Last night Carbon Unit left a comment on my Substack Notes announcement about my recent “Chemical Security Inspector Reduction in Force” post on Substack. The comment objected to the characterization of the DOGE access to Chemical Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI), noting that:
“The USDS team has been vetted and has already covered far more sensitive data than this.”
As I noted in my reply to that comment, CVI information in
possession by CISA includes security plans for the 3,000+ chemical facilities
that were covered by the CFATS program at the time of the program’s termination
in July 2023. That is some of the most sensitive information not covered by
national security classified information program in the possession of the
government. In fact, according to 6 USC 623(d):
“In any proceeding
to enforce this section, vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other
information submitted to or obtained by the Secretary under this subchapter,
and related vulnerability or security information, shall be treated as if the
information were classified information.”
Additionally, the chemical inventory data on the 300 most
sensitive chemicals (from a weaponization point of view) submitted under the
CFATS’ Top Screen program on over 45,000 facilities is also held on those same
CVI servers.
While the DOGE team members may have been vetted (I am not
sure what vetting process has been used, but from public reporting it does not
meet the access requirements outlined for CVI access, because of the training
requirements) that does not mean that they have the ‘need to know’ the facility
chemical security information held by CISA.
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