
Personnel Surety Program
Section 7 of the bill was written in response to industry
concerns about the expansion of the personnel surety program reporting
requirements to Tier 3 and Tier 4 facilities. It amends 6
USC 622(d)(2)(A) in two instances. The first would make
participation in the terrorist screening database (TSDB) via the Chemical
Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) mandatory for all Tier 1 and 2 facilities and
optional (at the owner’s discretion) for Tier 3 and 4 facilities.
The second change is an additional attempt to limit the
scope of the TSDB screening. It modifies the description of those covered by
the requirement by adding the qualifier “who will have access to any chemical
of interest”. Currently the program covers all facility employees, as well as
most contractors and visitors that have unaccompanied access to critical areas
of the facility.
Commentary
The big problem with both this section and the DHS effort to
expand the application of the personnel surety program to Tier 3 and 4
facilities (already required, but the Infrastructure Security Compliance
Division set up the implementation of the PSP in a two phased process) is that
there has been no official evaluation of the efficacy of the program. I would
have been much more comfortable with the section if it had prohibited ISCD from
starting phase II of the PSP implementation until after the GAO had a chance to
report on the first phase. Two important items would have to be included in
that report, the number of people in Tier 1 and 2 facilities that were reported
as being found on the TSDB and the number of those who were inappropriately
identified.
One thing that Sen. Johnson appears to have not taken into
account in his effort to appease the chemical industry’s ongoing complaints
about the PSP is that a large proportion of the Tier 3 and Tier 4 facilities
are in the CFATS program because of their possession or manufacture of
chemicals that are on the list of DHS chemicals of interest (COI) because they
can be used to make improvised chemical weapons or improvised explosives. This
means that they are at risk, not so much for release on site, but for theft or
diversion to some underground manufacturing site where they would be converted
into weapons. These facilities would be prime targets for infiltration (if we
had an active terrorist threat) by terrorist organizations to effect the theft
or diversion of these COI.
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