Yesterday DHS published a notice in the Federal Register (84
FR 25495-25496) announcing the availability of a redacted
copy of a report [.PDF download link, 28 mega bites] by Sandia Laboratories
on their technical research, testing, and findings related to the feasibility
of weaponizing commercially available products containing ammonium nitrate.
This report is being made available as part of the DHS rulemaking on
‘Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Program’.
Public Comments
The Department is seeking
two types of comments from the public in regards to this publication as part of
the ammonium nitrate security program rulemaking. First it is seeking information
about the processes that Sandia Labs used to evaluate the explosive nature of
compounds made with ammonium nitrate. Specifically, DHS is looking for evaluative
comments on:
• The scientific methodology and test plans SNL
employed;
• The technical data generated by SNL; and
• The test results, and factors affecting
detonability thresholds.
Next the Department is seeking comments on the applicability
of the information provided in the report to the definition of
ammonium nitrate in the notice of proposed rulemaking. Specifically, DHS is
looking for comments on:
• Whether the report supports changes to the proposed
mixture and weight thresholds, and
• The potential economic impacts of any changes to
the proposed definition
Public comments should be submitted to DHS by September 3rd,
2019. Comments may be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal (www.Regulations.gov; Docket # DHS-2008-0076).
Comments
It is always fun reading redacted documents. The inquisitive
mind tried to figure out what data was beneath the black bars. DHS has further
engaged the inquisitive mind by adding hints as to what data has been occluded.
The report is interesting in that it would seem to indicate
that a much smaller quantity of ammonium nitrate is needed to make an explosive
device than was considered by the NPRM. The NPRM definition limit was 25-lbs,
but Sandia was able to successfully detonate devices using as little as 3-lbs
and the report suggests that DHS might need to consider using a 1-lb limit.
A change of this sort (even the 3-lb limit) would greatly increase
the cost of the ANSP as more AN containing-products were brought into the
regulatory schema, perhaps even pharmacies and medical supply stores that sold
AN based cold-packs.
It would seem that DHS is making this document public with
the intent to get itself taken out of the business of regulating ammonium
nitrate. The proposed regulation is already more expensive than could be
justified by the cost avoidance of a Murrah Building type attack (see my
discussion here).
Unfortunately, this document will be used to excoriate DHS if a successful AN-based
improvised explosive is used to kill a large number of people; and I am sure
that the folks at DHS understood that. With that in mind, I want to
congratulate DHS on the political fortitude exemplified in publishing this
document. It is a valuable set of information in the debate on regulating
improvised explosive precursors that could have nasty political consequences
down the road.
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