House Passes HR 397 - CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2021

Today the House finished their consideration of HR 397, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2021, in an unusual ‘bulk’ vote on 15 bills that were debated yesterday under the House suspension of the rules process. The bulk vote required a 2/3 super majority for passage and was passed with a significantly bipartisan 355 to 69. That is the same 2/3 majority that would have been required on a typical suspension of the rules vote on HR 397.

Elements of the Republican party demanded votes on each of the bills when they were considered yesterday. This has been a common occurrence in the 117^th Congress as more radical elements of the minority party have made a concerted effort to slow the operation of the House to keep the Democrats from completing their agenda.

The one vote for 15 bills process was outlined as a one-time effort by the House Rules Committee in their rule (H Res 330) for the consideration of three other bills being considered under normal order. That resolution passed by a straight party-line vote as do most rule resolutions when the bills to be considered under the rule are partisan bills.

While the Democrats have demonstrated a readily repeatable technique to counter the radical Republican delay tactics, the protestors countered with another unusual parliamentary delaying tactic. When the proforma motion to ‘reconsider’ the vote was offered, the standard reply to table the motion was made. Normally that motion to table is agreed to in a voice vote, but in this case Rep Biggs (R,AZ) demanded a recorded vote. That recorded vote was postponed until tomorrow. Technically, that vote could lead to invalidating today’s vote on the 15-bills, but it is highly unlikely. But, it will take up time on the floor of the House tomorrow, and that was the point of the exercise.

HR 397 will be sent to the Senate. It could be considered there under the Senate’s unanimous consent process with no debate and no amendments. One Senator, could stop that proceeding by objecting to the consideration of the bill, and that objection would not have to have anything to do with the provisions in the bill. The bill would not make it to the floor of the Senate under regular order; it is not important enough to take up the Senate’s time with debate and an amendment process.

HR 397 Introduced – CBRN Intelligence

Last month Rep Gimenez (R,FL) introduced HR 397, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2021. The bill would establish DHS responsibilities for collecting and disseminating intelligence information involving terrorist threats “involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials against the United States” {new §210F(a)(1)}.

This bill is very similar to HR 1589 that was introduced by Rep Walker (R,NC) who retired last year. The earlier version was amended in Committee, passed in the House and then amended again in Committee in the Senate. No floor action was taken in the Senate. The language in this version is very nearly identical to that reported in the House last session.

Moving Forward

Both Gimenez and his cosponsor {Rep Katko (R,NY)} are members of the House Homeland Security Committee to which this bill was assigned for consideration. Gimenez is a Freshman member of the House, but Katko is the Ranking Member so there is sufficient influence here to see the bill considered in Committee. As in the past, the bill would likely receive strong bipartisan support within the Committee and on the floor of the House.

Commentary

As I have said with previous versions of the bill this bill is ostensibly about chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks, but the reporting emphasis is on biological attacks. The changes made in the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee last session did much to equalize that focus. I would recommend that the House Homeland Security Community take a look at those changes when they meet to markup the bill this session.

For the chemical threat information sharing portion of this program, I would like to suggest that the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program would receive special mention within the bill. Additionally, the CFATS program should additionally be required to establish a formal mechanism for sharing such intelligence information with facilities covered under the CFATS program. To that end I would like to propose the following language be added to §210F(a)(5):

(a) The term ‘other Federal agencies’ mentioned above will include at a minimum:

(i) Transportation Security Administration

(ii) Coast Guard, and

(iii) The agency responsible for the administration of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS).

(b) The CFATS program will establish processes for distributing chemical threat information to the appropriate facilities covered under the program.

HR 1589 Reported in Senate – CBRN Intelligence

Last week the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee published their report on HR 1589, CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019, as well as an amended version of the bill that was adopted in a markup hearing last November.

In light of the recent and ongoing problems with responses to the potential CODIV-19 epidemic in this country it is interesting to note that one of the changes made by the Senate panel. The re-write of §2(c) would require DHS to report to Congress on the information sharing activities of “all relevant entities within the Department of Homeland Security to counter the threat from global infectious disease [emphasis added] and attacks using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials, devices, or agents”.

Senate Committee Amends and Adopts HR 1589 – CBRN Intelligence

Yesterday the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a business meeting where they considered HR 1589, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019. The Committee adopted substitute language and ordered the bill reported favorably by a voice vote.

The Revisions

For the most part the substitute language adopted by the Committee was a technical re-wording of the House bill with little or no change in intent. For example, see the differences below in the wording of the proposed §210F(a):

HOUSE - ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.— The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security shall—”

SENATE - ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, acting through the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and working with the intelligence components of the Department, shall—”

In this case (and in most of the bill) the two versions really mean the same thing; they just reflect a different editorial style. There are a couple of places that substantive changes have been made in the bill. For example, the House version of §210F(a)(5) reads:

‘‘(5) share information and provide tailored analytical support on such threats to State, local, Tribal, and territorial authorities, and other Federal agencies, as well as relevant national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, as appropriate; and”

The Senate version of the same paragraph deletes the phrase: “, as well as relevant national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders”.

The other significant change is found in the complete re-write of §210F(b). The House version reads:

‘‘(b) COORDINATION.—Where appropriate, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with other relevant Department components, including the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, agencies within the intelligence community, including the National Counter Proliferation Center, and other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial authorities, including officials from high-threat urban areas, State and major urban area fusion centers, and local public health departments, as appropriate, and enable such entities to provide recommendations on optimal information sharing mechanisms, including expeditious sharing of classified information, and on how such entities can provide information to the Department.”

The Senate version changes this subsection to read:

‘‘(b) COORDINATION.—Where appropriate, the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall—

‘‘(1) coordinate with—

‘‘(A) other Departmental components, including the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Science and Technology Directorate; and

‘‘(B) other Federal, State, local, and Tribal entities, including officials from high-threat urban areas, State and major urban area fusion centers, and local public health departments; and

‘‘(2) enable such components and entities to provide recommendations on—

‘‘(A) optimal information sharing mechanisms, including expeditious sharing of classified information; and

‘‘(B) how such components and entities can provide information to the Undersecretary and other components of the Department.”

Moving Forward

As soon as the Committee publishes their report on this bill, it could be considered by the full Senate. The bill was adopted as part of an en bloc consideration of a large number of bills. The voice vote heard for that en bloc vote in the video of the hearing did not include any ‘No’ votes. Given this bipartisan support I would suspect that the bill would be considered under the Senate’s unanimous consent process. I doubt that it could make it to the floor under regular order; there is just too much going on for the Senate to take up debate and procedural time on this bill.

I suspect that the House could accept the changes proposed by the Committee if the leadership allowed the language to come to an open vote.

Commentary

I think that the two substantive changes that I described above have made a major change in the focus of this bill. I have maintained that the House wording, with its specific references to biosecurity and biodefense, made this bill a biosecurity bill and not a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security bill. The changes made by the Committee return this to a more balanced look at all four of these threats.

HR 1589 Reported in House – CBRN Intelligence

This week the House Homeland Security Committee published their report on HR 1589, the

CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019. The Committee amended the bill in a hearing on March 13^th.

This bill is currently scheduled to be considered by the full House on Monday, April 1^st, 2019 under the suspension of the rules process. There will be limited debate and no floor amendments will be authorized. The bill is expected to be passed with substantial bipartisan support.

HR 1589 Marked Up in House

Today the House Homeland Security Committee held a markup hearing to consider seven bills, including HR 1589, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019. That bill was amended twice and adopted by the Committee by unanimous consent as part of a block of bills.

Both of the amendments to HR 1589 were relatively minor wording additions.

The first amendment from Rep. Clarke (D,NY) changed §210H(a)(1) to read:

“(1) support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of terrorist actors, their claims, and their plans to conduct attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials against the United States, including critical infrastructure [added];”

The second amendment from Rep. Jackson-Lee (D,TX) changed §210H(a)(4) to read:

“(4) leverage existing and emerging homeland security intelligence capabilities and structures to enhance early detection, [added] prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack;”

As I mentioned in my earlier blog post today, this bill will make its way to the floor of the House where it will be considered under the suspension of the rules process. That process does not provide for any additional amendments to be made from the floor. The bill will almost certainly pass with a significant bipartisan vote.

HR 1589 Introduced – CBRN Intelligence

Last week Rep. Walker (R,NC) introduced HR 1589, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019. The bill would establish DHS responsibilities for collecting and disseminating intelligence information involving terrorist threats “involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials against the United States” {new §210H(a)(1)}. The bill is very similar to HR 677 from the last session which passed in the House without amendment.

There are a number of relatively small changes made in the current bill. The largest is the addition of the words “the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office and” in paragraph (b). This office was created since HR 677 was introduced in 2017 and it would be added to the list of offices with which the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis would coordinate in developing CBRN information.

Moving Forward

As I mentioned earlier this week, HR 1589 will be considered by the House Homeland Security Committee in a markup hearing today. It is expected to pass by a voice vote without amendment. The bill is likely to come to the House floor in the not too distant future under the suspension of the rules process where there will be limited debate and no floor amendments will be authorized. The bill would be expected to pass there with substantial bipartisan support.

As in the last two sessions of Congress it is likely that this bill will not receive consideration in the Senate.

Commentary

While the word ‘chemical’ in the ‘CBRN’ of the title of this bill and in a couple of places within the language itself, there appears to be little intent to involve DHS intelligence in trying to track terrorist threats to chemical manufacturing or transportation. This bill remains at heart a bill addressing the potential threat of bioterror attacks.

While bioterrorism certainly presents a theatrical level threat, that type of attack is much harder to successfully pull off than a conventional or even a cyber attack on chemical storage or transportation systems. In my opinion paragraph (a)(5) of this bill should be modified to reflect this by making it read:

“(5) share information and provide tailored analytical support on such threats to:

(A) State, local, Tribal, and territorial authorities, and other Federal agencies;

(B) Relevant national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, as appropriate;

(C) Owners and operators of chemical facilities operating under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards and the Maritime Transportation Security Act; and

(D) Freight rail owners operating under conditions specified in 49 CFR 1580 Subpart B.”

An interesting side note here; HR 677 was introduced by then Rep. McSally (R,AZ). She has since moved on to the Senate and has not yet introduced a version of this bill in the Senate. McSally was the chair of the Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee when she introduced HR 677. Walker is not the Ranking Member of that Committee. This would seem to indicate that this bill is a priority for the Republican leadership of the Homeland Security Committee.

Bills Introduced – 03-07-19

Yesterday with both the House and Senate preparing to leave for the weekend there were 117 bills introduced. Three of those bills may receive additional coverage in this blog:

HR 1589 To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence and information sharing functions of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security and to require dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security, and for other purposes. Rep. Walker, Mark [R-NC-6] 

HR 1592 To direct the Secretary of Education to establish a pilot program to award competitive grants for the integration of cybersecurity education, and for other purposes. Rep. Langevin, James R. [D-RI-2]

S 715 A bill to improve the productivity and energy efficiency of the manufacturing sector by directing the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the National Academies and other appropriate Federal agencies, to develop a national smart manufacturing plan and to provide assistance to small- and medium-sized manufacturers in implementing smart manufacturing programs, and for other purposes. Sen. Shaheen, Jeanne [D-NH] 

Most past legislative references to CBRN intelligence have focused on ‘biological’ issues as I suspect that HR 1589 will. Still I will cover this bill because the bill will mandate ‘chemical’ intelligence sharing even if that is not the focus.

HR 1592 will be followed here if it contains specific mention of industrial control system cybersecurity education.

Shaheen’s previous ‘smart manufacturing’ bills have not addressed cybersecurity concerns. We will have to see if this changes with this bill.

Senate Committee Amends and Adopts HR 2825 – DHS Authorization Bill

Last week the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee took up HR 2825, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Authorization Act of 2017, that was passed in the House last July. The Committee Chair and Ranking Member introduced substitute language that was further amended and adopted in Committee by unanimous consent.

The substitute language was essentially a complete re-write of HR 2825. Much of the DHS Headquarters and acquisition language remains in the new bill. It is missing much of the agency specific (TSA, Coast Guard, etc.) language in the original bill, but it does include (with slight modifications) the provisions of HR 3359, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2017.

The following sections in the new version of the bill may be of specific interest to readers of this blog:

§1320. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence and information

sharing.

§1416. Cyber preparedness.

§1419. Study of the use of grant funds for cybersecurity.

§1601. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.

CBRN Information Sharing

Section 1320 of the bill contains most of the effective language of HR 677, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2017 which was passed in the House in February, 2017. One potentially significant change was made in the new 6 USC 2101. In the sub-paragraph {(a)(3)} requiring the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to “support homeland security-focused risk analysis and risk assessments of the homeland security hazards”, the Senate language adds “including the transportation of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological materials”.

Cyber Preparedness

Section 1416 of the bill amends 6 USC 148 (to be changed to §2209 by this bill) by adding to the existing information sharing requirements of §148(c) the requirements to include sharing of ‘best practices’ and to share with ‘State, local, and regional fusion centers’. It also contains a non-binding ‘sense of Congress’ statement that DHS “should, to the greatest extent practicable, work to share actionable information in an unclassified form related to such threats” {§1417(b)}.

Grant Funds

Section 1419 of the bill requires DHS to conduct a study looking at how grants provided under the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grant Program during the period 2006 thru 2016 have been used to support cybersecurity initiatives. It would also look at the problems related to funding cybersecurity initiatives using these programs with recommendations as to how the process could be improved.

 

Additional Amendments

As must be expected when looking at large-scale authorization bills like this, there were 27 amendments offered during the two days that this bill was under consideration. The submitted and adopted amendments included the addition of the following sections of potential interest to readers of this blog:

• Cybersecurity Research and Development Projects;

• Hack DHS Bug Bounty Pilot Program;

• Briefing on Pharmaceutical-Based Agent Threats;

• Report on Applications and Threats of Blockchain Technology; and

• Cybersecurity Talent Exchange

The R&D projects section requires DHS S&T to conduct/support and transition to use a fairly comprehensive list of research and development activities supporting the Departments cybersecurity responsibilities. The new section relies on the existing IT-limited definitions of 6 USC 148. No additional funds are authorized to support these activities.

The bug bounty provision is essentially the language of S 1281, the Department of Homeland Security (Hack DHS) Act of 2017.

The pharmaceutical agent amendment requires the Department to prepare a briefing for Congress on the potential threat of pharmaceutical agents. That term is defined as “a chemical, including fentanyl, carfentanil, and related analogues, which affects the central nervous system and has the potential to be used as a chemical weapon” {new §1309(d)(2)}.

The blockchain technology amendment would require DHS to report to Congress on the “potential offensive and defensive cyber applications of blockchain technology and other distributed ledger technologies” {new §1306(c)(1)} as well as the potential terrorist use of “distributed ledger-enabled currency and other emerging financial technological capabilities” {new §1306(c)(2)} to fund terrorist operations.

The cybersecurity talent exchange amendment is actually an amendment to another (unpublished) amendment that would establish some sort of program that would allow private-sector cybersecurity experts to work in DHS and allow DHS cybersecurity experts to work with private-sector organizations to enhance the level of cybersecurity expertise in DHS.

Moving Forward

Since this bill was actually considered by the Committee, the chances of it making its way to the floor of the Senate for consideration have been greatly increased. The fact that there was no opposition to this version of the bill in committee indicates that bill could pass with substantial bipartisan support. This bill would almost certainly have to be considered in normal order with all of the attendant amendments and extended debate.

Any bill passed by this process would have to go back to the House for consideration. It would likely end up going to Conference to iron out the differences between the two bills.

House Passes Three Homeland Security Bills

Yesterday the House took up 17 homeland security related bills under the suspension of rules process and passed all of them. Of these, three are probably of interest to readers of this blog:

• HR 437, the Medical Preparedness Allowable Use Act;

• HR 612, the United States-Israel Cybersecurity Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2017; and

• HR 677, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2017.

HR 437 passed by a voice vote after less than 10 minutes of ‘debate’; no one spoke in opposition to the bill.

HR 612 passed by a voice vote after about 16 minutes of ‘debate’; no one spoke in opposition to the bill.

HR 677 passed by a voice vote after about 5 minutes of ‘debate’; no one spoke in opposition to the bill.

All three of these bills would almost certainly pass in the Senate if they make it to the floor for consideration. Since earlier versions of all three of these bills passed in the House in the 114^th Congress, but were not taken up by the Senate, it is obvious that consideration by the Senate is not a given.

With these bills being passed in the first 30-days of the 115^th Congress, time constraints will not be a factor in whether or not they make it to the floor. What matters is whether or not there is a champion in the Senate with enough political influence with the leadership to bring them to the floor. If any of these bills are considered, they will most likely be considered under the Senate’s unanimous consent procedure with no debate and no actual vote. A single Senator can block a bill under this procedure.

HR 677 Introduced – CBRN Intelligence

Last week Rep. McSally (R,AZ) introduced HR 677, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2017. The bill would require DHS to establish chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear intelligence and information sharing functions of the Office of

Intelligence and Analysis. The bill is nearly identical to HR 2200 that was passed in the House in the 114^th Congress.

This bill continues to maintain an almost unreasonable emphasis on the biological aspect of the CBRN threat. Again, the only mention of the private sector in the information sharing portion of the bill remains the reference to “relevant national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders” {§210G(a)(5)}.

This bill is moving to the floor of the House this week. It will be considered on Tuesday as part of a number of homeland security related bills to be considered under suspension of the rules. It will almost certainly pass with substantial bipartisan support. It will be interesting to see if this bill continues to be ignored in the Senate.

House Passes DHS Bills with Minimal Debate

This has been the week for the House to consider a number of low-controversy bills for DHS. Two of the bills in particular have been ones that I have been commenting on in this blog:

HR 1646 – The Homeland Security Drone Assessment and Analysis Act

HR 2200 – The CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2015

Both of these bills were debated on Tuesday, but neither attracted much discussion. The debate on HR 1646 lasted a little over six minutes. The debate on HR 2200 only took nine minutes. There were 40 minutes allotted for the debate of each bill.

HR 1646 was passed on a voice vote on Tuesday. When it came to vote on HR 2200 a recorded vote was requested which delayed the proceedings until this morning. The House voted 420 to 2 to approve HR 2200. Both bills now head to the Senate where they are likely to be considered under the unanimous consent process, but there is no telling when that might happen. They could even  die a quiet death by being ignored by the Senate leadership.

HR 2200 Reported in House – CBRN Intel

Last week the House Homeland Security Committee report on HR 2200, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2015, was published. The amended version of the bill was also published.

The only ‘new’ information in the Committee Report is a mention about concerns about terrorist access to “CBRN materials, such as highly enriched liquid uranium” (pg 7). This does appear to slightly expand the non-biological concerns covered in the bill. There is still no mention of the potential threat posed by weaponization of readily available industrial chemicals.

Moving Forward

This bill is currently scheduled to be considered by the House on Tuesday. It will be considered under suspension of the rules, so there will be no possibility of the bill being amended on the floor. This also means that the Leadership considers that this bill will receive substantial bipartisan support.

Subcommittee Amends and Adopts CBRN Intel Bill

Yesterday the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the House Homeland Security Committee passed two amendments to HR 2200, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2015 by voice vote and then recommended the bill to the full Committee.

The first amendment was the substitute language from Chair McSally (R,AZ) that I described in an earlier post. The second amendment was offered by Rep. Payne (D,NJ), the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee. That amendment added local public health departments to the agencies to be notified of CBRN information developed by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.

As I mentioned earlier while this legislation is billed as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear intelligence bill, it is clear that the main focus is actually biological attacks. I understand the concern with the consequences of a successful bio-attack it still takes a great deal of sophistication to execute an attack of this sort, much more sophistication than it takes to conduct an attack with industrial chemicals.

New Homeland Security Subcommittee Markup Hearing

Yesterday the Emergency Preparedness, Response and Communications Subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee announced that they would be holding a markup hearing on Thursday. Three bills will be reviewed, including HR 2200 that I reviewed this weekend.

The Chair, Rep. McSally (R,AZ) is offering an amendment in the form of a substitute that will form the version to be marked up. The change is administrative in nature; taking the congressional reporting requirements out of the new section 210g being added to  the Homeland Security Act of 2002. They will remain in the bill, but will not become part of the statute if this bill is adopted.

As I noted in my earlier post this bill appears to be slated for early movement to the House floor. We are likely to see it considered in a full committee hearing in the next week or so.

HR 2200 Introduced – CBRN Intelligence

A week ago Rep. McSally introduced HR 2200, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2015. The bill would require the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) to take specific actions with regard to intelligence about chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats (CBRN).

The bill would add a new section to Subtitle A of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121 et seq.) entitled: “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Intelligence and Information Sharing”. It would require the OIA to {new §210G(a)}:

∙ Support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of terrorist actors, their claims, and their plans to conduct attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the Nation;

∙ Support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of global infectious disease, public health, food, agricultural, and veterinary issues;

∙ Support homeland security-focused risk analysis and risk assessments of the homeland security hazards described in paragraphs (1) and (2) by providing relevant quantitative and non-quantitative threat information;

∙ Leverage existing and emerging homeland security intelligence capabilities and structures to enhance prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack; and

∙ Share information and provide tailored analytical support on these threats to State, local, and tribal authorities as well as other national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders;

The bill also amends §201(d)(8) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(d)(8)) by adding tribal entities to the agencies to which the OIA disseminates information.

There are no provisions included in the bill for additional funding or manpower to support the requirements added by the bill.

Moving Forward

Rep. McSally is the Chair of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the House Homeland Security Committee. Her co-sponsors include Rep. McCaul (R,TX), the Committee Chair and Rep. Thompson (D,MS), the Ranking Member of the Committee. I suspect that this bill will move through the Committee relatively quickly and I see no issues that would raise any organized opposition on the floor of the House where it will probably be considered under suspension of the Rules. The bill would probably be picked up for consideration in the Senate under the unanimous consent process. This bill has a very good chance of getting to the President this year.

Commentary

While there is nothing here to draw any significant opposition, I do see one thing wrong with the bill. The information sharing requirements in §210G(a)(5) of the bill do not specifically mention sharing information with private sector entities beyond ‘other national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders’. This reflects the Homeland Security Committee’s long held concern about bio-attacks well above any concerns about the other attack modes included in CBRN.

From my point of view it would seem that information about attack capabilities and intentions using industrial chemicals as WMD should be higher than legitimate concerns about bio-based WMD attacks. Industrial chemicals are much easier to obtain and weaponize than are bio-based weapons. But even if you take into account the black swan potential of a bio-based attack to rate that as a higher consequence concern, completely ignoring of the need to share the chemical, radiological and nuclear information required to be considered by this bill is very shortsighted.