Today the House Rules Committee web site announced a hearing
to be held this afternoon to formulate the Rule for the consideration of the
Conference Committee Report on HR 4310, the National Defense Authorization
Act of FY 2013. The Report includes language for the revised version of HR 4310
that was adopted by the Conference Committee.
Cybersecurity Provisions
Nothing in the final version of the bill directly addresses
industrial control system security, but there are a number of cyber provisions
in the bill. They include:
§244. Report on cyber and
information technology research investments of the Air Force.
§931. Implementation strategy for
Joint Information Environment.
§932. Next-generation host-based
cyber security system for the Department of Defense.
§933. Improvements in assurance of
computer software procured by the Department of Defense.
§934. Competition in connection
with Department of Defense tactical data link systems.
§935. Collection and analysis of
network flow data.
§936. Competition for large-scale
software database and data analysis tools.
§937. Software licenses of the
Department of Defense.
§938. Sense of Congress on
potential security risks to Department of Defense networks.
§939. Quarterly cyber operations
briefings.
§940. Sense of Congress on the
United States Cyber Command.
§941. Reports to Department of
Defense on penetrations of networks and information systems of certain
contractors.
I have covered most of these in some detail in earlier blog
posts on the Committee
Report on HR 4310, House
floor action on the bill, the
introduction of S 3254, and
the Senate floor action on that bill. Only two of the House provisions made
it to the final bill, §244 and §939. There are two provisions that I cannot
find in either the House or Senate versions of the bill (§931 and §936), but
neither of them deal with cybersecurity so I did not look real hard for the earlier
versions.
The three most significant provisions that will almost
certainly have an impact on civilian cybersecurity are found in §932, §933, and
§941. The host-based cybersecurity systems developed for DOD will almost
certainly affect the development of similar systems for non-defense critical
infrastructure systems. The software development security protocols should also
migrate well to control system development. Finally, the network penetration
reporting requirements will almost certainly find their way into any
cybersecurity legislation for critical infrastructure protection.
Moving Forward
The rule reported by the Committee will certainly be a
closed rule with no floor amendments allowed. There will be a limited debate;
probably 40 minutes. And, when this comes to a floor vote on Thursday evening
or Friday it will almost certainly pass with a substantially bipartisan vote.
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