Well, President Obama finally signed the long promised
Cybersecurity Executive Order. We don’t have an EO number yet, that will come
in the next day or two when the EO is published in the Federal Register. In any
case, what is posted on the White House web site is certainly good enough for
us to start seeing what practical effect this EO will have on cybersecurity.
The Policy
We couldn’t even get started on this without looking at the
basic policy statement included in §1:
“It is the policy of the United
States to enhance the security and resilience of the Nation's critical
infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that encourages efficiency,
innovation, and economic prosperity while promoting safety, security, business
confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties.”
While this policy is supposed to be focused on ‘critical
infrastructure’ it is clear that the focus of the cybersecurity effort is on
information security. Control systems are addressed in passing (a single
mention, safety, is specifically targeted at physical systems), but it is clear
that this is mainly an IT policy.
Critical
Infrastructure
Since this EO is targeted on protecting the cybersecurity of
critical infrastructure it is important to understand what that term means.
First in §2 we see a basic definition of the term:
“As used in this order, the term
critical infrastructure means systems and assets, whether physical or virtual,
so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters.”
The way this definition is constructed it is difficult to
see any single facility or company that would qualify as ‘critical
infrastructure’. This definition would only seem to apply to networks or
organizations. For example, only the incapacity or destruction of the electric transmission
network, the gasoline pipeline network or the financial network would have a
truly debilitating impact on the ‘national economic security’ or ‘national
public health’. It is hard to see how the destruction or incapacity of any
single entity would meet the definition.
This definition is expanded somewhat in §9(a) where the
Secretary of DHS is required to identify “critical infrastructure where a
cybersecurity incident could reasonably result in catastrophic regional [emphasis added] or national
effects on public health or safety, economic security, or national security”.
The addition of a lower ‘regional’ impact standard will increase slightly the
number of affected facilities. It would probably stretch to include major oil
refineries for instance or regional power companies.
Now all of this certainly depends on how you define ‘debilitating
impact’; a term carefully left undefined in this EO. The more broadly you
define ‘debilitating’ the more inclusive the term ‘critical infrastructure’
becomes. Water it down enough and everything is critical infrastructure.
Information Sharing
The one thing that should be relatively easy to implement in
this EO would be the information sharing provisions of §4. It shouldn’t take an
EO, however, for the President to direct the intelligence agencies to produce
unclassified reports on cybersecurity threats as is outlined in §4(a). The
expansion of the sharing of classified intelligence as outline in §4(c) will be
slow as the private sector will be slow to adopt the necessary security
mechanisms required to handle classified documents.
The Cybersecurity
Framework
Since there is no Congressional mandate or authority for the
regulation of cybersecurity, the President has studiously avoided the use of
the word ‘regulation’. Instead he has required the Director of the National
Institute of Standards (NIST) to lead the development of “a framework to reduce
cyber risks to critical infrastructure”. To ensure that everyone understands
that these non-regulation are intended to behave like regulations, §7(a) goes
on to explain that the framework “shall include a set of standards,
methodologies, procedures, and processes that align policy, business, and
technological approaches to address cyber risks”.
The semi-regulatory nature of the framework is further
reinforced by the requirement in §7(d) that the Director shall “engage in an
open public review and comment process”; the same type review process that is
used for writing or revising regulations.
The one area where this EO has certainly taken an extreme
leap of faith has been in the time frame set forth for the development of the
Cybersecurity Framework. Section 7(e) of the order provides the Director 240
day to publish a preliminary version of the framework. Depending on how much of
the work of developing the framework has already been done by NIST (and I would
bet that they have been hard at work on this while the EO was being developed)
this might actually be doable.
It will be nearly impossible, however, to have the final
version of the framework published 125 days later (within one year of the
official publication of this EO). This is because of the need to complete the
comment and review process promised in §7(d). Anything less than a 90 day
comment period will certainly end up in court and it will take a minimum of at
least another 90 days for NIST to process and formulate responses to the huge
number of comments that will inevitably result.
Since these are supposed to be consensus standards
formulated in consultation with rest of the federal government, I will be very
surprised if the draft version of the framework can be published within the one
year time frame and it could be 2016 before the OMB approves the final version.
And the OMB will be intimately involved in the publication of this document;
see §12(b).
Voluntary Adoption of
Framework
Section 8 of the EO clearly makes adoption of the framework
by the private sector voluntary and there will be incentives developed {§8(d)}
even before the draft framework is completed to encourage that voluntary
participation in the program. The most important incentive is outlined in §8(e)
where an attempt will be made (almost certainly successfully) to require
adoption of the standards as part of the federal acquisition process. That is a
fairly big carrot/stick that could be wielded far beyond the broadest possible definition
of ‘critical infrastructure’.
The portion of the EO that will cause the most problems for
the private sector is to be found in §10 where it spells out how agencies “with
responsibility for regulating the security of critical infrastructure” will try
to find existing authorities to require the implementation of the framework
within the regulated community. Those agencies have 90 days from the
publication of the preliminary framework to identify:
• If agency has clear authority to
establish requirements based upon the Cybersecurity Framework to sufficiently
address current and projected cyber risks to critical infrastructure;
• The existing authorities
identified, and
• Any additional authority
required.
It is likely that some agencies will be able to begin
implementation of the framework requirements before the final framework is
approved in the comment and response process. Even where clear authority
exists, though, it will take regulatory changes (with the required comment and
review process) to fully implement the final framework provisions.
The Legislative
Process
The one thing that
this EO will certainly do is to aggravate the legislative process for the
adoption of cybersecurity measures by Congress. The Republican controlled House
is certain to start work on bills to limit the authority of the President to
implement the framework even before the initial version is published. Those challenges
will focus on the provisions of §8(e) and §10. That legislative work will
certainly take away from efforts to produce a Republican consensus cybersecurity
bill.
In the Senate, the amendment process on any cybersecurity
legislation will be tied up in the processing of amendments to limit the
implementation of this EO. The impossibility of getting the votes necessary to
move past those amendments will kill any floor action on even the most
agreeable cybersecurity legislation.
Implementation
1 comment:
I agree, Pat. I have been wondering who is feeding the Legislative and Executive branches the fodder they use to write this stuff. It appears the answer is Nobody that has any concept of what works.
I get the strong impression that instead of attempting to impose reporting requirements, on site documentation, recognized certificates, or anything of the sort, they're attempting to impose security in much the same way that the rest of the Federal Government has --and we see how well that's working for them.
Jake Brodsky
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