Yesterday the DHS ICS-CERT published
an advisory about multiple file management vulnerabilities on the IOServer
OPC Server. The vulnerabilities were
first reported by Hinge of foofus.net (ICS-CERT did provide a link to the
initial vulnerability report – finally).
The Official Word
The three listed vulnerabilities allow low-skilled attacker
to remotely download files from the affected system. The vulnerabilities are:
• Insufficient access controls (CWE-219);
• Directory listing (CWE-538); and
• Directory traversal (CWE-22).
According to the Advisory, IOServer has produced a patch
that resolves one of the three (Directory traversal) vulnerabilities and this
has been verified by Hinge. Hinge (NOT IOServer) recommends using a trailing
backslash on the ‘Root Directory’ configuration value to reduce the extent of
the remaining vulnerabilities. There is no mention in the Advisory if/when
IOServer will be correcting these vulnerabilities.
The Oddities
There are some odd things going on with this advisory. First
off, since there was not an earlier alert, one would normally assume that this
was a coordinated disclosure, but that is certainly not stated. In actuality,
the original public disclosure that ICS-CERT provides the link to is dated
August 17th, 2012 and there is nothing on that site that would imply
a coordinated disclosure. Big question here is if it was a coordinated
disclosure why did it take ICS-CERT almost a month to report this serious vulnerability
(more on that later). If it wasn’t coordinated why wasn’t an alert issued a
month ago?
Underplayed Vulnerability?
A quick reading of the Advisory leaves one with the
impression that this is not a real big thing. After all it does not allow
anyone to take control of the system or allow for the execution of arbitrary
code; it just allows unauthorized people to read some files (all right the cognoscenti
will go “Oh Sh*” to that). Reading the Hinge disclosure makes this sound much
more interesting; describing it this way:
“A directory traversal vulnerability exists such that the web server can be
tricked to serve up any file on the
server [emphasis added], outside of the configured “Root Directory”. On
Windows, one common thing to do with an issue like this is to download the
backup copy of the SAM, in order to retrieve password hashes and mount an
offline attack on them. Any other potentially sensitive file on the server can
be accessed this way as well, if the attacker knows the path to it”
The original disclosure goes on to describe the impact this
way:
“Unexpected arbitrary access to the file system can lead to the disclosure
of sensitive information. Worst case, disclosure of the system’s password
hashes can lead to compromise of the
passwords [emphasis added], and therefore, of the server.”
If you own the OPC Server, you have control of the ICS. So,
is this a major vulnerability or what?
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