FCC Sends PNT Solutions NPRM to OMB

Yesterday the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) announced that it had received a notice of proposed rulemaking on “Promoting the Development of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Technologies and Solutions, WT Docket No. 25-110”. The Commission requested comments on 25-110 via a public notice (not FR publication) on March 6^th, 2025.

According to the Spring 2025 Unified Agenda entry for this rulemaking:

“The proceeding seeks to build a record on specific actions the Federal Communications Commission can take to help develop complements and alternatives to the Global Positioning System (GPS) with the goal of ensuring robust and reliable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) technologies and solutions.”

Because of the potential use of the ‘timing’ portion of this technology by SCADA (and other types of control) systems, I would expect to give some level of attention the publication of this rulemaking in this blog.

Review – HR 4344 Introduced – Resilient PNT Demonstration

Back in July Rep Mullin (D,CA) introduced HR 4344, the Resilient Low Earth Orbit Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (Resilient LEO PNT) Act. The bill would require the Department of the Air Force (DAF) to “carry out a capability demonstration project, to be known as the “Commercial Low Earth Orbit Resilient Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capability Demonstration””. The “Pathfinder Program” would be conducted subject to the availability of appropriations, effectively passing the spending authorization requirement to the appropriations committees.

I can find no bills in the 118th Congress that look to be similar to HR 4344. ‘Positioning, navigation and timing’ topics are of interest here because of the use of the ‘timing’ feature in these systems by a number of SCADA systems to coordinate operations at disparate locations.

Moving Forward

While Mullan is not a member of the House Armed Services Committee to which this bill was assigned for consideration, one of this two cosponsors, Rep Wittman (R,VA) is a member. This means that there may be sufficient influence to see this bill considered in committee. Lacking any specific funding authorization, I see nothing in this bill that would engender any organized opposition. Having said that, I also suspect that there could still be some resistance to supporting a bill that would potentially cost an unspecified, but significant, amount of money. Still, I would suspect that there would be some level of bipartisan support for this bill were it to be considered.

Commentary

The ability to ‘restore service’ in a timely manner is going to be an increasing requirement for DOD satellite services. This means that the vendor is going to need to demonstrate the capability to launch replacement satellites on a near demand basis.  Depending on the size and weight of the satellite, there are an increasing number of launch providers that could provide relatively quick response launch capabilities. This also means that the PNT service provider is probably going to have to have some number of satellites on hand, available to launch and activate when needed.

 

For more information on the provisions of this bill, including additional commentary on satellite resiliency, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/hr-4344-introduced-resilient-pnt - subscription required.

NASA Announces PNT Advisory Board Meeting – 9-12-21

Today NASA published a meeting notice in the Federal Register (86 FR 64962) for a two-day meeting of the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board on December 9^th and 10^th, 2021. The meeting will be open to the public.

The meeting agenda includes:

• Reports and Updates from PNT Advisory Board Working Groups

• Preliminary Deliberations on any Findings and Recommendations

• Other PNT Advisory Board Business and Work Plan Schedule

There is no information available on the Advisory Board web site about the current activities of the working groups. The last time the Board met was in July 2020.

S&T Announces GPS Spoofing Testing Event

Earlier this week the DHS Science and Technology Directorate announced that it would be conducting a GPS spoofing test event later this year. The event will be designed to allow manufacturers as well as critical infrastructure owner/operators to have their space-based position, navigation, and timing (PNT) equipment evaluated in a live GPS spoofing environment.

S&T is soliciting participation of vendors and owner/operators in the test event. Requests to participate should be submitted to S&T via GPS4Critical-Infrastructure@hq.dhs.gov. More information about the event can be found here.

Commentary

While not specifically being mentioned in this announcement, this event is being conducted in support of the President’s EO 13905 – Responsible Use of PNT Services. Information from this event will almost certainly be used to update PNT profiles that are supposed to be developed by the Department of Commerce.

Participation in the free testing program certainly makes sense for PNT vendors that are concerned about the potential for cyber attacks via this type of equipment.

EO 13905 – Responsible Use of PNT Services

Yesterday the President published a new executive order in the Federal Register (85 FR 9359-9361) on “Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Services”. EO 13905 will require actions by various agencies of the Federal Government to “foster the responsible use of PNT services by critical infrastructure owners and operators”.

Definitions:

Section 2 of the order provides a listing of the critical definitions used; they include:

PNT services – any system, network, or capability that provides a reference to calculate or augment the calculation of longitude, latitude, altitude, or transmission of time or frequency data, or any combination thereof.

Responsible use of PNT services – the deliberate, risk-informed use of PNT services, including their acquisition, integration, and deployment, such that disruption or manipulation of PNT services minimally affects national security, the economy, public health, and the critical functions of the Federal Government.

PNT profile – a description of the responsible use of PNT services—aligned to standards, guidelines, and sector-specific requirements—selected for a particular system to address the potential disruption or manipulation of PNT services.

PNT Profiles

Section 4 of the Order requires the Department of Commerce (DOC) to develop PNT profiles. Those profiles will {§4(a)}:

• Enable the public and private sectors to identify systems, networks, and assets dependent on PNT services;

• Identify appropriate PNT services;

• Detect the disruption and manipulation of PNT services; and

• Manage the associated risks to the systems, networks, and assets dependent on PNT services

PNT profiles will be referenced in the Coast Guard’s Federal Radionavigation Plan.

DHS will develop a plan to “test the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets in the event of disruption and manipulation of PNT services.” The results of the tests will be used to update PNT profiles.

Where appropriate, PNT profiles will be referenced in Federal acquisition contracts “with the goal of encouraging the private sector to use additional PNT services and develop new robust and secure PNT services.”

DOT, DOE and DHS will develop pilot programs “to engage with critical infrastructure owners or operators to evaluate the responsible use of PNT services.” These pilot programs will help inform efforts by the Director of The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop a national plan “for the R&D and pilot testing of additional, robust, and secure PNT services that are not dependent on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS).” In support of this effort, the DOC will “make available a GNSS-independent source of Coordinated Universal Time, to support the needs of critical infrastructure owners and operators”.

Commentary

This is not the first presidential policy on PNT issues. In 2004, President Bush updated the 1996 based policy document on U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy. That effort, however, was based upon optimizing the use of the GPS based GNSS. Since that time, it has become obvious that spoofing the satellite signals has become an operational reality, posing a potential danger to the continued use of GNSS based PNT. This potential danger was publicly recognized as early as 2014 by the PNT Advisory Board. In 2015 DOT started looking at the use of the eLoran system as an alternative to GNSS PNT.

It will be interesting to see how DOC and the rest of the government deals with the PNT profiles mandated in this EO. The large the number of ‘profiles’ developed the more useful they will be for private sector use in the internal evaluation of the use of PNT services. On the other hand, minimizing the number of profiles developed will make things easier for government agencies to develop broad, minimally specific guidance documents.

Of particular usefulness would be detailed information on how to ‘detect the disruption and manipulation of PNT services’. Again, user/operators will be best served by the most detailed information available. Government agencies, however, may feel better served by providing only the most generic information.

NASA Announces PNT Advisory Board Meeting – 12-10-14

Today NASA published a meeting announcement in the Federal Register (79 FR 67469) for the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board in Washington, DC on December 10^th, 2014. Readers of this blog may be interested in this meeting because the GPS system is used for timing coordination in many control systems.

The agenda includes:

• Examine emerging trends and requirements for PNT services in U.S. and international arenas through PNT Board technical assessments.

• Update on U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Policy and Global Positioning System (GPS) modernization.

• Prioritize current and planned GPS capabilities and services while assessing future PNT architecture alternatives with a focus on affordability.

• Examine methods in which to Protect, Toughen, and Augment (PTA) access to GPS/Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) services in key domains for multiple user sectors.

• Assess economic impacts of GPS on the United States and in select international regions, with a consideration towards effects of potential PNT service disruptions if radio spectrum interference is introduced.

• Explore opportunities for enhancing the interoperability of GPS with other emerging international GNSS.

The meeting is open to the public and no advanced registration is required, but there is limited seating. There are no indications that the meeting will be web-cast or be made available via other electronic means; odd from a technology based organization like NASA.