Last month Sen Cortez-Masto (D,NV) introduced S 3513,
the UAS Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. The bill would amend provisions
in the 2016 FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (PL
114-190) that would allow facilities to petition the FAA to be declared
restricted flight zones for unmanned aircraft.
UAS Restricted Areas
Section 2 of the bill would add ‘railroad facilities’ to the
limited list of facilities that should be authorized to request that the FAA “prohibit
or restrict the operation of an unmanned aircraft in close proximity” {PL
114-190 §2209(a), (130
STAT. 634)} to the facility.
The bill would also establish a deadline of March 31, 2019
for the FAA to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking to carry out §2209 and a requirement
to publish the final rule within one year of that date.
Moving Forward
Both Cortez-Masto and her single cosponsor {Sen. Fischer (R,NE)}
are members of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee to
which this bill was assigned for consideration. Earlier in the session this
might have allowed for their influence to ensure that this bill was considered
in Committee. It is certainly less likely now, however, that this bill will
receive any additional attention in the closing days of the session. The bill
is likely to be re-introduced in the 116th Congress.
The original authorization bill that this bill amends received
bipartisan support in both the House and Senate. There is nothing in this bill
that would raise the prospects for significant opposition. If the bill were to
be considered in this session it would likely pass in both Committee and on the
floor with bipartisan support.
Commentary
The practical problem with this bill and the underlying
requirement for establishing critical infrastructure ‘no fly zones’ is that
there is currently no way to enforce the restrictions. Unmanned aerial systems
(UAS) are typically too small to have readily identifiable identification
numbers while they are in flight and it is currently illegal for anyone in the
private sector or non-federal law enforcement to interfere with the operation
of UAS or intercept the communications between the UAS and its controller. Even
the recent
authorization (sent to the President on October 4th) for DHS or
DOJ physical action against UAS would not apply at these facilities.
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