The DHS (CISA) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division
(ISCD) held the third of their Explosive Precursor Chemical Stakeholder
Engagement Meetings yesterday in Houston. Two more to go in Indianapolis
and Chicago.
I have not been (and unfortunately will not be) able to
attend any of the meetings and they are not being web cast. But a long time
reader, Cathi Cross,
was able to attend today and was able to share some observations about the
meeting. Here is what she saw {NOTE: Comments in brackets are my additions;
they are not Cathi’s fault (grin)}:
In addition to DHS personnel, the
16 attendees were a mix of industry representatives, trade association
representatives, academia, and the general public.
DHS clarified the series of
scheduled meeting’s intended purpose is to focus on point of sale risk
mitigation for certain precursors identified in the 2017
National Academy of Sciences Study [link to my blog post added], conducted
for this purpose. DHS is seeking public comments on the report [link to NAS report web
site added] .
DHS clarified that the discussion
would intentionally deviate from CFATS regulation or the facilities regulated
under its jurisdiction - and focus on mitigating risk at the point of sale [NOTE: ‘point of sale’ potentially includes all venues
where precursor chemicals are sold] within the supply chain.
DHS began by reviewing the NAS
report, at a high level. Key points: select precursor chemicals used to
manufacture homemade explosives (and the prioritization method used by NAS),
domestic chemical supply chains, and international regulations, possible
control strategies, and the report’s six recommendations.
The Office of Bombing Prevention
representative reminded participants of the available resources from their Bomb
Making Materials Awareness Program (BMAP). Some of which have been made
available on the website for the Center for Domestic Preparedness.
Next, DHS facilitated open
discussion on explosive precursor chemicals, the supply chain, and
point-of-sale. Topics included chemical prioritization, potential voluntary
programs (including industry stewardship programs), potential regulatory
programs, additional as of yet-unidentified high-risk points in the supply
chain, concerns regarding commerce encumbrances, citizen awareness & worker
training ideas, and brainstorming mitigation strategies.
Three specific concerns/ideas
raised during the open discussion seemed to resonate with the attendees:
1. Initiator chemicals were
removed from the scope of the NAS report. Reconsidering initiator chemicals and
limiting the scope of this initiative to only those - may optimize
administrative controls to a much smaller footprint while achieving significant
risk reduction.
2. All point-of-sale transactions
involve a financial transaction. Consult the financial sector for ways to
identify, and eventually screen purchases through the financial transactions at
point of sale.
3. The recommendation was made
that the agency review comments previously submitted for the ANPRM on AN
(October 29, 2008) because many of the comments may prove very valuable beyond
the scope of that rulemaking, in development of a broader precursor program. [I
did a series of blog posts on those comments here,
here,
here,
here, here,
here,
and here]
Commentary
Back to my voice again.
As Cathi noted any precursor chemical security program is
not going to be part of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)
program. I have heard this emphatically from folks in and around the program.
David Wulf is heading up this effort at CISA because the Ammonium Nitrate
Security Program rulemaking was put under ISCD purview and this is an outgrowth
of the ANSP.
Again, to be absolutely clear; this is not yet a rulemaking
proposal. Congress has provided a mandate for establishing an ANSP, NOT an
explosive precursor program. Before ISCD can even begin to start the rulemaking
process, Congress is going to have to provide a new/revised authorization. DHS
knows that there is a problem with tracking the sale of precursor chemicals,
but they are not yet prepared to ask Congress for new/revised authorization to
establish such a program. The whole point of these meeting is to gather as much
input from the affected (potentially regulated) communities about what might
and might not work.
There are two more meetings in the coming weeks;
• Indianapolis, IN June
11th, 2019
• Chicago, IL June
13th, 2019
Personnel wishing more information about attending the
meetings should contact ISCD (CFATS@hq.dhs.gov)
[AGAIN this does not mean that this is being added to the CFATS program, it is
just a readily available email address that is already being staffed and
worked]. If you are working with and/or more importantly selling one of the
precursor chemicals identified in the NAS report, you really might want to
consider attending one of these two meetings. You might be able to help educate
one of your potential regulators.
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