Review - ChemLock Exercises – Chemical Sector Active Shooter

NOTE: This is part of a series of blog posts looking at various CISA Tabletop Exercises Packages (CTEP) offered to chemical facility managers by the new CISA ChemLock program, a voluntary chemical security program run by the Office of Chemical Security (the CFATS folks). It is a follow-up to my earlier Overview post. CTEP administrative documents can be found here. The scenario manuals can be found here. Earlier posts in the series include:

Chemical Sector IED (short version)

The Situation Manual for this exercise bills it as a review of “emergency preparedness plans and response procedures to an active shooter incident at a chemical sector facility.” It follows the same format as the IED exercise I previously discussed. Using the same format will make it easier for facilities to run subsequent exercises as they will already be familiar with the exercise processes.

The first Module is slightly more complex than that seen in the IED exercise. It provides two separate starting points for the exercise, a stolen vehicle and a disgruntled employee. Both starting points lead to an unidentified shooter arriving at the loading dock who is quickly killed by responding officers before the shooter can progress into the facility.

The exercise proceeds with the same question discussion format used int eh IED exercise. The second and third modules are nearly identical to the IED exercise in that they look at the short term and long term response to the incident. The same discussion questions are used in the second and third module as were used in the IED exercise.

Commentary

Active shooter situations are becoming much more common in the United States. With that in mind, facilities certainly need to consider running exercises such as this. This scenario, as presented, could be run at any manufacturing facility. Unfortunately, it is billed as a “Chemical Sector Active Shooter” exercise, but it does not take into account any of the unique problems that chemical facilities could face in an active shooter situation. This exercise assumes that the shooter, their bullets and the bullets of the responders that take him down never enter an area of the facility that contain chemicals. While such a limited event could occur, that is not what a “Chemical Sector Active Shooter” exercise should address.

For more details about the exercise, including my suggested additional discussion questions, see my article at CFSN Detailed Analysis - https://patrickcoyle.substack.com/p/chemlock-exercises-804 - subscription required.

HR 1539 Introduced – PROTECT Act

Last month Rep Aguilar (D,CA) introduced HR 1539, the Providing Rational Options Toward the Elimination of Catastrophic Terrorism (PROTECT) Act of 2021. The bill would require DHS to develop “guidance relating to domestic preparedness for and collective response to terrorism in order to assist in the development of emergency action and response plans for active shooter and mass casualty incidents in public and private locations, including facilities that have been identified by the Department as potentially vulnerable targets” {new §890B(a)}.

Guidance

Section 2 of the bill would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding a new §890B. The guidance for ‘emergency action and response plans for active shooter and mass casualty incidents’ could include {new §809B(b)}:

• A strategy for properly responding to an active shooter or mass casualty incident in a public or private location, including training, evacuating, and providing care to persons in such location, with consideration given to the needs of persons with disabilities.

• A plan for establishing a unified command, including identification of casualty collection points and staging areas for law enforcement, fire response, and medical personnel.

• A schedule for regular testing of equipment used to receive communications during such an incident.

• A practiced method and plan to communicate with occupants of such location during such an incident.

• A practiced method and plan to communicate with the surrounding community regarding such an incident and the needs of Federal, State, and local officials.

• A plan for coordinating with volunteer organizations to expedite assistance for victims.

• A schedule for joint exercises and training.

• A plan for outreach to facilities that have been identified by the Department as potentially vulnerable targets.

• Other planning documents, as determined by the Secretary, including appropriate regionally focused products, plans, training, and outreach.”.

Moving Forward

Aguilar is not a member of the House Homeland Security Committee to which this bill was referred for consideration. However, four of his 21 Democratic cosponsors {Rep Clarke (D,NY), Rep Rice (D,NY), Rep Luria (D,VA), and Rep Correa (D,CA)} are members of the Committee. This means that there should be enough influence available to have the Committee consider this bill.

I do not see anything in the bill that would engender any serious opposition to the bill, especially since the guidance ‘requirements’ I have listed above are permissive not mandated. But the fact that there are no Republican cosponsors, even in this highly partisan 117^th Congress, would seem to indicate that there could be some Republican concerns that I do not see. Still, I suspect that the bill would pass out of Committee with significant bipartisan support and could be expected to move the floor of the House via the suspension of the rules process.

This bill would not be considered under the normal order of business in the Senate, it is simply not important enough to take up the time required for the debate and amendment process in the Senate. If there is any significant Republican opposition in the House, the bill would almost certainly not be considered in the Senate under the unanimous consent process. The only other way this bill could make it to the President’s desk would be as an amendment to an authorization or spending bill.

Commentary

This bill does not really fall into any of the categories of bills that I normally follow here in this blog, but it is here because active shooter planning is a pet peeve of mine. I am certainly in favor of active shooter planning, but I am extremely concerned that no one seems to want take into account the unique problems the response to an active shooter incident would entail at a facility with significant storage of hazardous chemicals. Bullets from most handguns and almost all longarms would penetrate the vast majority of chemical storage tanks and almost all portable containers, resulting in leaks of potentially toxic or flammable chemicals into the incident site. And it does not matter if those bullets come from perpetrator firearms or police firearms, the release will occur and further aggravate the situation. This is one of the reasons that the chemical industry has historically been so resistant to the use of armed guards on their facilities.

Any response guidance that does not take into account this potentially catastrophic problem does a serious disservice to law enforcement and private security guards, as well as the general public. With that in mind, I would like to see the following sub-paragraph inserted in §809B(b):

“(8) A plan for facilities that store hazardous chemicals on site that would include prior notification to potential armed responders to an active shooter incident about the hazards associated with the potential release of those chemicals resulting from penetration of bullets into the storage tanks and portable containers on site.”

Bills Introduced – 3-3-21

Yesterday, with both the House and Senate in session, there were 117 bills introduced. One of those bills may receive additional coverage in this blog:

HR 1539 To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to develop and make available guidance relating to domestic preparedness for and collective response to terrorism regarding active shooter and mass casualty incident response assistance, and for other purposes. Rep. Aguilar, Pete [D-CA-31]

I will be watching this bill for language and definitions that indicate that DHS should provide specific information related to incidents at chemical facilities.

NOTE: Corrected title to reflect the date that the bills were actually introduced - 3-5-21, 9:54 pm EST

Reader Comment – CFATS and Active Shooters

Earlier this week over on LinkedIn, Michael Kennedy, a long-time reader and a lawyer active in CFATS matters, left an interesting comment about my gun shot detection post:

“I just wonder if it's cost effective, and if the juice is worth the squeeze? But, what if CFATS had active shooter classes as a requirement? Something to kick around for the next reiteration...”

His question about an ‘active shooter classes’ requirement in the next iteration of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) authorization is an interesting suggestion that deserves discussion.

Active Shooters and Chemical Facilities

Michael provided a link to the DHS Active Shooter web site (which is still up during this extended Federal Funding Fiasco; I with NIST would follow the DHS example, but that is a whole separate discussion). This site provides a wealth of information and reflects the current DHS interest in helping facilities and responders prepare for an active shooter situation. Unfortunately, it overlooks the unique planning and training requirements for addressing active shooter situations at chemical plants.

I have written about these issues a number of times over the years (see here and here for example) and even prepared a training program for a law enforcement training site (now off-line) on the topic. For this post, I will just summarize the problems potential problems associated with an active shooter response at a facility that stores, manufactures or uses industrial chemicals. For facilities with:

• Flammable chemicals on hand, flammable atmosphere situations should be expected and muzzle flashes from firearm discharges could ignite such atmospheres;

• Flammable chemicals on hand, bullets flying around should be expected to pierce storage containers producing flammable atmospheres (see above);

• Toxic inhalation hazard chemicals on hand, bullets flying around could be expected to pierce storage containers to release toxic fumes to the atmosphere, endangering personnel over a wide area;

• Chemicals with heavier-than-air vapors, bullets flying around could be expected to pierce storage containers producing locally oxygen deficient atmospheres;

Chemicals on site that are capable of reacting with one another could be released producing unexpected toxic inhalation, fire, or heavy vapor hazards; and

• The release of any number of less-than-immediately toxic chemicals during such an attack could lead to unpredictable medical issues amongst responders and innocent bystanders.

Each industrial facility with chemicals on hand is going to have to analyze for the specific hazards associated with their facility in a potential active shooter incident and plan for measures to mitigate those hazards. Security responders and law enforcement personnel will need to be trained to recognize the hazards at specific facilities and modify their use of firearms as appropriate to avoid escalating a relatively simple active shooter response to an active chemical release incident with potential off-site consequences where responders are also having to deal with an active shooter.

Active Shooter CFATS Language

In keeping with the earlier set of posts that I did on potential language that I would like to see in a CFATS reauthorization bill, I would like to see the following language considered for active shooter situation planning and response:

(h) The Secretary will revise 6 CFR 27.230(a) to include a risk-based performance standard addressing planning for an active shooter incident. The language would include requirements for that RBPS would include:

(1) Identification of chemical hazards that would have to be considered during planning for an active shooter incident;

(2) Plans to limit active shooter access to areas where the identified chemicals are stored, used or produced;

(3) Training for armed facility security personnel and/or local law enforcement personnel about areas in the facility where special precautions would have to be taken when discharging firearms during an active shooter response; and

(4) Unique emergency response requirements for chemical releases during an active shooter incident.

Existing CFATS facilities would be given a reasonable deadline (6 months?) to revise approved site security plans to take into account the new RBPS requirements.

HR 4650 Introduced – Active Shooter Guidance

Last month Rep. Aguilar (D,CA) introduced HR 4650, the Providing Rational Options Toward the Elimination of Catastrophic Terrorism (PROTECT) Act of 2017. The bill would require DHS to provide guidance on planning for and responding to active shooter incidents. It would also add active shooter incidents to the list of priorities for State and Urban Area Initiative grant programs under 6 USC 608.

The bill would add a new section (§890B) to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that would require DHS to develop and make available guidance “to assist in the development of emergency action and response plans for active shooter and mass casualty incidents in public and private locations” {new §890B(a)}.

Moving Forward

Aguilar is not a member of the House Homeland Security Committee to which this bill was assigned for consideration, but one of his co-sponsors, Rep. Watson-Coleman (D,NJ) is. This means that it is possible that Watson-Coleman has enough influence to have this bill considered in Committee.

There is nothing in this bill that would engender any significant opposition. The bill would probably draw bipartisan support if it were considered. If it makes it to the floor of the House, I suspect that it would be considered under the suspension of the rules process.

Commentary

This bill is very generic in its guidance requirements. The most important piece of the bill is the amendment of §608 that adds ‘active shooters’ to the list of threats that DHS will consider when awarding homeland security grants under the Urban Area Security Initiative (§604) and the State Homeland Security Grant Program (§605).

I am disappointed (though hardly surprised) that the bill does not require DHS to prepare specific guidance for responding to active shooter incidents at facilities that store hazardous materials; particularly flammable liquids and gasses or toxic liquids and gasses. Over the years I have talked to police officers in a number of jurisdictions (including one with specific response responsibilities at an oil refinery) and none of them have been aware of the specific hazards associated with the discharge of firearms in facilities with potentially flammable atmospheres. Nor have they been aware of how easy it is for bullets to penetrate the walls of many storage tanks used to store toxic and flammable liquids.

If this bill makes it out of committee without language being added to require this sort of specific guidance being added, it is unlikely that it would be subsequently added in the legislative process. Any floor action in the House or Senate would almost certainly be made under abbreviated consideration rules which do not typically provide for amendments being offered.

HR 5643 Introduced – Active Shooter

Earlier this week Rep. Duckworth (D,IL) introduced HR 5643, the Active Shooter Preparedness Enhancement Act of 2016. The bill outlines DHS responsibilities for assisting State and local governments and the private sector develop active shooter preparedness plans.

Preparedness Response

Section 2 of the bill would add a new section to the Homeland Security Act of 2002; Sec. 890B. Active shooter and mass casualty incident response assistance. It would require DHS to develop guidance “to assist in the development of emergency action and response plans for active shooter and mass casualty incidents in public and private locations, including facilities that have been identified by the Department as potentially vulnerable targets” {new §809B(a)}. The guidance would include {new §809B(a)}:

• A strategy for properly responding to an active shooter or mass casualty incident in a public or private location;

• A plan for establishing a unified command;

• A schedule for regular testing of equipment used to receive communications during such an incident;

• A practiced method and plan to communicate with occupants of such location during such an incident;

• A practiced method and plan to communicate with the surrounding community regarding such an incident;

• A plan for coordinating with volunteer organizations to expedite assistance for victims;

• A schedule for joint exercises and training;

• A plan for outreach to facilities that have been identified by the Department as potentially vulnerable targets; and

• Other planning documents, as determined by the Secretary.

Grants

Section 3 of the bill amends 6 USC 607(a)(2) to add “training exercises to enhance preparedness for and response to mass casualty and active shooter incidents and security events at public and private locations” {new §607(a)(2)(E)} to the list of law enforcement terrorism prevention activities for which grants are authorized under the Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland Security grant programs.

Section 4 of the bill amends 6 USC 608(b) by adding “Active shooters” {new §608(b)(9)} to the list of threats that DHS takes into account in prioritizing Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland Security grant allocations.

No new funding is provided in the bill.

Moving Forward

Duckworth is not a member of any of the three committees (Homeland Security, Judiciary, and Transportation and Infrastructure) to which this bill was assigned for consideration. This means that, especially this late in the session, it is unlikely that the bill will receive consideration in any of these committees unless she convinces people in the committee leaderships to co-sponsor the bill.

There is nothing in the language of this bill that would raise any organized opposition to the bill. If it were to make it to the floor for the vote, it would likely do so under the under suspension of the rules provisions and pass with solid bipartisan support.

Commentary

I will start out with a by now familiar comment about the grant portions of the bill. The bill would expand the number of potential grants without expanding the amount of money available to share with State and local authorities. This means that the number of other grants available would have to be reduced or the amounts monies in the other grants would be reduced. This type of legislative grant dilution is political grandstanding.

The other thing wrong with this bill is not unique to Duckworth’s approach. I have yet to see any serious discussion of the unique problems that chemical storage brings to the active shooter situation. I have talked to a senior police officer with a major municipal police force who had responsibilities for responding to active shooter and terrorist incidents at a major refinery. No one had explained to him the potentially catastrophic problems that could arise if his police started shooting on the refinery grounds.

Given the fact that various hazardous chemicals are found in a wide variety of industrial facilities (NOT just chemical plants) any requirement for a strategy for active shooter incidents at industrial facilities is going to have to start with an assessment of the potential chemical hazards that could be encountered at the facility.

It is just as important that emergency response personnel (police, fire and emergency medical technician) that could respond to an active shooter event at a facility that stores hazardous chemicals be informed of the hazards associated with the chemical and their locations in the facility. Additionally, medical facilities that could be accepting and treating casualties from such events need to be informed of the potential hazardous chemicals with which casualties could be contaminated, both for the safety of the medical facility and staff as well as needing to be prepared to treat the chemical injuries that could result from chemical releases during active shooter events.

With that in mind, I would insert a new paragraph (b) to the section being added by §2 of the bill {and change the current paragraph (b) to paragraph (c)}:

(b) Strategy guidelines for facilities that store industrial chemicals:

(1)   In developing an active shooter strategy, all industrial facilities will first develop an assessment of the hazardous chemicals stored at the facility. That assessment will include a listing of:

A.    Each hazardous chemical stored at the facility;

B.     The quantity of each hazardous chemical identified in (A) above; and

C.     The location of each place in the facility where the chemicals identified in (A) above are produced, used, or stored.

(2)   The facility will determine the potential hazards associated with each of the chemicals identified in (1) above. At a minimum the facility will determine the potential consequences of multiple punctures of storage containers of each of the chemicals listed in (1) above, including:

A.    The potential for fires and explosions,

B.  The potential for, and extent of, a toxic atmosphere,

C.  The potential for the formation of an oxygen deficient atmosphere, and

D.  The potential for the mixing of incompatible chemicals and the hazards associated with such mixing;

(3)   The facility will also determine the areas of a facility where the potential for a flammable atmosphere might be expected to exist during normal operations; and

(4)   The facility will also determine the areas of a facility where the potential for an oxygen deficient atmosphere might normally be expected to exist.

(5)   The information developed in (1) thru (4) above will be listed as annexes to facility strategy for properly responding to an active shooter or mass casualty incident.

(6)   Definition: In this section the term ‘hazardous chemical’ will include, at a minimum, all of the chemicals listed in §112(r) of the Clean Air Act {42 USC 7412(b)}. This definition does not prohibit a facility owner/operator from adding chemicals to the hazardous chemical list when, in the opinion of the owner/operator, the added chemical presents a potential hazard to employees or the environment if released during an active shooter event.

Bills Introduced – 07-06-16

With both the House and Senate in session yesterday there were 38 bills introduced. Of those three may be of specific interest to readers of this blog:

HR 5634 Making appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2017, and for other purposes. Rep. Carter, John R. [R-TX-31]

HR 5639 To update the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act, and for other purposes. Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-4]

HR 5643 To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide for active shooter and mass casualty incident response assistance, and for other purposes. Rep. Duckworth, Tammy [D-IL-8] 

The DHS spending bill is being introduced awfully late in the session, particularly for an election year. It is unlikely to receive consideration as a stand-alone bill. Still it will be interesting to see what is included in the Committee Report on this bill.

The NIST authorization bill will be covered only if it includes specific provisions related to cybersecurity, particularly control system security.

The active shooter bill will probably not be mentioned again, but I am hoping that it will have at least some sort of provision requiring the Department to address the unique aspects of active shooter situations at chemical storage/production facilities.

Active Shooter Plan

In a posting earlier this week I mentioned that DHS Chemical Sector Office had a number of new security planning documents available on its Training and Resources web page. Among the documents that I said could be requested from the Chemical Sector Office was the Best Practices Guide for an Active Shooter Incident.

Having received my copy, I would like to look at that guidance. This booklet looks at some things that facilities should consider in developing their emergency response plan for an active shooter. This is not a counter-terrorism plan; it deals with the more likely incident where an individual, usually someone associated with the facility, enters the facility and starts shooting at employees. It defines an active shooter this way:

“An active shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill persons in a confined and populated area. In most cases, active shooters use firearms with no apparent pattern or method to select their victims.”

We have seen these types of incidents take place at all sorts of facilities; it is only a matter of time before one happens at a chemical facility. This guidance document was developed based upon a number of table top exercises that DHS held with a variety of chemical facilities across the nation. The guidance in the document is written with a broad brush reflecting the reality that each facility is going to have their unique situation that will have to be dealt with in their emergency response plan. 

The booklet does briefly address arguably the most important part of an active shooter plan; how to recognize the warning signs of an employee on the edge of breaking and becoming an active shooter. The ‘red flags’ that it identifies may be predictors of potential for violent behavior, but I don’t think that it adequately addresses the fact the vast majority of people exhibiting these factors never take up a gun to threaten much less shoot their co-workers. Over reacting to these indicators could do serious damage to the morale and cohesiveness of the facility work force.

Pre-Planning 

The one of the strong points in this document is the section dealing with pre-planning guidance. The pre-planning section provides a list of things that the facility management needs to do during the development of their plan. The actions listed are not targeted specifically at chemical facilities; they could be used by just about any civilian facility in developing an active shooter plan. For example, the document advises:

“Invite all emergency services responders to tour your site and provide details about the facility that will help responders to adjust their protocols if necessary.”

This is certainly good advice for any facility, but it fails to address many of the special situations involved at chemical facilities. I would have liked to see this statement followed by a list of some of those chemical specific situations, including:

HAZMAT storage locations; Locations where flammable atmospheres might be expected; Listing of hazardous chemicals on site, to include MSDS; and Chemical release evacuation procedures.

If the active shooter remains in the office areas of the facility there would be no problems for the responders. As soon as the shooter moves to production or storage areas, the law enforcement personnel are going to have to take many more factors into account in their shoot/no shoot decision making process. Without significant prior training, they are going to make poor and potentially catastrophic decisions.

Incident Response 

The section on the planning for the actual response to an active shooter incident switches to a slightly different format. It poses a number of questions that management needs to take into consideration in planning what should take place during an incident. Once again, most of these questions would apply to any facility. Three very good questions, however, target chemical specific situations. These are

“Are there any safety concerns as emergency responders enter process areas?" 

“What are the personnel procedures for safely securing operations that include hazardous materials?” 

“At what point do site emergency procedures dictate process shutdown?”

This section also provides a brief listing of the ways that a relatively ‘simple’ active shooter scenario can get really complicated. In addition to the typical problems potentially found in any facility (hostages, explosive devices, etc) this section identifies a “chemical release” as a potentially complicating situation. Someone is going to have to start thinking about how an active shooter could complicate the chemical release emergency response plan.

Incident Recovery 

This guide continues the question format into the section on what needs to be done after the active shooter is killed/detained. I am really happy to see that this important part of the situation is addressed. Most planning operations fail to take into account what happens after the active portion of the operation is completed. There is a nice balance in the questions posed in this section. Safety, security, and business continuity are all at least briefly addressed. Two questions have special significance for chemical facilities:

“Who will make re-entry decisions?” 

“Who will provide safety and security debriefings?”

Again, I would have liked to see more chemical facility specific details provided for both of these questions. Re-entry decisions will require taking into account legal (crime scene), psychological (clean up of blood etc), and chemical safety issues. A number of people will provide input on the decision, but who will have the responsibility and training to make the decision needs to be identified in advance. And don’t forget to take into account that the selected individual may be in the hospital or the morgue; identify multiple backups.

The safety debriefing is particularly important at a chemical facility. Every attempt must be made to identify all shots fired in, around or at process areas of the facility. Then every bullet must be traced to see what equipment may have been damaged before start up begins. Actual shutdown activities need to be reviewed to see what was done and what wasn’t; inadequate shut down procedures could have catastrophic consequences if not identified and addressed in a timely manner.

Employee Response 

There is a section of this guide that specifically addresses individual employees responses in an active shooter incidet. It addresses issues that need to be considered prior to an active shooter incident occurring, actions to take initially during an incident and, very importantly, how to respond to law enforcement personnel entering the facility during an incident. The guidance is good for general facility type response but, once again, does not adequately address the complicating factors that are found in chemical facilities.

Tabletop Exercises 

The final section of the guidance document very briefly addresses the importance of conducting tabletop exercises of the facility’s emergency response plan for active shooters. The opening paragraph of this short section is one of the best descriptions of the importance of exercises in general.

“Proactive chemical facility managers and emergency responders use facilitated tabletop exercises to simulate security incidents or natural disasters and engage in interactive discussions on how to prepare for, respond to, and recover from such events. Interactive tabletop exercises allow participants to test critical thinking skills, learn how the public and private sectors will react to a security breach, and identify areas for improvement.”

DHS, through the Chemical Sector office, has worked with state chemical industry councils to “develop the voluntary Security Seminar and Exercise Series”. These facilitated exercises can help facilities and local responders work out the bugs in their emergency response plans before they actually have to be implemented. The DHS Chemical Sector-Specific Agency can be contacted for further information about these exercises.

Recommendation 

When I requested this booklet from DHS I was hoping to see a guide on how to prepare for an active shooter terrorist attack where a team of terrorists attacks a facility with small arms and limited size explosive devices. While I was slightly disappointed that it didn’t address that scenario, this document is probably more valuable since the probability of the type of disgruntled ex-employee active shooter described in the guidance is a much higher probability event.

High-risk chemical facilities will have many counter-terrorist security measures that reduce the chance of an active shooter incident, but the chance of a gun toting employee getting past those security measures can be way too high to prevent these types of attacks. An emergency response plan for these situations needs to be developed for all chemical facilities regardless of their risk for a terrorist attack.

While I have some concerns that there is not enough information in this guide specifically tailored to chemical facilities, I think that this guide is well worth the time and energy needed to read and consider the implications for your facility. The price (did I mention that it is free?) obviously can’t be beat. And there is an awful lot of valuable information in the 16 page booklet. I fully recommend that every chemical facility manager should have a marked-up, well read copy of this booklet on his desk. Contact the DHS Chemical Sector-Specific Agency today to get your copy.