Earlier this week Rep. Duckworth (D,IL) introduced HR 5643,
the Active Shooter Preparedness Enhancement Act of 2016. The bill outlines DHS
responsibilities for assisting State and local governments and the private
sector develop active shooter preparedness plans.
Preparedness Response
Section 2 of the bill would add a new section to the
Homeland Security Act of 2002; Sec. 890B. Active shooter and mass casualty
incident response assistance. It would require DHS to develop guidance “to
assist in the development of emergency action and response plans for active shooter
and mass casualty incidents in public and private locations, including
facilities that have been identified by the Department as potentially
vulnerable targets” {new §809B(a)}.
The guidance would include {new §809B(a)}:
• A strategy for properly
responding to an active shooter or mass casualty incident in a public or
private location;
• A plan for establishing a unified
command;
• A schedule for regular testing of
equipment used to receive communications during such an incident;
• A practiced method and plan to
communicate with occupants of such location during such an incident;
• A practiced method and plan to
communicate with the surrounding community regarding such an incident;
• A plan for coordinating with
volunteer organizations to expedite assistance for victims;
• A schedule for joint exercises
and training;
• A plan for outreach to facilities
that have been identified by the Department as potentially vulnerable targets;
and
• Other planning documents, as determined by the
Secretary.
Grants
Section 3 of the bill amends 6
USC 607(a)(2) to add “training exercises to enhance preparedness for and
response to mass casualty and active shooter incidents and security events at
public and private locations” {new §607(a)(2)(E)}
to the list of law enforcement terrorism prevention activities for which grants
are authorized under the Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland
Security grant programs.
Section 4 of the bill amends 6
USC 608(b) by adding “Active shooters” {new §608(b)(9)} to the list of threats that DHS takes
into account in prioritizing Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland
Security grant allocations.
No new funding is provided in the bill.
Moving Forward
Duckworth is not a member of any of the three committees
(Homeland Security, Judiciary, and Transportation and Infrastructure) to which this
bill was assigned for consideration. This means that, especially this late in
the session, it is unlikely that the bill will receive consideration in any of
these committees unless she convinces people in the committee leaderships to
co-sponsor the bill.
There is nothing in the language of this bill that would
raise any organized opposition to the bill. If it were to make it to the floor
for the vote, it would likely do so under the under suspension of the rules
provisions and pass with solid bipartisan support.
Commentary
I will start out with a by now familiar comment about the
grant portions of the bill. The bill would expand the number of potential
grants without expanding the amount of money available to share with State and
local authorities. This means that the number of other grants available would
have to be reduced or the amounts monies in the other grants would be reduced.
This type of legislative grant dilution is political grandstanding.
The other thing wrong with this bill is not unique to
Duckworth’s approach. I have yet to see any serious discussion of the unique
problems that chemical storage brings to the active shooter situation. I have
talked to a senior police officer with a major municipal police force who had responsibilities
for responding to active shooter and terrorist incidents at a major refinery.
No one had explained to him the potentially catastrophic problems that could
arise if his police started shooting on the refinery grounds.
Given the fact that various hazardous chemicals are found in
a wide variety of industrial facilities (NOT just chemical plants) any
requirement for a strategy for active shooter incidents at industrial
facilities is going to have to start with an assessment of the potential chemical
hazards that could be encountered at the facility.
It is just as important that emergency response personnel
(police, fire and emergency medical technician) that could respond to an active
shooter event at a facility that stores hazardous chemicals be informed of the
hazards associated with the chemical and their locations in the facility.
Additionally, medical facilities that could be accepting and treating
casualties from such events need to be informed of the potential hazardous
chemicals with which casualties could be contaminated, both for the safety of
the medical facility and staff as well as needing to be prepared to treat the
chemical injuries that could result from chemical releases during active
shooter events.
With that in mind, I would insert a new paragraph (b) to the
section being added by §2
of the bill {and change the current paragraph (b) to paragraph (c)}:
(b) Strategy guidelines for facilities that store industrial
chemicals:
(1)
In developing an active shooter strategy, all
industrial facilities will first develop an assessment of the hazardous
chemicals stored at the facility. That assessment will include a listing of:
A.
Each hazardous chemical stored at the facility;
B.
The quantity of each hazardous chemical
identified in (A) above; and
C.
The location of each place in the facility where
the chemicals identified in (A) above are produced, used, or stored.
(2)
The facility will determine the potential
hazards associated with each of the chemicals identified in (1) above. At a
minimum the facility will determine the potential consequences of multiple
punctures of storage containers of each of the chemicals listed in (1) above,
including:
A.
The potential for fires and explosions,
B. The
potential for, and extent of, a toxic atmosphere,
C.
The potential for the formation of an oxygen deficient atmosphere, and
D.
The potential for the mixing of incompatible chemicals and the hazards
associated with such mixing;
(3)
The facility will also determine the areas of a
facility where the potential for a flammable atmosphere might be expected to
exist during normal operations; and
(4)
The facility will also determine the areas of a
facility where the potential for an oxygen deficient atmosphere might normally
be expected to exist.
(5)
The information developed in (1) thru (4) above
will be listed as annexes to facility strategy for properly responding to an active
shooter or mass casualty incident.
(6)
Definition: In this section the term ‘hazardous
chemical’ will include, at a minimum, all of the chemicals listed in §112(r) of the Clean Air
Act {42 USC 7412(b)}. This definition does not prohibit a facility owner/operator
from adding chemicals to the hazardous chemical list when, in the opinion of
the owner/operator, the added chemical presents a potential hazard to employees
or the environment if released during an active shooter event.
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