Earlier this month Rep. McCaul (R,TX) introduced HR 6401,
the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018. This bill is a refinement of S
2836, a bill of the same title introduced by Sen. Johnson (R,WI). Both
bills would provide somewhat limited authority to DHS and DOJ to mitigate the
threat “that an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft poses to the
safety or security of a covered facility or asset” {new §210G(a)}.
Most of the changes made by this bill are simply the
addition of clarifying language. For example, in §210G(a), this bill substitutes “sections 32, 1030,
1367 and chapters 119 and 206 of title 18, United States Code” for the “any
provision of title 18, United States Code” used in the Senate bill.
Other changes actually narrow (albeit only slightly) the
scope of the authority of DHS and DOJ to maintain records of information obtained
while taking actions against UAS/UAVs. For example, in paragraph (e)(3) this
bill replaces the broad “support one or more functions” language with the slightly
more restrictive “support 1 or more safety or security functions” language in
explicating when the departments can hold information obtained past 180 days.
There is also a minor narrowing of the definition of ‘covered
facility or asset’ in paragraph (k)(3) with the frequent addition of the phrase
“considered to be high-risk or assessed to be a target for unlawful unmanned
aircraft activity” in the descriptions of the different categories of covered
facilities, assets or activities.
Moving Forward
McCaul is the Chair of the House Homeland Security Committee
and thus will call up this bill for consideration when ever he pleases.
Interestingly, he did not include this bill in the recent markup
hearing where other bills introduced on the same day were addressed. I
suspect that this was due to concerns of Committee Democrats about some of the
provisions of the bill. I expect that when this bill is considered, it will be
with substitute language.
Commentary
Like S 2836, this bill does not address the problem of preventing
potential UAS attacks on privately owned critical infrastructure. The reasons
for that are two-fold. First, these bills are attempting to closely hold the
authority to attack UAS, limiting it to actions undertaken by DHS and DOJ.
There is going to be a strong reluctance on many in Congress to providing any
authority to take down any sort of aircraft operating in the national airspace.
Strictly limiting that authority is going to be a prerequisite to any
congressional action.
The second problem is that too many people (congresscritters
specifically included) have a hard time accepting that there is a realistic
threat of a consequential attack by UAS. While everyone is well aware of the
military use of attack drones, most people think of UAS in the national
airspace as the quadcopters and small helicopters that are sold at the local
mall. The use of those devices as a terrorist weapon of significance is
generally discounted in the minds of most people.
I expect that for any counter UAV bill to make it to the
President’s desk, the bill will have to restrict the definition of a UAV/UAS to
the larger types of commercial aircraft that are able to carry a more
substantial payload. The smaller quadcopters, camera platforms, and flying toys
will just not be taken seriously as a substantial threat. Until, of course, one
is actually used in a successful, high-profile attack. Then all bets are off….
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