Tuesday, September 15, 2020

1 Update Published – 9-15-20

 Today the CISA NCCIC-ICS updated one control system security advisory for products from ENTTEC.

ENTTEC Update

This update provides additional information on an advisory that was originally published on June 25th, 2020. The new information includes:

• Added the fact that E-Streamer Mk2 was end-of-life (and not supported), and

• Provided information on updated firmware that mitigates the vulnerabilities

No indication that Cross (the researcher reporting vulnerabilities) was provided an opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.

ISCD Publishes 2 New Fact Sheets – 9-15-20

Today the CISA Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) published two the Fact Sheets on their Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Knowledge Center. They also revised a Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) and four responses to FAQs.

New Fact Sheets

ISCD published to new Fact Sheets as part of their outreach program. The two

• Protect Chemicals at Warehouse, Storage, and Distribution Facilities From Use in a Terrorist Attack

• CFATS: Top-Screens for Dynamic Business Operations

The warehouse fact sheet is part of the ISCD’s industry outreach program; providing information about the CFATS program and how warehousing facilities are affected by the program. This is very similar in concept and information to previously published industry outreach fact sheets. One small nit to pick with the information provided; the list of ‘common chemicals of interest (COI) includes ‘anhydrous ammonia’; probably more commonly found in warehouse operations would be ‘ammonia (concentration 20% or greater)’.

The dynamic business operations fact sheet is another look at a topic that was discussed here last week. The information provided in this new fact sheet is very similar to the information provided in the relatively new  CSAT Top Screen Submissions Tips page.

Revised FAQ – Ammonium Nitrate

While ISCD has been revising a number of FAQs over the last couple of months to make them more useful, every once-in-a-while they actually change one of the questions being asked, which generally requires a significant rewrite of the response. Such was the case today when FAQ #1228 was changed.

• Old question - How is the Screening Threshold Quantity (STQ) calculated for Ammonium Nitrate (AN)?

• New question - How is the screening threshold quantity (STQ) calculated for ammonium nitrate (AN) [with more than 0.2 percent combustible substance, including any organic substance calculated as carbon, to the exclusion of any other added substance]?

NOTE: The links provided for the FAQs in this post were copied from the CFATS Knowledge Center but may not work when followed from your machine. This is an artifact of that web site. If the links do not take you to the referenced FAQ you will have to use the ‘Advanced Search’ function on the page to link to the FAQ or download the ‘All FAQs’ document at the bottom of the ‘Advanced Search’ page.

The difference is important because there are two different listings for ‘ammonium nitrate’ in the list of DHS Chemicals of Interest (COI); ammonium nitrate, the explosive (where the ‘more than 0.2%... applies) and ammonium nitrate, the potential explosive precursor. The original FAQ did not really distinguish between the two and this made the Response a tad bit confusing. Instead of just taking the easy way out and just revising the response to address the precursor form of the AN, ISCD revised the question, expanded the answer and, in my opinion, just made the matters more confusing, but then again AN is confusing.

AN, the fertilizer is the ‘non-explosive’ form of the chemical. I know, Beirut and West, TX were big (big is a massive understatement in the case of Beirut) explosions of AN. Perhaps ISCD should skip the two listings (would take a rule change) for AN and treat both forms of the material as an explosive for security purposes. It would still have the release-explosive and theft/diversion security classifications and STQ’s, but it would clear up a lot of the confusion. And let’s face it; a smart terrorist could craft an attack on an ammonium nitrate fertilizer storage that would result in a massive explosion.

Revised FAQ Responses

ISCD revised the responses for the following FAQ’s:

FAQ #1272 Who is responsible for submitting a Top-Screen in situations where chemicals of interest are located on property that is leased by a tenant from a landlord?

FAQ #1405 How will I know if the agricultural extension has been lifted and what to do next?

FAQ #1456 Should release chemicals of interest (COI) presently in process or chemicals that are by-products be considered when calculating COI quantities toward the screening threshold quantity (STQ)?

FAQ #1541 How does a facility count the amount of a release-flammable mixture that is a fuel with a National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) rating of 1, 2, 3, or 4 if it is stored in an aboveground tank farm (including farms that are part of pipeline systems)?

For the most part these changes were non-substantive changes made for clarification purposes; no changes in policy or procedure were included. The changes were:

#1272 Added a reference link and additional explanatory language (2nd paragraph),

#1405 Changed URL to document link,

#1456 Removed reference to ‘total onsite quantity (TOQ)’, and

#1541 Added comments about the gasoline Top Screen extension (2nd paragraph).

Bills Introduced – 9-14-20

 

Yesterday with both the House and Senate in session there were 24 bills introduced. Two of those bills may receive additional coverage in this blog:

HR 8239 To facilitate the development and distribution of forensic science standards by establishing in the National Institute of Standards and Technology the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, and for other purposes. Rep. Johnson, Eddie Bernice [D-TX-30] 

S 4568 A bill to facilitate the development and distribution of forensic science standards by establishing in the National Institute of Standards and Technology the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, and for other purposes. Sen. Wicker, Roger F. [R-MS]

I will be watching these apparent companion bills by the two respective science committee chairs for language including cyber forensics in the list of ‘Area Committees for Forensic Science’.

Sunday, September 13, 2020

Public ICS Disclosures – Part II

 

This week also included the latest tranche of advisories and updates from Siemens. Most of those were addressed by NCCIC-ICS, but three updates from Siemens were not covered.

GNU/Linux Update

Siemens published an update for their advisory on GNU/Linux vulnerabilities in their SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518(F)-4 PN/DP MFP. The advisory was originally published in 2018 and most recently updated on August 11th, 2020. The new information includes adding the following CVE’s:

• CVE-2020-8620,

• CVE-2020-8621,

• CVE-2020-8622,

• CVE-2020-8623,

• CVE-2020-8624, and

• CVE-2020-16166

NOTE 1: Siemens periodically updates the firmware for this device, mitigating vulnerabilities as it does so. The advisory still shows existing vulnerabilities dating back to 2015 in the most current firmware version.

NOTE 2: NCCIC-ICS has not published an advisory for these Siemens vulnerabilities.

SIMATIC Update

Siemens published an update for their SIMATIC, SIMOCODE, SINAMICS, SITOP, and TIM advisory that was originally published on December 10th, 2019 and most recently updated on August 11th, 2020. The new information includes information about successor products for SIMATIC RF180C and RFID 181EIP.

NOTE: There is an NCCIC-ICS advisory for the vulnerability described in the Siemens update.

PROFINET-IO Update

Siemens published an update for their PROFINET-IO advisory that was originally published on February 11th, 2020 and most recently updated on August 11th, 2020. The new information includes information about successor products for SIMATIC RF180C and RFID 181EIP.

NOTE: There is an NCCIC-ICS advisory for the vulnerability described in the Siemens update.

Commentary

The last two updates had corresponding NCCIC-ICS advisories that were not updated. Both Siemens advisories included the same information:

“For SIMATIC RF180C and RF182C: migrate to a successor product within the SIMATIC RF18xC/CI family, V1.3 or later version. For details refer to the notice of discontinuation.”

I am not sure why NCCIC-ICS would not consider this to be a valuable piece of mitigation information for users of these devices. I hope that this was simply an oversight on the part of NCCIC-ICS that will be corrected in the coming week.

Saturday, September 12, 2020

Public ICS Disclosure – Week of 9-2-20

We have eight vendor notifications about the CodeMeter vulnerabilities reported earlier this week by NCCIC-ICS from Phoenix Contact, PEPPERL+FUCHS, WAGO, ABB, and Pilz. We also have four vendor notification from Schneider, Moxa, Medtronic, and BD. There is a vendor update from Mitsubishi. We have a researcher report of 0-day vulnerabilities for products from Fuji Electric.

CodeMeter Advisories

Phoenix Contact published an advisory for the CodeMeter vulnerabilities. They listed their affected products and announced a new version of their Activation Wizard that mitigates the vulnerabilities.

VDE-CERT published an advisory for the CodeMeter vulnerabilities in products from PEPPERL+FUCHS. It provides a list of affected products and recommends implementing the WIBU Systems update.

VDE-CERT published an advisory for the CodeMeter vulnerabilities in products from WAGO. It reports that the e!COCKPIT engineering software is bundled with the CodeMeter software. VDE-CERT notes that WAGO will update their e!COCKPIT setup routine later this year.

ABB published four CodeMeter advisories for the following products:

• General information,

• AC 800PEC platform,

• Ability™ Operations Data Management zenon, and

• ABB Drives applications

Pilz published an advisory for the CodeMeter vulnerabilities. It provides a list of affected products and recommends using the current version of CodeMeter.

Schneider Advisory

Schneider published an advisory describing five vulnerabilities in their SCADAPack remote connect and security administrator applications. The vulnerabilities were reported by Amir Preminger of Claroty. Schneider has new versions that mitigate the vulnerabilities. There is no indication that Preminger has been provided an opportunity to verify the efficacy of the fix.

The five reported vulnerabilities are:

• Deserialization of untrusted data - CVE-2020-7528 and CVE-2020-7532,

• Path transversal - CVE-2020-7529,

• Improper authorization - CVE-2020-7530, and

• Improper access control - CVE-2020-7531

Moxa Advisory

Moxa published an advisory for the BootHole vulnerability. Moxa reports that none of its products are affected.

Medtronic Advisory

Medtronic published an advisory describing the SweynTooth vulnerabilities in a number of their products. Medtronic reports that they remediated these vulnerabilities when they did their software update in June 2020.

BD Advisory

BD published an advisory describing the SigRed vulnerabilities in a number of their products. BD recommends ensuring that the appropriate Microsoft® patches have been applied.

Mitsubishi Update

Mitsubishi published an update for their MC Works advisory that was originally published on June 18th, 2020. The new information includes links for security patches for MC Works64 Version 4.00A - 4.02C.

Fuji Electric Reports

Kimiya published 14 reports (ZDI-20-1103 thru ZDI-20-1117) of vulnerabilities in the Fuji Electric Tellus Lite product. The vulnerabilities were reported to ‘ICS-CERT’ (presumably, NCCIC-ICS) by the Zero Day Initiative back in April.

The vulnerabilities include:

• Stack-based buffer overflow,

• Out-of-bounds write, and

• Out-of-bounds read

Bills Introduced – 9-11-20

 

Yesterday with the House meeting in pro forma session (and the Senate off for the weekend) there were 46 bills introduced. One of these bills may receive future coverage in this blog:

HR 8223 To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 promote evidence-based controls for defending against common cybersecurity threats and cybersecurity risks, and for other purposes. Rep. Katko, John [R-NY-24]

I will be watching this bill for language and definitions that would include industrial control systems.

Friday, September 11, 2020

CSB Addresses Combustible Dust Hazards

 

Yesterday the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board published a new document in its ongoing campaign to prevent combustible dust incidents. Not only was the document ‘new’ in a timeliness sense, but it is a new format for the CSB; a ‘Learning Review’ document.

Methodology

On October 24th, 2018 the CSB issued a ‘call to action’ “to gather comments on the management and control of combustible dust from companies, regulators, inspectors, safety training providers, researchers, unions, and the workers affected by dust-related hazards.” As a result, he CSB received comments from 57 different entities about the problems and perceptions associated the combustible dust problem.

The results were provided to Dynamic Inquiry LLC for review. That company used a relatively new investigation technique called a “learning review” to analyze the responses. There is a brief discussion of that technique here and a paper on the topic here. In short, the technique tries to avoid a linear assessment of ‘blame’, but rather tries to determine:

• Why did it make sense for those workers to do what they did at that time?

• Were their choices part of otherwise normal operation?

• How can we change those processes to make the facility safer?

In this case, instead of looking at the facts associated with a single incident, Dynamic Inquiry took the comments from the 57 ‘call to action’ responses as the database upon which they assessed the problem of how to address the combustible dust problem.

Results

The Conclusion of the study determined that (pg 29):

“Replies from this voluntary outreach revealed many industry assumptions and challenges and also offered suggestions for improvement. Important and innovative topics emerged through the sensemaking phase of the Learning Review.”

It went on to explain that what new information that various parts of the study identified, including:

• Barriers to improvement explored how individuals and organizations approach risk.

• Controls examined the efficacy of traditional approaches to risk and hazard management. Reporting identified the importance of creating psychological safety in the workforce to facilitate the open sharing of information.

• Language and Communication revealed that even the words used to describe combustible dust can introduce vulnerabilities to the system and that effective communication within and between facilities is essential for safe practices.

• Learning was shown to be a function of the willingness to share information and change assumptions and was not guaranteed through traditional training methods.

• Sharing information was found to be the most desired and valued topic from respondents.

Commentary

Anyone looking to find concrete solutions to the combustible dust problem at a given facility is not going to find a great deal of help in this document. There is some information included in Appendix B that may be helpful. Here the report takes quotes from the various responses and groups them in categories like ‘awareness’ and ‘judgement & experience’. Anyone that has perused industry responses to requests for information will realize that this categorization of comments is very helpful for analysis, but finding useable brilliant nuggets of information in those comments is very unlikely.

This is my first exposure to a ‘learning review’ type assessment and I am not sure that it is really the most appropriate way of reviewing this type of data. The ‘facts’ being used here are not necessarily factual and are certainly clouded by the agendas of the individual commentators. It would be interesting to see a parallel chemical incident investigation done using the standard CSB investigative techniques and this learning review and to compare the recommendations that came out of each. I think that this would be very informative.

One question here; how much is the issuance of this ‘new’ type report being governed by the lack of governance at the CSB? The question is not meant to be malicious or casting aspersions at anyone at the CSB, but the CSB board only has one member. As such the agency is not legally able to reach conclusions about incidents or make recommendations to improve industry safety. How much of the issuance of this report is about the CSB remaining influential while legally impotent? There is nothing the CSB can do about their lack of a quorum; that is the President’s fault.

 
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