This is part of a continuing discussion of the recently
passed HR 4007, Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist
Attacks Act of 2014. In this post I’ll discuss the way Congress worked around the
problem of DHS telling facilities what is needed for security. The previous postings in this series were:
I have long complained about the limitation Congress placed
on DHS with their requirement in the §550 authorization that “the Secretary may
not disapprove a site security plan submitted under this section based on the
presence or absence of a particular security measure” {§550(a)}
This has been interpreted to mean that DHS cannot tell facilities what security
measures can be implemented to meet the risk-based performance standards. This
has been one of the reasons why it has taken so long to get site security plans
approved.
Congress did include similar language in HR 4007 {§2102(c)(1)(B)(i)},
but they also required the Secretary to ‘suggest’ security measures to bring
site security plans into compliance when a submitted plan is deficient. For
example, when the Secretary determines that a site security plan submitted by
an enhanced approval facility (EAF) is inadequate during a compliance
inspection, then DHS is required to “recommend specific additional security measures
that, if made part of the site security plan by the facility, would enable the Secretary
to approve the site security plan” {§2102(c)(1)(G)(ii)(II)(aa)}. The key word
here is “recommend” as it is made clear that the facility still has the right
to not use the recommended security measures as long as their alternatives
serve the same purpose.
I understand that some chemical security inspectors (CSI;
PLEASE DHS change their title so we can use a different acronym) have already
been making these types of recommendations to owner of smaller facilities. The
new requirement will ensure that all chemical facilities get this level of
assistance regardless with which CSI they work.
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