Saturday, August 12, 2017

NIST Cybersecurity Workforce RFI Comments – 08-05-17

This is part of a continuing series of blog posts looking at the comments that NIST has received on their request for information (RFI) on cyber workforce development. The comments are posted to the NIST National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) web site. The earlier posts in the series were:


This week there were only four new submissions posted to the NIST web site. Those were from:


AT&T pointed at a report that it had helped prepare for the Federal Communications Commission on cybersecurity workforce development in the communication’s sector.

The comments from Southern Utah University pointed at the course outline for their Masters program in Cybersecurity & Information Assurance. They also emphasized the need for academia and industry to cooperate in providing internship/apprenticeship opportunities for students or early career professionals.

The UI LABS – DMDII comments outline work that organization has done looking at the DFARS cybersecurity requirements for DOD contractors. They point out their research points to the problems that many of those contractors are having complying with the 109 cybersecurity requirements outlined in NIST 800-171.


UMass Lowell describes the certification program they have developed for implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.

Bills Introduced – 08-11-17

Both the House and Senate met in pro forma session yesterday and there were 5 bills introduced. None of those bills were of specific interest to readers of this blog.

The reason that I am making this post today is to bring attention to a little known process in the House; during these pro forma sessions, it is possible to pass legislation. Yesterday two bills were passed, HR 2288 and HR 339. Both of these bills had previously passed in the House, but were amended in the Senate. For whatever reason, the House Leadership determined that it was necessary to pass the bills now while the vast majority of House members were back in their district.

Rep. Comstock (R,VA) asked for unanimous consent for both bills to be considered under the unanimous consent process (a single Nay sounded in the chamber would have killed either bill). The amended versions of both bills were adopted without any objection from the unnamed Democrat that was probably the only other elected representative {besides the presiding acting Speaker Pro Tempore, Rep. Perry (R,PA)}  on the floor of the House chamber.


Now there is nothing untoward or sneaky about Friday’s proceeding. Both bills originally passed with overwhelming support (unanimous vote for HR 2288 and a voice vote for HR 339) in the House and by unanimous consent in the Senate. But it does remind us that even in the dead days of summer in the Capital, legislative action is possible.

Friday, August 11, 2017

ICS-CERT Publishes 5 Advisories

Yesterday the DHS ICS-CERT published five control system security advisories for products from ABB, Fuji Electric, Solar Controls (2), and SIMPlight.

ABB Advisory


This advisory describes a relative path traversal vulnerability in the ABB SREA-01 and SREA-50 remote monitoring tools. The vulnerability was reported by Bertin Jose and Fernandez Ezequiel. HMS Industrial Networks Ab provided a patch to correct the issue, but ABB has only tested it on the SREA-01. These are unsupported legacy products. There is no indication that the researchers have been provided an opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker could use publicly available exploits to remotely exploit the vulnerability to access files on the affected products’ file systems, view data, change configuration, retrieve password hash codes, and potentially insert and send commands to connected devices without authorization.

NOTE: ABB reports that exploit code was published on github by the researchers.

Fuji Advisory


This advisory describes multiple vulnerabilities in the Fuji Monitouch V-SFT screen configuration software. The vulnerabilities were reported by Fritz Sands and kimiya via the Zero Day Initiative. Fuji has released a new version to mitigate the vulnerabilities. There is no indication that the researchers have been provided an opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.

The three reported vulnerabilities are:

• Stack-based buffer overflow - CVE-2017-9659;
• Heap-based buffer overflow - CVE-2017-9660; and
• Improper privilege management - CVE-2017-9662

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker could remotely exploit the vulnerabilities to allow remote code execution or cause the software that the attacker is accessing to crash. The improper privilege management vulnerability could allow an attacker with local access to escalate privileges.

WATTConfig Advisory


This advisory describes an uncontrolled search path element vulnerability in the Solar Controls WATTConfig M Software. The vulnerability was reported by Karn Ganeshen. ICS-CERT reports that Solar Controls has not responded to requests to coordinate with NCCIC/ICS-CERT.

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker with uncharacterized access could exploit the vulnerability to allow arbitrary code execution.

HCDownloader Advisory


This advisory describes an uncontrolled search path element vulnerability in the Solar Controls Heating Control Downloader (HCDownloader). The vulnerability was reported by Karn Ganeshen. ICS-CERT reports that Solar Controls has not responded to requests to coordinate with NCCIC/ICS-CERT.

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker with uncharacterized access could exploit the vulnerability to allow arbitrary code execution.

SIMPlight Advisory


This advisory describes an uncontrolled search path element vulnerability in the the SIMPlight SCADA Software. ). The vulnerability was reported by Karn Ganeshen. ICS-CERT reports that Solar Controls has not responded to requests to coordinate with NCCIC/ICS-CERT.


ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker with uncharacterized access could exploit the vulnerability to allow arbitrary code execution.

Thursday, August 10, 2017

Linking Safety and Security

Joe Weiss has an interesting blog post, Why SOCs are not comprehensive enough for ICS cyber security, over on ControlGlobal.com. At first glance, it is a re-working of a common complaint of Joe’s, the inability to initially differentiate between control system errors and cyber-attacks; a very important problem in process industries. But Joe points out a very real need to coordinate safety, physical security and cybersecurity activities in the process environment. And that is worth serious discussion.

Joe and I have talked about this on more than a couple of occasions. We both got into the cybersecurity world via the process side of operations; Joe in nuclear power plant engineering and me as a manufacturing process chemist. For both of us, process safety was an important consideration in everything we did.

Safety Reviews


A key tool that we both have used (with a variety of names) is the process hazard analysis, or PHA. In the chemical industry, this is a process for looking at the chemical manufacturing process that employs a step by manufacturing step analysis of a process to identify all of the things that can go wrong.

While techniques vary, each step of the process is looked at. A team of individuals (representing the various areas of expertise involved in a modern manufacturing environment) looks at each process variable (temperature, mixing, pressure, ingredient addition, etc.) to determine what would happen if the variable were changed. If the consequence raises a safety issue, the potential causes of the non-standard situation are identified and compensating controls are identified to prevent the non-standard occurrence. As the potential consequence get worse, the team is required to identify more mitigation measures.

One of the variables that is always included in these reviews is operator error. When there is an extensive process history available (these PHAs are periodically re-done, even if no changes are made to the process), then each of the operator errors that have occurred in the past is specifically include when the appropriate portion of the process is reviewed. Otherwise, the team (which always includes at least one operator and an operations supervisor) looks at what types of operator errors might be expected to be made.

The one operator error that is almost never included is a deliberate attempt by the operator to sabotage the process. This is because it is almost impossible to mitigate this type of ‘operator error’. The only effective mitigation is the implementation of a two-man rule where an operation can only be triggered by operating two physically separated controls nearly simultaneously. This is a very expensive (both in engineering and manpower) and used in only the most extreme situations.

An item that is always included in the list of things that can go wrong is the failure of a piece of process equipment. Pumps, valves, sensor, actuators can all fail and Father Murphy is well known by all process professionals. Common mitigation measures include routine calibration, inspection and schedueled preventative maintenance of process equipment. In situations where equipment failure has the most extreme consequences a common technique is to have parallel processing capability installed where the failed piece of equipment can be bypassed automatically or by simple operator action. Where critical sensors are a concern, multiple and independent sensors are installed and allowable output variations are established.

Security Reviews


Industry has been slower to conduct formal physical security reviews of their facilities. Until 9-11, most such reviews (nuclear power generation facilities excepted) were primarily directed at inventory shrink more than preventing attacks on the facility. Since 9-11 that has changed and there has been more attention paid at preventing terrorist attacks and stopping active shooter situations.

Most physical security reviews (there has not been the level of standardization of security reviews as we have seen with safety reviews) focus on identifying critical portions of the facility and positing what standard attack scenarios are expected and then placing controls in place to deter, delay and detect such events. As in safety reviews, a physical security review increases the mitigation measures employed as the potential consequences (or the probability) of attack increases.

Formal cybersecurity reviews for the process industries are much less common and seem (from the limited data that I have seen) to focus on vulnerability management (patching) and access controls. We are just starting to see implementation of tools to actively monitor process controls to detect intrusions.

Linking Safety and Security


Safety and security have very similar purposes in the process industry, prevention of unintended consequences, particularly hurtful consequences. In very many ways they are two sides of the same coin. Safety protects against random system failures and security prevents system failures caused by deliberate actions. Understanding the potential consequences of any given system failure allows for prioritization of costs and efforts.

Security folks need to have representation on the PHA teams. Not so much for their contributions to safety (though that is an obvious benefit), but so that they can truly understand the critical portions of the process environment. If they understand what the key safety components of the control system are, they may be able to plan a more effective defense-in-depth that provides additional security against intrusion (or more quickly identifies intrusion) into those critical parts of the control system.

Likewise, safety people and process people need to be represented on the security reviews, both physical and cyber (if those are done separately). Their input will be necessary to understand how security measures will impact operations and safety. Planning for a police response to an active shooter incident at a facility handling flammable materials will require careful consideration of safety issues. Allowing for multiple (and contemporaneous) operator logon to controls systems may be necessary. These are just two of the possible operations and safety considerations that need to be accounted for in a security review.


Protecting facilities from incidents that impact operations or the local community is the goal of both safety and security managers. Close cooperation between the two and with the operations team is something that has to take place for all three teams to succeed in supporting a successful business.

Wednesday, August 9, 2017

HR 3435 Introduced – Crude Oil Vapor Pressure

Last month Rep. Lowey (D,NY) introduced HR 3435, a bill that would establish crude oil Reid Vapor pressure standards for the shipment of crude oil by rail. The bill is virtually identical to HR 2379 that was introduced in the 114th Congress. No action was taken on that earlier bill.

The bill would immediately establish a maximum Reid Vapor Pressure limit of 8.5 psi for all crude oil shipped by rail. The DOT would then be required to establish “establish an appropriate national standard for the maximum volatility of crude oil to be permitted to be shipped by rail” {new 49 USC 20169(b)}. No guidance is provided on what would constitute ‘an appropriate national standard’.

Moving Forward


Lowey is not a member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee to which this bill was assigned for consideration, but her co-sponsor {Rep. Garamendi (D,CA)} is. This means that there is a remote chance that the bill could be brought up in Committee. It is highly unlikely that the bill will receive consideration due to oil industry opposition. Since the initial RVP standard set in this bill is the average value reported out of the Bakken oil fields, it would severely reduce oil shipments from those fields (the bills intention).

Commentary


The fact that this bill would rely on the Trump Administration to establish an ‘appropriate national standard’ without providing legislative guidance on that standard provides a clear indication that this is a pro forma introduction with no expectation that the bill will pass into law. Further, the introduction of the bill just before the summer recess (particularly when it is nothing more than a copy of a previously ignored bill) is a clear indication that Lowey and Garamendi produced the bill to ‘show’ their supporters that they are doing something about crude oil shipments.

As I have mentioned in an earlier post the Reid Vapor pressure test required by this bill has a number of technical problems associated with it. There is a good technical article that describes those problems and more effective test for predicting the problems with the rapid rise in pressure due to fire impingement that has led to some of the overpressure situations seen in some Bakken crude oil train wreck.


I would think that most transportation safety people would agree that some sort of reasonable limit on the vapor pressure of crude oil, particularly a standard related to the rate of pressure rise in a fire impingement situation, would help to reduce some of the incidents of explosive fires that we have seen in some crude oil train incidents. Having said that, the Reid Vapor Pressure testing required by this bill is totally inadequate to that task.

Tuesday, August 8, 2017

ICS-CERT Publishes Two Advisories

Today the DHS ICS-CERT published two control system security advisories for products from Moxa and OSIsoft. I mentioned the OSIsoft vulnerabilities in a blog post last month.

Moxa Advisory


This advisory describes an uncontrolled search path element vulnerability in the Moxa SoftNVR-IA Live Viewer. The vulnerability was reported by Karn Ganeshen. Moxa has developed an update to mitigate the vulnerability. There is no indication that Ganeshen was provided an opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.

ICS-CERT reports that an uncharacterized attacker with uncharacterized access could exploit the vulnerability to execute code from a malicious DLL on the affected system with the same privileges as the application that loaded the malicious DLL.

OSIsoft Advisory


This advisory describes two vulnerabilities in the OSIsoft PI Integrator. The vulnerabilities are self-reported. OSIsoft developed new versions of the software to mitigate the vulnerabilities.

The two reported vulnerabilities are:

• Cross-site scripting - CVE-2017-9655; and
• Improper authorization - CVE-2017-9653

 ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker could remotely exploit the vulnerabilities to gain privileged access to the system. An attacker may also be able to store a malicious script in the application database.

BTW: Siemens published a new advisory and updated two advisories yesterday (notification on TWITTER® here, here, and here). I had kind of expected ICS-CERT to report on these today. Maybe tomorrow….

Monday, August 7, 2017

S 1662 Introduced – FY 2018 CJS Spending

Last month, Sen. Shelby (R,AL) introduced S 1662, the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act, 2018. The bill does not specifically mention cybersecurity, but there are a number of places in the Committee Report on the bill that address cybersecurity issues.

DOC Cybersecurity


Most of the Department of Commerce (DOC) cybersecurity funding is made through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Thus, it is not surprising that all of the Committee cybersecurity comments are related to NIST. The Committee comments that:

• NIST cybersecurity spending remains constant and “NIST is encouraged to update and enhance the NIST Cybersecurity Framework” (pg 21);
• No less than $33,000,000 is provided for the expanded National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE); (pgs 21-2);
• NIST shall provide a detailed accounting for the NCCoE’s budget and activities in its fiscal year 2018 spend plan (pg 22); and
• The Committee provides up to $2,000,000 to develop an IoT cybersecurity research initiative; the initiative shall seek to improve security of IoT devices in consumer and industrial settings (pg 22).

DOJ Cybersecurity


The situation in the Department of Justice is quite a bit different, with a number of agencies having cybersecurity responsibilities. In general, “the Committee directs the Department to maintain its cybersecurity posture at no less than the fiscal year 2017 level to defend and respond to current and emerging attacks that threaten its own infrastructure and activities” (pg 60). Additionally, the Committee provided specific guidance:

• The Committee increased the spending for the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) by $4.9 million above the requested amount;
• The increased spending will all the USAO to “provide the high-caliber level of training on cybercrime and digital evidence needed for Assistant U.S. Attorneys to be able to analyze and present digital evidence across all types of criminal cases” (pg 69).
• After noting that the “FBI remains the only agency with the statutory authority, expertise, and ability to combine counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal investigatory resources to neutralize, mitigate, and disrupt illegal domestic computer-supported operations” (pg 74), the Committee provided programmatic increases for cybersecurity activities throughout the FBI;
• The Committee provided $1 million “for the continuation of a Cybercrime and Digital Evidence • Resource Prosecutor Pilot Program to provide State and local prosecutors with training and trial experience in cybercrimes and digital evidence” (pg 92); and
• The Committee provided $1 million “to establish a partnership with an institution for higher learning for the purposes of furthering educational opportunities for students training in computer forensics and digital investigation” (pg 92).

NSF Cybersecurity


The Committee continued funding for cybersecurity research at current levels. Additionally, they provided “no less than $55,000,000 for the CyberCorps: Scholarships for Service program” (pg 118. Of that money, $7.5 million was allotted for continued support of “community colleges that have been designated as a Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance 2–Year Education [CAE2Y]” (pg 119).

Moving Forward



As with the other spending bills, it is unlikely in the extreme that this bill will be specifically considered in the Senate. It looks like the two Appropriations Committees will be spending their time working out a continuing resolution and a subsequent combined spending bill. As a result, the money amounts mentioned above are very likely to change before the final spending bill is passed.
 
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