Earlier this week Rep. Price (D,NC) introduced HR
3163, the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related
Agencies (THUD) Appropriations Act, 2020. The House Appropriations Committee
also published their Report
on the bill. There are lots of interesting provisions in the bill as well as
some important discussions in the Report.
Control System Security
Section 195 (pgs 103-4) of the bill would prohibit DOT from issuing
grants “to entities that do not comply with practices for control system
procurement recommended by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center” {§195(a)} This overly broad language does include an
escape clause whereby the Secretary can waive the requirement when it “would be
inconsistent with the public interest” {§195(b)(1)}.
The Report address the cybersecurity of a specific type of
control system; Positive Train Control (PTC). On page 54 the Committee urges
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) “to establish enhanced cyber security
methods, standards, and best practices for PTC systems and future versions of
this technology”.
Automated Transportation Systems
Section 106 of the bill would establish, within the Office
of the Secretary, a Highly Automated Systems Safety Center of Excellence. The
HASSCE would {§106(b)}:
• Serve as a single place within the Department of
Transportation for expertise in automation and human behavior, computer
science, machine learning, sensors, and other technologies involving automated
systems;
• Support all Operating Administrations of the
Department of Transportation; and
• Have a workforce composed of Department of
Transportation employees, including direct hires or detailees from Operating [Modal]
Administrations.
Employees of HASSCE would “audit, inspect, and certify
highly automated systems to ensure their safety” {§106(c)}.
There is additional discussion of the role of HASSCE in the
Report (pg 11). The role of the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration in the regulation of automated vehicles is addressed in pages 41
thru 42 of the Report.
Liquified Natural Gas by Rail
On page 53 of the Report the Committee ‘provides’ $2.5 million for “FRA to
research and mitigate risks associated with the transportation of crude oil,
ethanol, liquefied natural gas (LNG)”. That paragraph goes on to direct FRA and
the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) “to continue
to support cooperative research on the safe use of LNG in these applications [locomotive
fuel and bulk rail transport] which could inform the development of new
regulations”.
Page 75 provides a more detailed discussion of LNG by rail
rulemaking being pursued by PHMSA. It directs PHMSA to fund a study by National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine on the transportation of LNG
by rail. The study would address multiple transportation scenarios and look at:
• Release events;
• Hazards when a spill is coupled with an ignition source;
• Leak detection;
• Impacted geographic areas;
• Route terrain challenges; and
• Emergency and first responder training and notification
The Report provides additional discussion of that last item,
training, on pg 78. There the Committee “directs PHMSA to enhance its training
curriculum for local emergency responders to account for LNG facilities and the
transportation of LNG in rail tank cars.”
Commentary
It is odd that the Bill and the Committee Report both
specifically address cybersecurity issues with transportation control systems,
but then fail to address cybersecurity issues in their discussions of the
HASSCE. While early discussions in DOT about highly automated driving systems
did at least mention cybersecurity issues, there has been a glaring lack of
such language in recent DOT rulemaking processes. Congress must insist that DOT
include cybersecurity oversight in its regulation of automated driving systems.
And it would have seemed to me that the language in §106 would have been an ideal place to do so.
With that in mind, I would like to suggest the following two
changes to provisions within §106:
Revise §106(b)(1) to read:
(1) serve as a single place
within the Department of Transportation for expertise in automation and human
behavior, computer science, machine learning, sensors, cybersecurity, and other technologies
involving automated systems;
Revise §106(c) to read:
(c) Employees of the Highly
Automated Systems Safety Center of Excellence shall audit, inspect, and certify
highly automated systems to ensure their safety and cybersecurity.
With regards to the control system supply chain security requirements
of §195, the only
recommended practices document that I can find on the CISA web site is the 2009
“Department
of Homeland Security: Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems”.
I am not sure how DOT would go about ensuring that those
guidelines are being followed by organizations requesting various Transportation
Department grants. Or, even more broadly, how they would determine what
organizations would have control systems that would be covered by those
recommendations.
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