This is part of a continuing series of blog posts about the recently released Federal Register notice about the implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) personnel surety program (PSP). The notice outlines how the Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) is planning to implement the vetting of covered chemical facility personnel and visitors against the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to determine if any covered personnel are suspected of having ties to terrorist organizations. Other posts in this series include:
The Four Options
ISCD’s new PSP program provides facilities with four specific options on how the facility will implement the requirements of 6 CFR 27.230(a)(12)(iv). Those four option (described in detail in the notice) can be briefly summarized this way:
Option 1 – Facility submits data and ISCD has TSA conduct screening;
Option 2 – Facility submits data on personnel with previous screening and ISCD has TSA confirm that screening is current;
Option 3 – Facility uses TWIC Reader to verify identity and screening status of Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC) holder; and
Option 4 – Facility visually inspects TSDB based identity document to verify that person had been screened against TSDB.
The facility can use any of the four options or combinations of them to satisfy the terrorist ties vetting requirements of the CFATS program. In practice it looks like most facilities will be using some combination of the four options in their site security plan (SSP). As I mentioned in the previous post, adding the facility’s terrorist screening program to the SSP will be the first step in achieving compliance with the new portion of the PSP.
Option 4 – Visual Verification
I am going to start this more detailed review with what ISCD describes as the option providing the lowest amount of security, Option 4. This option provides for using visual screening of existing TSDB based identification credentials. This would include the TWIC, the Hazardous Material Endorsement to a CDL and various traveler based vetting programs. The notice provides a more detailed discussion of the problems associated with this option, but does note that it has a legitimate (and Congressionally mandated) place in the vetting program.
Actually, this option is pretty well suited to the vetting of commercial truck drivers making deliveries to the facility or picking up shipments from the facility. There is a fairly high likelihood that over-the-road drivers will already possess a TWIC or HME. MTSA covered facilities already have established the requirement that drivers coming to their facilities must possess a TWIC or the load will be refused or not allowed to be picked-up. CFATS facilities implementing Option 4 will have to notify their vendors and transportation companies of the need for TWIC or HME for all drivers entering the facility.
Facilities can increase the security of this option by requiring that vendors and trucking companies provide advance notice of the name and ID number of drivers coming to the facility.
There is a downside to this option for the trucking industry. There is already something of a shortage of long-haul truck drivers. Further limiting those be requiring a HME or TWIC (which both have criminal background check requirements) is going to further aggravate the driver shortage.
When using this option ISCD is almost certainly going to require the facility to spell out in its site security plan how facility personnel are going to be trained to visually verify the validity of the document (recognize and detect counterfeit documents) and verify the identity of the document holder. Requiring advance notice (perhaps with copy of ID) will help with that training requirement.
Option 3 – TWIC Reader
The TWIC was designed to be verified (both the document and personal identity) with a TWIC Reader. Unfortunately the Coast Guard and TSA have had problems with the TWIC reader implementation process and there is still not an approved rule for the implementation of TWIC Readers in the MTSA program. The TSA reports that it has published a list of approved TWIC Readers, but I have not been able to find such a list in an internet search, typical for all things related to TSA.
There are a couple of problems currently associated with the use of a TWIC Reader. First, and foremost, they are relatively expensive. Second they must at least periodically be connected to the Internet (or a phone line?) to update the list of expired/revoked TWICs. Finally, individuals must apply for (and pay the application fee for) the TWIC which requires a trip to one of the limited number of TWIC issuing facilities.
The TWIC Reader does not need to be used at facility entrances to be effectively used as part of the PSP. The facility could require TWIC holders to periodically (that period to be established in the SSP) present themselves to a designated office (possibly an off-site 3rd party office) where the TWIC and identity could be verified.
This option would be valuable for facilities that have a high percentage of personnel that already have a TWIC. This would also be valuable for corporations that also have MTSA covered facilities and have personnel that move between facilities. Contractors doing periodic maintenance or facility turnarounds that also serve MTSA covered facilities will have very high TWIC densities and would probably want to use this option.
The notice provides a limited amount of guidance on what ISCD would expect to see in the facility SSP for implementing the TWIC Reader option. It also outlines the security downside to the use of the TWIC, is a TWIC holder is subsequently identified as having possible terrorist ties there is nothing that will trigger an investigation of that person at the covered facility or allow for notification of the facility until the next time the periodic check is made.
Option 2 – Data Submission on Previously Vetted Personnel
This has long been the most controversial of the vetting options proposed by ISCD. Industry has always assumed that previously vetted (via TSDB) individuals would not require data submission to DHS. ISCD has always maintained that such data submission is required to ensure that periodic vetting is accomplished and that the facility can be notified if a previously vetted individual is subsequently added to the TSDB.
ISCD also likes this option because it reduces their costs of submitting data to TSA for vetting against the TSDB. They do not have to ‘pay’ for a full initial TSDB scan, they just have to verify that the previous vetting was done. Ironically, this also means that the facility will have to provide more data for this option because they need to provide data on the previous screening program (program name, ID number, and expiration date).
Facilities using this option are going to have to include a description of the training program that they use to train the personnel that are visually verifying the legitimacy of the presented document and the identity of the person submitting the document. Not specifically mentioned in the notice, but almost certainly to be required in the SSP, is a discussion of what will be done when the existing document expires.
Facilities that have a relatively high population of personnel that have been vetted by another agency against the TSDB are going to have to weigh the higher security benefits of Option 2 against the simpler process for Option 4. ISCD would much prefer to see Option 2 used, but was required by Congress to provide option 4. I suspect that this might mean that Option 2 might not receive as close a level of scrutiny in the SSP review as would Option 4.
Option 1 – Data Submission and Screening
There is no doubt that this is the method that ISCD would prefer to see all facilities implement as it provides the best ability for the Department to conduct vetting of covered personnel and tie the resulting information back to individual facilities. I suspect that this will be translated into a very wide latitude in how the Department views SSP submissions implementing this option.
ISCD will allow data submissions from either the corporate level or the facility level (or both) and will have some system set up for mass data submissions, probably via spread sheets. Third party data submissions will also be allowed so that companies can use personnel management agencies or background check agencies to do the actual data submissions. The use of the agency that the facility is already using to do the other background and identity verification checks currently required in the PSP will obviate the need for detailed information in the SSP about the training of the personnel collecting and verifying the data being submitted to ISCD.
A Blended Program
All but the smallest facilities are probably going to find that they are going to use all four options in their SSP. Explaining how each option would be used in the implementation of the new terrorist ties vetting program will provide the facility with the widest latitude in how they start and maintain the program over the coming years. Even if the facility does not intend to initially adopt one or more of the options, putting them all in the SSP will make it easier to start using an option as situations change (no subsequent change to the SSP will be required).
Facilities are going to have to take a close look at the employees, contractors and visitors before they decide how they are going to implement the terrorist ties vetting in their personnel surety program. They are going to have to balance the security needs of the facility to prevent access by people with suspected terrorist ties with the complexity of the program that will be used to identify those people.
ISCD has committed to working closely with each Tier 1 and Tier 2 facility while they design and implement this final phase of the PSP. That means that there will be a risk-based staggering of the initial SSP update requirement. The time to start working on this, however, is now, not when ISCD provides the facility with notification of the date by which the revised SSP will have to be provided to Department.