FMCSA-PHMSA Publishes Nurse-Tank Safety Advisory

Earlier this month, DOT Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) published a Safety Advisory for “Possible Catastrophic Failure of Nurse Tanks and Recommendation for Periodic Testing”. The two agencies are recommending that owners of Anhydrous Ammonia Nurse Tanks manufactured by American Welding & Tank (AWT) between 2007 and 2011 “conduct voluntary periodic visual inspection in accordance with 49 CFR §173.315(m)(2)(i); thickness testing in accordance with 49 CFR §173.315(m)(2)(ii), and pressure testing in accordance with 49 CFR §173.315(m)(2)(iii).”

Generally speaking, anhydrous ammonia nurse tanks, that are considered an implement of husbandry transporting anhydrous ammonia and operated by a private motor carrier exclusively for agricultural purposes are exempted from periodic inspection requirements as long as the tank is marked with a valid, and legible ASME plate. For the purposes of this advisory, however, FMCSA and PHMSA are recommending periodic (every five years) voluntary testing in accordance with §173.315(m)(2)(iv).

According to the Safety Advisory:

“On August 23, 2023, a 2009 AWT nurse tank containing anhydrous ammonia experienced a catastrophic failure in a farm co-op lot, resulting in the release of all product. The failure caused the tank shell to “rocket” over 300 feet from its original location. While no injuries were reported, this event is an indicator of potential continuing problems with AWT nurse tanks that have now been in service for over a decade.

As a result of this incident, the owner of the nurse tank involved contracted with a third-party testing company to examine their AWT nurse tanks that were manufactured between 2008 and 2012. Radiographic testing showed that 7 of 8 the nurse tanks tested had extreme stress corrosion cracking, porosity, and inclusions/voids in the welds where the heads and shells of the nurse tanks were joined. Only the 2012 tank passed. The nurse tank owner submitted these results to engineering experts who were involved in previous research funded by FMCSA into similar issues with this series of AWT nurse tanks.1 Based on the test results and the review by the experts, the owner voluntarily placed the nurse tanks out-of-service. The parent company of the farm co-op subsequently conducted similar radiographic testing on 142 AWT nurse tanks manufactured between 2007 and 2012, and 100 failed the test. All 2012 tanks passed.”

The advisory also reports that:

“This notice focuses on nurse tanks manufactured from January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2011, by American Welding and Tank (AWT) at its Fremont, Ohio plant. Nurse tanks manufactured by AWT from 2009 to 2010 were the subject of a prior FMCSA investigation and enforcement action in response to improper manufacturing procedures.” (FMCSA press release here; AWT press release here)

ISCD Updates Resources Page – 8-30-18

Yesterday the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) updated their Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Resources web page. While the page was reorganized there is no new information provided. ISCD has added a link to the recently published anhydrous ammonia flyer and added a section for their previously published documents translated into Spanish. Both additions are overdue.

ISCD Publishes Anhydrous Ammonia Flyer

On Friday the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) published a notice in the “Latest News” section of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Knowledge Center that they have a new flyer for shippers of anhydrous ammonia. That notice does not provide a link to the flyer; that has to be found by scrolling down the “Fact Sheets and Flyers” list on the same page.

The intent of this flyer is very similar to the generic COI shipping flyer that was published in July 2017. It is part of the ISCD outreach program to try to ensure that all facilities that receive DHS chemicals of interest (COI) are aware of the reporting requirements for the CFATS program. ISCD is not requiring companies to send this flyer to their anhydrous ammonia customers; it is not clear that they have the legal authority to make such a demand. This may, however, be something that Congress may consider providing in the expected extension of the CFATS program.

The advantage (from the DHS perspective) of this type of chemical specific flyer over the generic flyer published earlier is that this flyer is able to include the specific screening threshold quantity (STQ) for anhydrous ammonia. It is also able to specifically address the agriculture reporting exception for some uses of anhydrous ammonia and that exception was not addressed at all in the generic flyer.

The extensive use of anhydrous ammonia as a refrigerant means that this chemical is shipped to a large number of facilities that would not normally consider themselves to be ‘chemical companies’. It would be expected that such companies might not be aware of the CFATS program, though ISCD has attempted to reach out to such facilities through a number of industry organizations that would affect such facilities. I would suspect that ISCD will also reach out to those organizations to ask them to distribute this flyer as well.

NOTE: The CFATS Resources page has not yet been updated to reflect this new flyer. I expect that will happen sometime this week.

IST Ammonia Systems and Regulatory Triggers

Inherently safer technology, or IST, has long been viewed by industry as code words for replacing hazardous chemicals with less hazardous alternatives. In reality, it also includes reducing the amount of hazardous chemicals stored on site. An interesting article at Ammonia21.com points out how industrial cooling equipment manufacturers are helping facilities avoid costly regulation compliance issues by reducing the amount of anhydrous ammonia (AA) used in commercial refrigeration units.

While an accompanying article on the same site provides more details on the safety improvement (and on-going safety requirements) for these advanced cooling systems, the first article makes it clear that the goal is reducing the amount of AA on-site below the 10,000-lb threshold that triggers coverage under EPA Risk Management (RMP), OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) and DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations.

Increase Safety or Reduce Regulatory Burden

Both of the above articles (and another here) strive to show that the advanced refrigeration techniques do enhance safety at the facilities that employ them in ways that extend beyond just reducing the amount of AA on hand. One key method would be removing the need to circulate liquid AA through process areas in the facilities. This greatly reduces the number of places where leaks can happen and moves the remaining potential leak sites away from employees.

If the goal were to simply reduce the amount of AA on hand to avoid regulatory compliance issues, it would seem that the manufacturers would just concentrate on the employment of advanced technology evaporators in current cooling systems. This would seem to be a lower initial cost alternative to reducing inventories below the 10,000-lb trigger. The more complete system change being advocated in these articles do appear to provide increased safety benefits beyond the inventory reduction.

Regulatory Triggers

This provides a good place to talk about the efficacy of regulatory triggers like this 10,000-lb anhydrous ammonia inventory trigger for RMP, PSM and CFATS. If a facility works at ensuring that they never exceed 9,999-lbs of AA on-site, they will not have to worry about complying with the requirements of the regulatory programs mentioned above. Reaching that 10,000-lb trigger, however, means that the facility is required to comply with a host of complicated and expensive regulatory requirements.

Is there a significant difference in the safety and/or security of a facility if they have 9,999-lbs or 10,000-lbs of anhydrous ammonia on hand? Of course not. That one-pound difference has no practical effect on the safety or security risks of the facility. These trigger-based regulatory standards are political artifacts based upon attempts to craft ‘risk-based’ safety and security standards.

The CFATS program acknowledges this trigger problem by having facilities that have reached that trigger submit data (Top Screen) to the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD). A more complex threat assessment process uses this data to determine if facilities are at high-risk for terrorist attack and thus require compliance with the CFATS regulations. While the base trigger problem remains, the two-step assessment process acknowledges that risk determination cannot rely on a single factor.

Industry Response

Since regulatory compliance is associated with significant costs, industry has significant financial incentives to avoid coverage under these regulatory programs. When companies are designing new facilities or refurbishing older facilities process designers take these regulatory triggers into account. If it does not significantly interfere with the process efficiency, special care will be taken to avoid reaching the regulatory triggers under these three federal programs.

I remember working at a facility that was planning on using aqueous ammonia to adjust the pH of a chemical manufacturing process. All of the lab work during product development used 20% aqueous ammonia for the formulation, the industry standard concentration. The CFATS program had used that concentration as part of the trigger for ammonia coverage under the program. The chemical distributor that we were using suggested that we should use a new product they were offering, 19% ammonia, so as to avoid CFATS coverage. We changed our formulations.

Regulatory Efficacy

Since the compliance costs required by reaching these regulatory triggers are significant, the question has to be asked, do facilities on either side (±1-lb) of the trigger inventory level present similar levels of risk after regulatory compliance has been achieved by facilities passing the trigger amounts? Since the answer has to be ‘no’, how can we justify the use of these triggers.

For the EPA and OSHA regulations, the simple answer is that regulators had to have some method of separating the wheat from the chaff and this was the most expedient method of setting some sort of regulatory cutoff. The regulators established some measurable standard for risk assessment for each class of hazardous chemical, applied it to individual chemicals, and then rounded the results to some ‘reasonable’ number. No assessment of actual risk at individual facilities was attempted or even considered.

Until the CFATS program came along, this was considered to be the easiest and most efficient way of establishing regulatory limits. Fortunately, time passed, computer processing became more efficient and cheaper, and the internet expanded access to high-speed data communications. The crafters of the CFATS program used these changes to craft a regulatory program that actually attempted to measure the risk at individual facilities before determining whether or not there was sufficient risk at the facility to justify the added costs associated with a fairly extensive security management program. The program did continue to use triggers (and copied the triggers from the RMP/PSM programs where they were applicable), but those numbers only triggered a one-time, relatively inexpensive, reporting requirement that would provide the data necessary for the risk assessment process.

Re-Look at Triggers Required

Perhaps it is time that Congress directs the EPA and OSHA to take a hard look at modifying the RMP and PSM programs to include an actual risk assessment process that addresses whether individual facilities need to establish expensive compliance programs to protect the public (EPA RMP) and facility employees (OSHA PSM) from the chemical hazards found at that specific site. Triggers (possibly even the current triggers) would still be used, but they would trigger a reporting requirement similar to the CFATS Top Screen that would provide information to the respective agency to make the actual regulatory risk-assessment.

ISCD Publishes New Anhydrous Ammonia FAQ

On Friday the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) published a new frequently asked question (FAQ) on the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Knowledge Center. The question, FAQ# 1786, addresses the effect of change of state in anhydrous ammonia in a refrigeration system on the reporting requirements for the CFATS Top Screen.

The response to the question reads:

“The total mass quantity within the system and the physical state, temperature, and pressure of the ammonia as it exists in the vessel(s) downstream of the condenser(s) should be reported.”

The ‘mass quantity’ portion of that response refers to the information that would need to be provided to question ‘Q1.70.010 Total Onsite Quantity’ on the Top Screen. The remainder of the response addresses the requirements to answer ‘Q1.70.030 Circle 1 Details’ for the largest quantity location for anhydrous ammonia.

Anhydrous Ammonia and Roadways

I ran across an interesting editorial about a recent anhydrous ammonia pipeline leak. The focus of the editorial was on the problem of aging pipelines, but it briefly addressed an issue that I have touched upon on several occasions; the problem of anhydrous ammonia leaks near major roadways.

The Incidents

The most recent incident was on October 18^th near Tekamah, NE (see news reports here, here, here and here). There was a major leak on an above ground portion of an 8” diameter pipeline carrying liquefied anhydrous ammonia. The resulting vapor cloud crossed US 75. A motorist drove through the cloud and died. The accident is being investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

The other incident that I have reported on was in August of 2009 in South Carolina where there was a hose rupture during a tankwagon unloading incident. Again, the resulting vapor cloud crossed a major highway (US 321). A mother of two drove into the cloud and died.

In both cases the facility owners properly notified authorities of the incidents, but the response was not quick enough (or perhaps not well planned enough) to have stopped the victims from driving into the cloud.

PHMSA and Leak Detection

Back in 2010 while reporting on an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) from the DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration on hazardous liquid pipelines I did a special post of the comments that I submitted on that rulemaking. In those comments I noted that pipelines carrying poisonous inhalation hazard (PIH) chemicals (like anhydrous ammonia) pose a special hazard in the case of leaks. I suggested that:

“Any time that a PIH pipeline traverses an area near major thorough fare the PHMSA regulations should provide treatment similar to the HCA provisions even if the roadway is in an otherwise rural area. Once again, any above ground portions of the PIH pipeline in these areas will have an even larger potential affect.”

I also noted that:

“Once again, I would like to suggest that any place where a PIH pipeline is above ground externally based leak detection sensors are the only technology that would provide adequate warnings of the relatively small leaks of PIH materials that could affect unprotected civilians.”

In its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on the hazardous material pipeline revisions PHMSA responded to my comments (and similar comments by others) about HCA provisions for pipeline segments near roadways by saying:

“PHMSA is not proposing to designate major road and railway crossings as HCAs, but will consider whether the pipeline IM requirements should be applied to these areas when completing the study that Congress mandated under section 5 of the Pipeline Safety Act of 2011. PHMSA notes that the pipelines at such crossings would be afforded additional protections under the other proposals made in this proceeding, including the requirements for the performance of periodic internal inspections and the use of leak detection systems.”

On the external leak detection issues, PHMSA responded:

“PHMSA commissioned Kiefner and Associates, Inc., to perform a study on leak detection systems used by hazardous liquid operators. That study, titled “Leak Detection Study,” [4] was completed on December 10, 2012, and was submitted to Congress on December 27, 2012. PHMSA is considering, in a different rulemaking activity, whether to adopt additional or more stringent requirements for sensitive areas in response to this study.”

It should be noted that in the recent incident, it appears that the pipeline operator did have flow-based leak detection active on the affected pipeline section. One news report stated that: “the company’s remote sensing system detected a pressure drop on the portion of the pipeline that runs through Burt County. A pressure drop means a release may have occurred, he said.” Automated valves were then closed and authorities notified, just not soon enough to stop the one victim from driving into the ammonia cloud.

Emergency Notification

In both of these incidents the facility owner made all of the appropriate notification when the leak was discovered and there is no indication that the emergency response was not prompt. Still, in both cases an innocent third-party, with no connection to the facility, died as a consequence of the leak. In both cases they drove into a vapor cloud that looked no different than innocent bank of fog. Once in the cloud the auto’s motor stopped (for lack of oxygen) and the people died either from ammonia exposure or lack of oxygen.

While it is easy to say that better something would have prevented the leak (and the NTSB investigation will tell us that), it is even easier to say that if the person driving the car had been warned not to drive into the cloud, they would not have been killed. We have to expand our definition of emergency notification.

For local residents, notifications can be made by a reverse 911 notification system. In the most recent incident that would have saved the victim; he was a local who apparently was in search of the source of the ‘pungent odor’ of ammonia that he had smelled. If he had been notified by a reverse 911 system, he may never have left the house, and almost certainly would not have driven into the cloud if the message had been properly crafted.

For out of area personnel traversing highways near such incidents, the reverse 911 system is much more problematic. More advanced systems use phone location for notifications not sign-up addresses. But, then again, safety people are trying very hard to stop people from answering phone calls while driving. Something else is needed.

I proposed in an earlier blog post that signs could be posted on major roadways near fixed facilities and pipelines that handle PIH chemicals. These would be digital signs that would flash a warning not to proceed when a local PIH chemical detector detected a chemical cloud near the roadway. When not warning of a PIH leak, the signs could display other safety messages.

Moving Forward

The editorial that peaked my interest in this incident concludes by saying:

“Nebraska’s congressional delegation needs to work together to ensure the agency [PHMSA] is giving Nebraska proper attention, particularly in the case of anhydrous ammonia, to avoid a repeat of the tragedy caused by the leak in Burt County.”

The Nebraska congressional delegation does have some influence. Rep. Fortenberry (R,NE) is on the House Appropriations Committee (but not the Transportation Subcommittee). Sen. Fischer (R,NE) is an influential member of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee and Chair of the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety and Security Subcommittee (at least until December 31^st).

The most immediate thing that will influence any legislative or regulatory action on the pipeline safety issues involved in this incident will be the outcome of the NTSB investigation. The preliminary investigation by NTSB has not yet resulted in the incident being added to the list of current investigations. This means that there may not be a formal NTSB investigations. If, the NTSB does not take up this investigation then the effects of this accident on future legislative or regulatory actions will be very limited.

Anhydrous Ammonia and Land Use Planning

One of the issues that was raised in the CSB’s report on the West Fertilizer explosion was land use planning and hazardous chemical facility siting. The question was asked in that report: “Why would a community be located so close to a facility storing a potentially dangerous chemical?” That same question was recently asked in an Iowa farm community with a different chemical, anhydrous ammonia, but in a more proactive manner.

It seems that a Midwestern farm chemical supply company recently shut down a fertilizer distribution facility. One of the reasons was apparently concerns about the location of their anhydrous ammonia storage tanks inside of a town of 800 people. While they had reportedly never had ammonia release, the potential consequences of such a release could be quite severe.

In searching for a site for a replacement facility, the company obviously wanted to be close to their customers, corn farmers, so they wanted a location near a farming community. They selected a site on a state highway a little more than a mile outside of a town of about 4,000 people. Then they went to the local government board to request an appropriate zoning change for the property.

It was not a completely isolated location, and a few of their potential neighbors objected. It was even suggested that the facility be located at an existing farm supply facility right in town. If that plan had been accepted it would have placed the entire town within the facility’s danger zone as  calculated by the EPA’s RMP*Comp program. The planning board demurred and ended up approving the site outside of town.

While that is the end of the story in the local paper, it may not be the end of the problem. If we look at a map of the area we can see that businesses are already expanding out of town along the state highway. Those businesses are already within a mile of the proposed fertilizer facility. It does not take any great skill to see that if the town continues to expand, one of the areas where that expansion will head is straight towards the new fertilizer company.

If the local leaders don’t keep the potential hazard in mind as they continue to allow their town to expand, then in five or ten years an accident at that facility could have a devastating impact on another small, tight knit community; all for the want of effective land use planning that takes into account potential chemical hazards at local businesses.

Improvised Chemical Devices

There are more and more reports coming out of the Middle East of both Syria and IS using improvised chemical munitions. These devices have generally used industrial chemicals (typically chlorine gas) rather than military grade chemical munitions (chlorine was used as the original chemical weapon, but it has long ceased to be considered an effective military grade chemical weapon). There is a brief summary article here that hits some of the high points and recent a New York Times article shows how easy these weapons are to make.

While there is a VERY outside possibility that some of these actual weapons will be sent to the United States, the much higher concern is that the development of very rudimentary weapons point to the fact that they could very easily be made in the United States by anyone with a moderately equipped home workshop. It would be very unusual for IS not to export the knowledge of how to make these weapons.

These are very definitely tactical scale terror weapons. While they do fit the current legal standard for being weapons of mass destruction (WMD) they should more probably be classified as weapons of mass hysteria (WMH). The concentration of these industrial gasses necessary to kill is relatively high and hard to achieve over any substantial area with these types of weapons. A limited number of people could certainly be killed by these weapons, but the hysteria resulting from their use would be much more devastating in both the long run and short run than would be the actual injuries from the chemicals.

It really is not hard to get your hands on some of the chemicals of interest that would be used in these devices. The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program does regulate the security at some facilities that manufacture, store or use, but not all of them by a long shot. Small water treatment facilities are exempt from both CFATS and EPA security programs and they frequently use small cylinders of chlorine gas. Small agricultural users of anhydrous ammonia are not currently under any security regulations.

I suspect that we are going to be hearing more about these types of attacks outside of the current conflict zone in the not too distant future.

Ammonia Control System Incident

Last week the Chemical Safety Board posted a safety video about hydraulic shock in an ammonia refrigeration system. On Saturday Jake Brodsky posted a very interesting comment about that video over on the SCADESEC mailing list. He noted that part of the cause of the accident as reported by CSB was a control system issue; he suggests in this short comment that this industrial control system (ICS) issue could be used as a method for attacking this type of cooling system.

Background

I will not try to go into a detailed discussion about how this control system works. The CSB did a great job is describing the system in their report on the report on the Millard Refrigeration Services accident that happened on August 23^rd, 2010. I’ll just do a very quick summary here.

Anhydrous ammonia refrigeration systems use circulate liquid ammonia into the heat exchangers inside of the refrigerator/freezer (Reefer) box. As the liquid circulates it picks up heat and turns into a gas (boils). The gas then goes through a condenser and is returned to the liquid state to repeat the process.

Water vapor in the air in the Reefer box condenses on the outside of the heat exchanger (frost) which acts as an insulator and adversely impacts the efficiency of the refrigeration system. Periodically the cooling system is shut down and hot gas is circulated through the heat exchanger to melt the frost. The line is then drained, cleared and then refilled with liquid anhydrous ammonia.

It is very important that the process of draining, clearing and refilling the lines is done properly, otherwise you get the hydraulic shock action that can break open the piping and cause a large anhydrous ammonia release. The Millard release was about 32,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia that injured almost 150 people out in the open a ¼ mile away.

The Incident

According to the CSB report there had been a 7 hour power outage at the facility. When power was restored there were a number of alarms on the control system letting the operators know what was going on. Presumably because the alarms were obnoxious, someone (not a trained operator) turned them off without noting the problems being reported. One of the problems was there was still hot gas in one of the cooling systems.

With the operators not knowing that there was hot gas still in the system they restarted the filling process without having gone through the required draining and clearing process. The result was a large hydraulic shock to the system that broke a 12” ammonia line. (Again it is a tad more involved than that; see the report for two pages of details).

A Cyber Attack

THIS WAS NOT A CYBER ATTACK. But, a cyber-attack probably could have been designed to accomplish what happened here. Now a lot of the details are going to depend on exactly what type of control system is used in the facility so there is no way to provide a detailed outline of an attack scenario (and I wouldn’t want to in any case). With that in mind here are some techniques that might be used.

First and simplest, replicate the 7 hour power outage. Okay, you probably don’t have to do the whole 7 hours; you would just have to shut the system down during the middle of a defrost cycle. The 7 hour shutdown added command pressure and made things more hectic because management was concerned about food starting to go bad. The key point is that the shutdown has to be done during a defrost cycle. Some sort of denial of service attack to shut down the refrigeration control system or the facility power system may be adequate for this purpose.

The problem from an attackers point of view with this method is that you are relying on operators to do the wrong thing during the re-start and that is an iffy proposition. Of course, if at first you don’t succeed….. At some point though the WC Fields addendum kicks in: “Then stop; there is no use being a damn fool about it.” This is especially true in this type of set-up; the more times you require folks to practice their emergency response plan, the better they will get at performing it.

The more complex, but surer way of pulling off this attack would be to attack the control system and interfere with the ability of the operator to drain, clear and refill the line at the end of the defrost cycle. This means that the attacker would have to reprogram some PLCs so that they operate in manner other than that which was intended and futz some sensor outputs to make it look like everything was operating normally.

This is, of course, why attacking an industrial control system is so difficult. First off you have to understand that you can cause hydraulic shock ruptures of ammonia lines, then:

∙ You have to understand how to optimize the conditions for that shock;

∙ You have to understand what controls work together to get that optimized condition;

∙ You have to understand what the operator is going to expect to see to do their part;

∙ You have to be able to provide that expected information to the operator;

∙ You have to know what safety systems are in operation and how to futz them; and

∙ You have to do all of this while hacking the system.

The one thing that should not escape anyone’s attention here is that the easiest place to do this hack is from the engineering workstation routinely used to work on the control system. And I don’t mean hacking into this from some off site hacker shop, but actually sitting at the terminal, sipping on a cup of coffee and smiling at the people around you. Yep, the infamous insider attack.

CSB Announces Public Meeting on US Ink Explosion

The Chemical Safety Board published a public meeting notice in today’s Federal Register (80 FR 1015) for a meeting on January 15^th in East Rutherford, NJ to review reports from the investigators looking at the explosion and fire that occurred at the US Ink Facility in East Rutherford on October 9^th, 2012.

The Accident Investigation web site lists the US Ink incident as a combustible dust explosion. That being the case I am pretty sure that the Board will take the opportunity of this meeting to excoriate the DOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for their continued lack of rulemaking on the combustible dust hazards.

If time permits the Board may also review reports on the anhydrous ammonia release that took place in Theodore, AL in August of 2010.

‘New’ Fuel has Security Implications

There is an interesting post over at Energy.BlogNotions.com about a potential replacement for hydrocarbon fuels, anhydrous ammonia. The author, Kurt Cobb describes six advantages to the use of ammonia:

• It contains no carbon, therefore no greenhouse gasses produced;

• Well-known processes for making ammonia;

• Worldwide ammonia production industry;

• Distribution technology understood;

• Enviable safety record (more on that later);

• Creates nothing that can be classed as pollution

In general this is a well thought out and well documented discussion about the pro-ammonia arguments. I do however, take exception to the glib statement about the anhydrous ammonia safety record and note that there are some serious security issues that must be taken into account in this discussion.

Safety Record

Anhydrous ammonia is a toxic inhalation (TIH) hazard chemical. This means that relatively low concentrations in the air can kill people. Kurt does make one good point about this particular TIH chemical; it is detectable and obnoxious at concentrations much lower than the lethal concentration in the air. This does mean that most people on the periphery of an ammonia cloud will be self-alerted to the danger so that they can undertake evacuation efforts.

One of the reasons that there have been fewer deaths from large scale accidents with anhydrous ammonia as compared to chlorine gas (another industrial scale TIH chemical) is that anhydrous ammonia is lighter than air so it generally rises above ground level in a release. Chlorine gas is about twice as heavy as air so that it hugs the ground.

You have to be careful about that word ‘generally’ there are all sorts of thing that can happen that will affect the rate of ascent of the gas cloud including air temperature profiles, amount of humidity in the air and the wind speed in the area. And, of course, if the gas cloud is inside of a building, all bets are off. And even if the bulk of the release cloud rises above ground level, air mixing is sure to keep non-lethal ammonia concentrations over a wide swath of down-wind ground, making life miserable for people in the short term.

As the 2009 incident in Swansea, SC showed even a gas cloud that is generally rising can cause deaths and this was from a relatively small volume release. If there is a drastic increase in the amount of anhydrous ammonia used in commerce the number of accidents can be expected to increase and I suspect that the accident rate would increase as small spills tend to cause personnel to evacuate the area rather than take immediate actions to stop the leak.

CFATS

Anhydrous ammonia is a DHS chemical of interest (COI) for the CFATS program. Any facility that has over 10,000 lbs of anhydrous ammonia on site (about 1800 gallons, a relatively small pressure tank) is required to register with DHS and to submit a Top Screen. The current extended CFATS community includes more than 40,000 facilities that have submitted Top Screens. That number would significantly increase if we replaced oil/gas fired energy producing facilities with anhydrous ammonia fueled facilities.

Once a Top Screen is submitted DHS looks at the potential effects of a release of chemicals like anhydrous ammonia to determine if they are at high-risk for terrorist attack. While DHS will not share the details of their assessment regime for security reasons, it is clear that the more people that would be affected by a release the higher the probability that DHS would declare the facility to be at high-risk. That declaration brings with it the requirement to fully implement the security standards set forth in the CFATS regulations.

Those security measures would seriously add to the cost (capital and operational) of an anhydrous ammonia fueled power generation facility. Coal, oil or natural gas power plants are not currently covered because of fuels (they may be covered for other chemicals) since coal, oil, and natural gas are not listed COI.

TSA Security

Anhydrous ammonia is specifically listed {§1580.100(b)(2)} in the TSA freight rail security regulations (49 CFR §1580.100 et seq) as a rail security-sensitive material. These materials require special handling by shippers, railroads, and receivers in high-threat urban areas (HTUA).

These special handling requirements, including train speed limits, will also add costs to the use of anhydrous ammonia as a power generation fuel. Again, these costs need to be taken into account in determining the economic viability of this ‘new’ fuel.

No Bleve at West Fertilizer

While I didn’t actually think that a bleve was responsible for the explosion at West Fertilizer this week (though I did discuss the possibility) I now have visual evidence that one was not involved (at least not an anhydrous ammonia bleve). A Reuter’s photo in a story on the Toronto Sun web site shows investigators (look real close) walking through the rubble around the anhydrous ammonia tanks. All five tanks that I identified earlier as probable anhydrous ammonia tanks are still present and intact.

CG Establishes Maritime Security Zones for RNC

Today the Coast Guard published a temporary final rule in the Federal Register (77 FR 50926-50929) concerning security zones for vessels carrying certain dangerous cargo. This rule is being issued as part of the DHS security support for the Republican National Convention taking place in Tampa, FL from August 25, 2012, through August 31, 2012.

While the term ‘certain dangerous cargo’ (CDC) may apply to a variety of extremely hazardous chemicals on vessels, the rule makes it clear that it specifically applies to only to vessels carrying “carrying anhydrous ammonia, liquefied propane gas, and ammonium nitrate” {77 FR 50927}. These are common bulk chemicals that transit Tampa Bay. Such CDC vessels will be escorted by Coast Guard vessels during their transit of the area.

Instead of requiring such CDC vessels to stay away from the Port of Tampa Bay during the Convention, the rule establishes a moving security zone around such vessels as they move through the Port area. The discussion in the rule notes that:

“Security measures have been limited to the minimum necessary to mitigate risks associated with the identified threats.” {77 FR 50927}

Because of the short notice period, there has not been a public comment period provided for this rule. Anyone with questions about the rule should contact Marine Science Technician First Class Nolan L. Ammons; D07-SMB-Tampa-WWM@uscg.mil.

Anhydrous Ammonia Theft

I haven’t talked about this issue in a while but I ran across an interesting article about one of the larger anhydrous ammonia thefts that I have ever seen. The article notes that a trailer used to apply anhydrous ammonia fertilizer to fields was stolen from a farm outside of Kalamazoo, MI. The empty 1,000-gallon tank was later recovered.

Terrorist Weapon?

As with presumably all such thefts to date this trailer was taken and emptied in support of the illicit manufacture of methamphetamines. If that was the case her, the thieves have a problem on their hand; according to the article “the ammonia was treated with GloTell, a substance that dyes the product bright pink and makes it unsuitable for meth production”.

With that said, could this type theft be a precursor for a terrorist chemical attack? It certainly could as any toxic inhalation chemical could be used in an attack. That is why anhydrous ammonia is a DHS chemical of interest (COI). It is listed in Appendix A as a release – toxic chemical and as such has a screening threshold quantity (STQ) of 10,000 lbs. While agricultural production facilities are exempted submitting Top Screens, if this farmer never had more than the quantity found in this trailer (reportedly 4,000 lbs) on site no Top Screen submission would be required.

Does that mean that this smaller quantity could not be used as a terrorist weapon? Certainly not. In many ways this quantity, in a portable tank, is much more useable as a weapon as it could be delivered to an appropriate target and the TIH material released there. In normal transport or in fixed tanks the material would have to be in the right place at the right time for it to be an effective weapon.

Why Not a Theft Diversion COI?

This begs the question, why isn’t anhydrous ammonia listed in Appendix A as a theft-diversion COI as well as a release COI? Chlorine gas, for example, is dual listed and these two chemicals share many traits; both are readily available TIH industrial chemicals. They both cause serious damage to the respiratory system in less than lethal concentrations. Chlorine is listed as a theft-WME (weapon of mass effect) COI with an STQ of 500 lbs in portable containers.

Technically, chlorine is listed as a theft-WME COI and anhydrous ammonia isn’t because chlorine was used as a war gas in WWI and is listed in the Chemical Weapons Convention list of chemical weapons. Anhydrous ammonia was never used or seriously considered for chemical weapons use and is not included in the Convention’s list of chemical weapons or their precursors.

Anhydrous ammonia was not considered for use as a chemical weapon because of its affinity for water, even water vapor in the air. This could seriously inhibit its functionality as a war gas. This wouldn’t have any practical effect on the effectiveness of its use against terrorist targets especially within buildings like shopping malls, schools, churches or other soft targets.

Agriculture Exemption

I am relatively certain that this CWC technicality was not the main reason that anhydrous ammonia was never considered as a theft-diversion COI when DHS put together Appendix A. One of the industries that use huge quantities of this material is agriculture where it is used as a very effective and cheap nitrogen fertilizer. It is typically hauled to fields in these 1,000-gallon tanks (they look like large propane tanks on wheels) and these tanks are then used to disperse the material into the ground before planting.

If DHS had included anhydrous ammonia as a theft-diversion COI it would have raised the cost of the use of this fertilizer and the agriculture industry would have raised fits. If you don’t think that this had any influence on the listing decision consider the case of propane. Because of the concerns of the agriculture industry and their tame Senators the STQ for propane (widely used on farms and other production facilities for a variety of heating uses) was set at 60,000 lbs instead of the 10,000 pounds set for similar release flammable COI.

Or consider the fact that the farmers, or their employees, hauling these trailers from the local supplier to their fields do not have to have hazardous material endorsements on their commercial driver’s license. PHMSA has given them a blanket agricultural exemption from that requirement.

Appendix A Review

This is another chemical of concern that needs to have its status reviewed during the current discussions about amendments to Appendix A of the CFATS regulations. This is particularly true since State regulations trying to prevent the theft of anhydrous ammonia for use in the manufacture of methamphetamines.

Anhydrous Ammonia Video

There is a very brief article over on EmergencyMgmt.com pointing their readers to a police dash-cam video of an Illinios State Trouper responding to an auto accident that, unknown to him, includes a fertilizer application trailer leaking anhydrous ammonia. The video should be one that is required viewing for all first responders.

I’m sure that the training that the Trooper received included recognizing DOT hazard placards. I am also pretty sure that he had received specific training on the hazards of anhydrous ammonia, Illinois has tough rules about the security of anhydrous ammonia storage because of the number of thefts of the material by meth manufacturers. Responding to leaks associated with those thefts must be common enough in the State for there to be specific hazard training to be conducted as a matter of course.

Unfortunately the trooper commits a common hazmat response error. He forgets his training when he sees the injured body lying on the road. Ignoring the ‘cloud of smoke’, the markings on the trailer and the strong pungent odor of ammonia he races, first aid kit in hand, to the injured person’s side. He is overcome by the fumes so quickly he cannot even radio for assistance. He passed-out on top of the person he was attempting to aid.

The fire truck and ambulance crews approaching from the opposite direction were either better informed about the accident, or just more experienced and wary. They did not approach to execute the rescue until they had donned their breathing apparatus and had set a hose to knock down the toxic cloud. When they carried the Trooper away from where he had fallen he was still breathing.

This was a relatively small and nearly-benign hazmat incident. The leak is apparently small with a decent breeze blowing through the area. This is an ideal situation to keep the concentration of the ammonia cloud relatively low, below deadly levels. If the leak had been faster or the wind slower the cloud would have been much more toxic and the Trooper probably would not have even made it to the other victim’s side.

If this had been a tank truck or railcar of anhydrous ammonia instead of a fertilizer application trailer, the cloud would have affected a much larger area. If the accident had taken place in a town or a city, the potentially affected population would have been larger and significantly less well trained.

This is why emergency response personnel have to be trained and retrained, practiced and rehearsed, made to repeat the response until it becomes as automatic as that seen in the fire truck crew in this video. They need to know what hazardous materials they could routinely encounter in their area, either from transportation trailers or from fixed sites. Local companies that make, use, or transport these materials, particularly TIH chemicals need to ensure that their local responders are appropriately trained and equipped to deal with these incidents.

If you disagree, watch the video again.

Anhydrous Ammonia Theft

A news story from Illinois points out the continuing problem of theft of anhydrous ammonia used to support illicit manufacturer methamphetamines. Unfortunately, it also points out the continuing lack of physical security at some high-risk chemical facilities.

Release Toxic COI Anhydrous ammonia is a release toxic chemical of interest and it is fairly clear that the facility in the article has more than 10,000 lbs on-site. While there is no description of the surrounding community in the article it would not be hard to expect that DHS would determine that a facility like this would be a high-risk chemical facility. Now the facility does have some pretty decent still and video footage of the individual stealing the anhydrous ammonia. Photos like this, publicized like this, will almost certainly lead to police catching this local drug manufacturer. What they don’t do, however, is to prevent the theft or release of this TIH chemical. A druggee penetrated the facility perimeter and remain unmolested by security or police for long enough to tap into a storage container and then walk out with a propane cylinder filled with the anhydrous ammonia. This then means that the security is also inadequate to prevent a terrorist from entering the facility with a propane cylinder sized IED to be detonated at one of the large storage tanks. If this is a high-risk chemical facility, and I really have no way of knowing for sure that it is, then the chemical facility inspectors from DHS need to pay an early visit to this facility. While it may not yet be due for its SSP inspection, the fact that its security has been publicly identified as being weak should call for special interest by the folks at DHS. Theft-Diversion COI Currently anhydrous ammonia is only a release toxic COI under CFATS regulations. It clearly doesn’t meet the requirements for a theft-diversion COI since it isn’t considered a precursor chemical for an IED explosive (though I could certainly describe a binary explosive device that would have some interesting side effects) and anhydrous ammonia doesn’t quite fit the description of a potential chemical agent. I certainly think that a legitimate argument could be made for making anhydrous ammonia a special case for designation as a theft-diversion COI. This would take at least a new rule being drafted/posted and would certainly be opposed by manufacturers, distributors and users of anhydrous ammonia. The additional security costs to stop the theft-diversion could be substantial. But, protecting communities from the potential toxic release that is frequently the byproduct of the drug related theft of anhydrous facilities is something that should be considered. I don’t expect that DHS would be willing to take on this issue, the political opposition would be too great and the homeland security benefit would be relatively small. It would take someone to propose the requirement in some legislation to make this happen. A logical place to put it would be the CFATS reauthorization legislation.

Working with Local First Responders

I ran into an interesting article over on MarshallNews.com that tells an important story about how chemical facilities coordinate and work with their supporting first responders. Interestingly, it was a food processing facility with an anhydrous ammonia refrigeration system that took the extra effort that all chemical facilities (especially high-risk facilities) should take to ensure that first responders understand the chemical hazards at the facility. In this case the Cargill meat processing facility provided in depth information about the characteristics, both physical and toxicological, of anhydrous ammonia. They explained how to knock down the toxic cloud as well as the precautions to take while doing that critical emergency response task. They explained the difference between the ‘worst case scenario’ (a catastrophic failure of the 44,000 lb storage tank potentially affecting up to 450 personnel off-site) and a bad leak that could affect no more than 5 nearby residents. Finally, they took the emergency responders on a facility tour that showed the relative location of the buildings, the storage tank, and the anhydrous ammonia pipes for the refrigeration system (including shut-off valves on that piping). While the maintenance personnel showed the firefighters the details of the plumbing, the facility safety manager showed police, EMS, and even 911 personnel around the plant so that they could understand the layout of the facility. Now what really impressed me about this presentation was not the detail of the presentation to the firefighters and EMS personnel, after all that is self-preservation, or even the inclusion of the police and 911 personnel (that was a smart and creative move). No what surprised and impressed me was that the management was smart enough to include a press representative in the audience. After all, now the local public has a better understanding of the hazards at the facility and how they are being protected from those hazards. The only way that I could have been more impressed would have been if they had included local school, church and civic leaders in the presentation. Maybe they will include those personnel when they talk to their 450 neighbors that could be affected by a catastrophic release. If this facility were a CFATS covered facility (probably not given the small number of people in the worst case danger zone), then security issues would also have been addressed. I would expect that a facility this concerned about communicating with first responders would do a similar job in showing the local law enforcement personnel the ins and outs of the security system at the facility.

Fertilizer and IST

I ran across an article on HossierAgToday.com that pointed out a basic misunderstanding of the inherently safer technology (IST) requirements of HR 2868. The article quotes an unnamed spokeswoman of the Fertilizer Institute as saying that “forcing makers of anhydrous ammonia for fertilizer to switch products would drive up costs and hurt quality”.

First off, the provisions of HR 2868 would not require any manufacturer of any chemical listed in Appendix A to 6 CFR part 27 (DHS chemicals of interest - COI) to stop manufacturing those chemicals. Since those products are what the manufacturer sells, it would not be economically feasible to stop them from selling those products; it would put them out of business.

Manufacturers of certain COI (mostly TIH chemicals) might have to be concerned that some of their customers might be required to switch to less hazardous chemicals because of the IST provisions of HR 2868 if the legislation were adopted. This concern would not be felt by fertilizer manufacturers.

The end users (farmers) of these dangerous chemicals (anhydrous ammonia and perhaps ammonium nitrate) would not be Tier 1 or Tier 2 facilities if they were covered by CFATS (farmers are currently temporarily exempted from the Top Screen submission requirements of CFATS). Only Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities could possibly be required by the Secretary to switch to safer chemicals. Thus anhydrous ammonia fertilizer end-point sales would not be affected by HR 2868 and the entire manufacture distribution system would be effectively exempted from the substitution requirements.

Where anhydrous ammonia is used to manufacture other fertilizers, it will be difficult to justify the switch to slightly less dangerous aqueous ammonia solutions simply on economic grounds. This would require the complete redesign of manufacturing processes and chemical handling equipment. It would significantly increase the number of hazardous materials shipments and the number of times that those chemicals would be handled. The capital costs for the switch and the increased operational costs would be hard to justify with the slim margins typically found on fertilizers used in large scale commercial farming.

It is always disheartening to see political discourse reduced exaggeration of the potential affects of legislation. There are a number of points of clear disagreement about many provisions of HR 2868. The discussion about whether or not to pass the bill should remain focused on those areas so that reasonable accommodations can be reached between the various affected groups. Resorting to exaggerated claims to garner wider support only poisons the political process.