Earlier this month, Rep. Wilson (R,SC) introduced HR 3994,
the Security and Privacy in Your (SPY) Car Study Act of 2015. The bill
would require the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) to report to Congress on potential cybersecurity
standards for automobiles made and/or sold in the United States.
A Study and Report to
Congress
Section 2(a) of the bill would require the NHTSA Administrator
to conduct a study “to determine appropriate standards for the regulation of
the cybersecurity of motor vehicles manufactured or imported for sale in the
United States that should be adopted by the Administration and any other
appropriate Federal agencies”. The study would be conducted in consultation
with:
• The Federal Trade Commission;
• The Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology;
• The Secretary of Defense;
• The Automotive Information
Sharing and Analysis Center;
• SAE International;
• Manufacturers of motor vehicles
and original motor vehicle equipment; and
• Relevant academic institutions.
The study would be designed to identify:
• The isolation measures that are
necessary to separate critical software systems from other software systems;
• The measures that are necessary
to detect and prevent or minimize the effects of anomalous code associated with
malicious behavior;
• The techniques that are necessary
to detect and prevent, discourage, or mitigate intrusions into the software
systems of motor vehicles and other cybersecurity risks in motor vehicles; and
• Best practices to secure driving
data collected by the electronic systems of motor vehicles while such data are
stored onboard the vehicle, in transit from the vehicle to another location,
and in off-vehicle storage.
Interestingly the term ‘critical software system’ is
specifically defined in the bill. It describes “a software system of a motor
vehicle that can affect the driver’s control of the movement of the vehicle” {§2(c)(2)}. Driving data
is also defined to include vehicle status information and personal information
about the owner, driver or passengers.
NHTSA would have one year to complete the study and then six
months more to present a report to Congress about the results of the study. The
report to Congress would be unclassified and would include recommendations for “any
legislation that may be necessary to authorize the adoption of such standards
[recommended in the study]” {§2(b)(2)}.
Moving Forward
Neither Wilson nor his cosponsor {Rep. Lieu (D,CA)} are
members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee to which this bill was
referred. Thus it is unlikely that there is the political pull to get this bill
considered by the Committee. If the bill were to make it to the floor it would
likely pass since it just requires a study and report. The automotive industry
would almost certainly object to any regulation of automotive cybersecurity,
but would probably hold-off opposing the bill since they would be able to
influence the results of the study.
Commentary
I certainly can’t fault Wilson for trying to get a group of
experts to determine what cybersecurity regulations might be necessary to
ensure that automotive control systems are reasonably safe from cyber-attacks.
And I agree that NHTSA, the government agency responsible for automotive
safety, should probably be the agency to regulate that security; the
Transportation Security Administration certainly is not a viable alternative.
Having said that, I do think that there is a DHS agency that should be included
in the study effort and that is ICS-CERT. They have the most knowledge of
control systems within the government.
There are two agencies that I’m not sure that I agree should
have anything to do with this study; the FTC and the DOD. The FTC’s
cybersecurity knowledge is pretty limited and certainly does not include
control systems. While they do have some regulatory experience, NHTSA already
has a great deal of experience in dealing with automotive safety regulations.
DOD certainly is developing cybersecurity expertise, but little of it has to do
with protecting control systems. They certainly do not have the level of
expertise in that arena that the ICS-CERT would have.
I’ll give Wilson’s staff credit for addressing the main
areas of interest with automotive control systems, but some of their attempts
at ‘technical language’ should not have been attempted. In §2(a)(2) for instance
they attempt to describe preventing hacking as “prevent or minimize in the
software systems of motor vehicles anomalous codes associated with malicious
behavior”; close but not quite there.
Then in §2(a)(2) in describing potential security techniques they
suggest “continuous penetration testing and on-demand risk assessments”.
Congress should leave as much of the technical language as possible to the
folks in the Executive Branch that actually work with the technology.
Two things are missing from the study and report
requirements. First is a failure to address how cybersecurity deficiencies
interface with the current recall process including a definition of how
software updates fit into that process. And second, is the failure to establish
software/firmware vulnerability disclosures, including allowing legitimate
security researchers to legally test automotive cybersecurity systems without
falling afoul of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA). Both of these will have to be addressed in any
legislation authorizing regulation of automotive cybersecurity.
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