Last month the House Armed Services Committee published their
report on HR
2500, the FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) along with a
copy of the marked
up version of the bill. There is one interesting TWIC bit in the actual
bill and an entire subtitle of cyber-operations provisions (§1621 thru §1632 starting on page
884), but nothing specific to control system security. There is, however, and
interesting discussion about ICS security in the Committee Report in a section
dealing with facility electrical utility security.
TWIC Use
Section 2832 clarifies the use of the Transportation Workers
Identification Credential (TWIC) for access to military facilities. This
section amends §1050
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (PL
114–328, 130 STAT. 2396). That earlier legislation directed DOD to consider
allowing the use of TWICS for unescorted access to military facilities. The
actual language allowed some wiggle room; “the Secretary shall, to the maximum
extent practicable, ensure that the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential (TWIC) shall be accepted as a valid credential for unescorted access
to Department of Defense installations by transportation workers.” {§1050(a)}
In this bill the entire first paragraph was replaced with
stricter language providing that the TWIC “is accepted as a valid credential
for unescorted access to a work site at a maritime terminal of the Department
of Defense” {new §1050(a)(1)}
and allowing DOD to consider authorizing the use of TWIC for access to other
DOD facilities.
ICS Security
The Committee Report (pgs 284-5) notes that in 2015 (2016?)
the “Department subsequently directed the services and other Defense agencies
to develop plans for identifying the goals, milestones, and resources needed to
identify, register, and implement cybersecurity controls on facility-related
ICS.” Apparently DOD has not provided adequate feedback to the Committee on how
that work has progresses, so the Committee is directing the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate:
• The extent to which the military departments have
developed and implemented plans and associated guidance to enhance the
cybersecurity of ICS and what, if anything, remains incomplete;
• The challenges the military departments have encountered
in implementing relevant guidance to enhance the cybersecurity of ICS and how
effectively the challenges have been overcome;
• How effectively the military departments implemented
industry leading practices to enhance cybersecurity for ICS; and
• How effectively the military departments conduct
tests of the cybersecurity of ICS and implement improvements to security to
counter any weaknesses identified.
Moving Forward
The House Rules Committee has closed the period for
submitting possible amendments
to HR 2500. As of today, 652 amendments have been submitted. I am currently
keeping an eye on five of those amendments for possible coverage in future blog
posts; #160,
#244,
#395,
#415,
and #457.
The Committee has not yet established a date for hearing on
the rule for consideration of HR 2500. There has been some talk of adding a DHS
spending bill (not yet published by the Appropriations Committee) to HR 2500,
but that would be an unusual combination of bills. I do expect that some form
of this bill will be considered before the House takes their summer recess.
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