Last month Rep. Jackson-Lee (D,TX) introduced HR 3310,
a bill that would require a DHS study on emergency response capabilities in
areas with high concentrations of chemical facilities (note: there is no fancy
title for this bill).
The Study
The bill would require the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate “conduct a study on how to improve training and support for local
emergency response providers in areas with high concentrations of covered chemical
facilities in how to respond to a terrorist attack on a chemical facility” {§1(a)}. In conducting the
study, DHS would consider {§1(b)}:
• The degree to which jurisdictions with high
concentrations of covered chemical facilities have fire, police, medical, and
other response personnel trained and equipped to respond to a terrorist attack
on a chemical facility;
• What, if any, distinctions are there in preparedness
for a terrorist attack on a chemical facility in jurisdictions that rely on
volunteers to carry out fire, police, medical and other response and jurisdictions
that do not rely, in whole or in part, on volunteers; and
• All training, equipment, and support provided by
the Department of Homeland Security to local emergency response providers in
areas with a high concentration of covered chemical facilities and chemical
facilities of interest.
A subsequent report to Congress on the study would include {§1(d)}:
• Improve the Department’s counterterrorism
preparedness and response planning, training, and equipment efforts to ensure
that they are better tailored and resourced to address the unique needs of
local emergency response providers in areas with a high concentration of
covered chemical facilities and chemical facilities of interest; and
• Improve coordination among Federal, State, local,
tribal, and territorial government officials in emergency planning and response
in areas with high concentrations of covered chemical facilities, chemical
facilities of interest, or other facilities with large quantities of hazardous
chemicals.
Moving Forward
Jackson-Lee is an influential member of the House Homeland
Security Committee, the primary committee (of two) to which this bill was assigned
for consideration. It is very likely that her influence on the Committee will
be sufficient to have the bill considered in Committee. There is nothing in the
bill that would engender any significant opposition since it is just a study
and report requirement. The bill would likely be considered by the full House under
the suspension of the rules process which requires a super-majority for passage,
limits debates, and prohibits floor amendments from being considered.
Commentary
This bill is almost exactly the same language as found in §16 of HR
3256, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) reauthorization
bill which is currently working its way through the House. I suspect that
Jackson-Lee offered this bill as a stand alone measure to ensure that this
study does get done even if the current language in the reauthorization bill
does not make its way to the President’s desk (a very high probability).
When
this language is in the CFATS reauthorization bill, the language covering what
types of facilities would be covered in the study was carefully tailored to
ensure that it was focused on facilities in the CFATS program. This is why we
see the undefined use of ‘covered facilities’ and ‘chemical facilities of
interest’; those terms are defined in the underlying program language which the
bill amends.
In this
bill, lacking the references to the previously defined terms, definitions
really should have been included. On the other hand, there really is no need in
this bill to limit the coverage to just CFATS covered facilities. There are
chemical facilities not covered under the CFATS program that would have
potentially severe consequences from a terrorist attack due to chemical
releases or theft and diversion. These would include facilities covered under
the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) program administered by the
Coast Guard. Additionally, any number of water treatment facilities covered by
EPA programs and possessing large quantities of chlorine gas, while not necessarily
part of a ‘high-concentration’ of chemical facilities, could be expected to
have wide-spread community impacts if successfully targeted in a terrorist
attack.
With
that in mind I would like to suggest this definition of ‘covered facilities’ be
included in a new §2, Definitions, of the bill:
(1) Covered Chemical Facilities – the term ‘covered chemical
facilities’ means any facility covered under one or more of the following
federal programs:
(A) Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards under 6 CFR
Part 27;
(B) Maritime Transportation Security Act under 33 CFR Part
105, limited to facilities that store, produce or ship large quantities of
hazardous chemicals;
(C) Public water systems as defined under 42 USC 300f, limited
to facilities where large amounts of chlorine gas are stored; and
(D) Treatment works as defined under 33 USC 1292, limited to
facilities where large amounts of chlorine gas are stored.
(2) High Concentration – the term
‘high-concentration’ means:
(A) any grouping of three or
more covered facilities where any portion of those facilities’ boundaries could
be included within a circle with a diameter of 5-miles; or
(B) any single facility where a
release due to the effects of a successful terrorist attack could be expected
have a significant effect on more than 20% of the population protected by a
single off-site fire department.
With this expanded definition of ‘covered facilities’ it
would also be appropriate to bring into the study a look at the effectiveness
of Local Emergency Planning Committees {established under 42
USC 11001(c)} in developing emergency response plans for incidents at
covered chemical facilities and whether those plans considered responses to a
terrorist attack on the covered facilities. With this in mind I would add a new
study requirement to §1(b):
(4) Determine if a Local
Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), established under 42 USC 11001, is in existence
that would have responsibilities for conducting emergency response planning for
the covered facility and whether an existing LEPC has prepared a response
plan that specifically covers a terrorist attack on the covered facility.
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