Wednesday, August 16, 2017

Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018

The House Rules Committee announced today that is working on massive, multi-department spending bill to be considered when the House returns from summer recess. It is a move to cut short the spending process so that there may be a chance to pass a government spending bill before the September 30th deadline. The Rules Committee is calling for submission of amendments by 10:00 am on August 25th.

The combined bill is a complete re-write of HR 3354, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018. The draft language incorporates most of the language from that bill and:

HR 3268 – Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3267 – Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3280 – Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3355 – Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3358 – Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018;
HR 3362 – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018; and
HR 3353 – Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018

The House has already passed a combined spending bill for the other four spending bills not covered above. That bill, HR 3219, included the following spending bills:

• The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2018;
• The Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2018;
• The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018; and
• The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018.


Combining eight spending bills into one big package could greatly reduce the amount of time required on the floor of the House for debate. I expect the Rules Committee would come up with a structured rule, with a few hundred floor amendments. The bill would almost certainly be passed in the House in a single week. The big question is whether or not the Senate would be allowed to take up the giant bill. Depending on what riders make it into the House passed version, I could almost expect to see an unusual amalgam of liberals and conservatives combining to block the moderate majority from considering and passing the bill.

ICS-CERT Publishes Two Advisories

Yesterday the DHS ICS-CERT published a medical device security advisory for products from BMC Medical and 3B Medical (one advisory). They also published a control system security advisory for products from Advantech

BMC Medical Advisory


This advisory describes an improper input validation vulnerability in the Luna continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) therapy machine produced jointly by BMC Medical and 3B Medical. The vulnerability was reported by MedSec. Newer versions (after July 2017) have had the problem corrected; ICS-CERT reports that the company’s do not plan on providing mitigation measures for ‘older’ (before July 2017) machines.

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker with adjacent network access could exploit the vulnerability to cause a crash of the device’s Wi-Fi module resulting in a denial-of-service condition affecting the Wi-Fi module chipset. This does not affect the device’s ability to deliver therapy.

NOTE: Buyers of CPAP devices should take careful note of the lack of post-production cybersecurity support demonstrated for this brand of devices.

Advantech Advisory


This advisory describes a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the Advantech WebOP operator panels. The vulnerability was reported by Ariele Caltabiano (kimiya) via the Zero Day Initiative. ICS-CERT reports that Advantech was unable to verify the validity of this vulnerability. (NOTE: this obviously means that no mitigation measures appear to be forthcoming.)

ICS-CERT reports that a relatively low skilled attacker with uncharacterized access could use publicly available exploits to exploit this vulnerability to cause the target device to crash and may allow arbitrary code execution.


NOTE: There are a large number of ‘pending’ vulnerability reports on Advantech products currently listed on the ZDI web site.

Tuesday, August 15, 2017

ISCD Updates CFATS Knowledge Center

Today the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) updated the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Knowledge Center by adding a link to a new CFATS fact sheet for colleges and universities and revised four frequently asked questions (FAQ) (according to the ‘Latest News’ blurb posted today on the Knowledge Center).

Colleges and Universities


The Colleges and Universities brochure is an update of a tri-fold brochure that was originally published in December 2010. The new brochure provides a brief overview of the CFATS program including a very brief description of the Top Screen reporting requirements. There is more detail in the new version and provides a number of important links to CFATS documents.

The one major shortcoming of the brochure is that, while it briefly describes chemicals of interest (COI) categories and explains that the list can be found in ‘Appendix A of the CFATS regulation’ there is no link to list of COI that is provided on the CFATS landing page, nor are the CFATS regulations actually listed (6 CFR 27).

New FAQs


The four ‘revised’ FAQ’s are:





The revised #1274 removes the mailing address [Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, ATTN: CSAT, Department of Homeland Security, Building 5300, MS 6282, PO Box 2008, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6282] and the messenger service delivery address [Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, ATTN: CSAT, Department of Homeland Security, Building 5300, MS 6282, 1 Bethel Valley Road, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6282] from the modes of contact for the CFATS Help Desk. I have no idea whether or not those old addresses are still good; but if they are, ISCD does not apparently want them used.

The revised #1288 adds regulatory references [§27.203(b) and §27.204(a)(2)] for the answer and a link to just the first reference. I have provided the link to the second.

FAQ #1606 is actually a new FAQ number, but the question and answer are very similar to an older FAQ (#1662) which is no longer on the current FAQ list (.PDF download). The new FAQ does not include any information (which was included in #1662) about a requirement to be CVI (Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information – the protocol for protecting the sensitive but unclassified information associated with the CFATS program) trained to be able to view/download the letter. Nor does the new FAQ mention that an Adobe Reader will be necessary to open the letter. NOTE: #1662 was still on the current FAQ list as of 8-4-17; the last time changes were made to the FAQ list.


FAQ #1785 is also a new FAQ number. There was an earlier article on the CFATS Knowledge Center (#1610) that addressed some of this information, but that article was prepared in 2010 and included copious descriptions of the old tiering process that was supplanted by CSAT 2.0 and the new Risk Assessment process. That article was removed sometime in early April of this year. The new FAQ very briefly mentions the tiering process and notes that facilities will be notified via the Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) that a tiering notification letter is available. It then briefly describes how to access that notification letter; and this time that discussion does include a mention of the CVI training requirements.

HR 3401 Introduced – Automated vehicles

Last month Rep. Schakowsky (D,IL) introduced HR 3401, a bill that would require the DOT’s National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) to establish new automotive safety standards for highly automated vehicles. This bill was introduced the same day that the House Energy and Commerce Committee  amended HR 3388 to do the same thing.

This bill is nearly identical to Section 4 of the revised HR 3388 adopted by the Committee. There is one area where the paragraph numbering is slightly different, but there are no substantive differences between the requirements. It would amend 49 USC by adding a new §30129, Updated or new motor vehicle safety standards for highly automated vehicles.

It would require DOT to “issue a final rule requiring the submission of safety assessment certifications regarding how safety is being addressed by each entity developing a highly automated vehicle or an automated driving system” {new §30129(a)(1)}.

It would also require DOT to submit to Congress a regulatory and safety priority plan designed to accommodate the development and deployment of highly automated vehicles while ensuring “the safety and security of highly automated vehicles and motor vehicles and others that will share the roads with highly automated vehicles” {new §30129(c)(1)}. That plan would include a requirement for NHTSA to “identify elements that may require performance standards including human machine interface and sensors and actuators, and consider process and procedure standards for software and cybersecurity as necessary” {new §30129(c)(2)(B)}.

Moving Forward


Ms. Schakowsky is the ranking member of the Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Normally this would probably allow her to have this bill considered in Committee. In this case, however, because this bill was introduced the same day that HR 3388 was, it seems as is the bill was introduced as a backup measure to ensure that the safety standards provisions of this bill could end up being considered separately from the remainder of the provisions of the larger bill if that bill was determined to be too controversial to be considered on the floor of the House.

I suspect that this bill will not see any further action until the House Leadership determines whether or not HR 3388 will make it to the floor. If it does not, this bill will likely be moved to the floor for a vote without going through a separate review by the Committee.

Commentary


I did not mention the cybersecurity requirements described above in my discussion of HR 3388 because they were duplicative of the requirements that I described but were not as expansive as the cybersecurity requirements in §5 of HR 3388.


What is important (and unusual from a cybersecurity perspective) here is that both bills would require the establishment for safety standards for HMI, sensors and actuators. It does not include any guidance on what those standards would include, but that would normally be expected to be developed by the technical experts at NHTSA. But this would end up being where the Federal government took its first crack at developing safety (and perhaps specific cybersecurity) standards for key components found in (almost by definition) these critical components of control systems. Those standards could end up being ground breaking regulatory standards for the ICS industry.

Monday, August 14, 2017

OMB Approves PHMSA Shipping Papers ICR Revision

Last Friday the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affair approved the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) information collection request (ICR) revision supporting requirements for hazardous material shipping papers and emergency response information. This ICR was filed in support of the most recent international harmonization of PHMSA hazardous material shipping regulations.

According to the abstract included in the recent notice, the ICR made the following changes to the ICR burden:

“This rulemaking reduced the burden to shippers by removing the requirement to provide a lithium battery handling document when shipping smaller lithium cells and batteries. While the rulemaking decreased the burden overall, the requirement that shippers communicate prototype or low production run battery shipments on a shipping paper resulted in an increase. The rulemaking also added new marine pollutant entries in Appendix B of § 172.101.”

While OIRA did not require any changes to the approved ICR, they did put PHMSA on notice about additional requirements that would be necessary for the next renewal of this ICR next spring. They noted that:

If PHMSA has not published a regulatory notice in the Federal Register seeking public comment on paperless hazard communication by the time PHMSA must publish a 60 day notice to extend OMB approval of this collection, PHMSA should include at least the following information in the 60 and 30 day notices for extending approval of this collection, in addition to the standard information required by the PRA:

• Identification and explanation of any technical and other barriers to paperless hazard communication by mode and environment (e.g., rural, urban) if applicable, and requests for public comment on ways to address those barriers;
• Identification and explanation of any safety problems associated with paperless hazard communication that are not present with paper-based hazard communication;
• Identification of safety, business and any other benefits associated with paperless hazard communication, by mode if possible; and
• At least rough estimates of the potential burden and cost reduction from fully allowing paperless hazard communication, by mode if possible, the methodology/inputs for the estimates, and request public comment on those estimates.

PHMSA will probably have to publish the 60-day ICR notice in the next couple of months to be able to get the comment period and time to review the responses before it becomes necessary to publish the 30-day notice before April 30th, 2018.

Commentary


This is not the first time that the Trump Administration’s OIRA has provided instructions to regulators to proactively move to electronic submission of information. This continues a regulatory theme that we have been seeing for the last couple of administrations. Not only will the electronic data collection reduce the data handling costs for the government, but it should provide at least some time burden reduction for industry.

As with my earlier post this morning, I do have some concerns about the cybersecurity protections for the data exchange process. If the data is submitted via email (a not very effective form of electronic data submission), this would provide a large number of emails (with attachments) from probably unauthenticated and unknown senders; a very sure method of increasing the general attack surface at PHMSA.

If, on the other hand, the data is directly provided to the database via a public web page, the security of that data can be subverted if the cybersecurity of the database (and the submission page) has not been properly implemented. More importantly, the cybersecurity protections need to be included in the design of the application and periodically reviewed and updated. This is an additional cost associated with electronic data submission that appears to be at least some what overlooked in the discussion of paperless government innovations.

EPA Sends Hazwaste Electronic Manifest Final Rule to OMB

On Saturday, the Environmental Protection Agency sent the final rule for the implementation of the Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest rule to the OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for approval. This bill implements the fee setting and implementation date requirements of the Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest Establishment Act (PL 112-195).

Commentary


With the Trump Administration’s concern about the ‘cost of regulation’ and how it effects business, it will be interesting to see how this final rule is being implemented. The congressional requirements for establishing the fund {42 USC 6939g(c)} are fairly comprehensive, leaving little room for fee reductions. There were no small business exceptions provided for in the authorizing legislation.


Since the authorizing legislation was written in 2012, there are no specific provisions requiring any cybersecurity protections of the E-Manifest system. Cybersecurity just was not on the Congressional radar at that point. It will be interesting to see if there are any attempts by the EPA to address such issues in this regulation.

Saturday, August 12, 2017

CG Publishes CSF Profile Document for Passenger Operations

Earlier this week the Coast Guard published on their Home Port web page (https://homeport.uscg.mil > Cybersecurity > Cyber News > Passenger Operations Cybersecurity Framework Profile Review; sorry the CG does not use links on its HomePort) a new cybersecurity guidance document and requested public comments on the document. The new document is the “Content Preview of the Passenger Operations Cybersecurity Framework Profile”. The Coast Guard’s blog did provide a real link to the document.

The Profile


This document is an attempt by the CG to help affected organizations (US passenger vessel operations) implement the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). According to the CG’s blog:

“A profile implements the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, which was developed in 2014 to address and manage cybersecurity risk in a cost-effective way based on business needs and without placing additional regulatory requirements on businesses. The profile is how organizations align the Framework’s cybersecurity activities, outcomes, and informative references to organizational business requirements, risk tolerances, and resource allocations.”

The Profile is a .PDF document that first provides a list of 13 passenger vessel mission objectives with a brief description of each. These objectives include:

• Maintain human safety;
• Maintain marine safety and resilience;
• Maintain environmental safety;
• Maintain guest support and basic hotel services;
• Maintain regulatory compliance;
• Assure secure communications by function and mode;
• Optimize guest experience and value;
• Maintain supply chain and turnaround;
• Disembarking, embarking, and turnaround;
• Coordinate port operations;
• Assure (optimize) lifecycle asset management;
• Maintain passenger information and accounting systems; and
• Manage, monitor and maintain non-guest-facing office technology

The Profile then provides a CSF matrix showing each of the functions, categories and subcategories listed in the CSF with a listing for each of the 13 mission objectives listed above; categorizing them as either ‘High Priority’, ‘Moderate Priority’ or ‘Other Implemented Categories’. It is interesting that they do not use the pejorative term ‘Low Priority’ in the categorization.

Public Comments


The Coast Guard is asking for public comments on the Profile. They have provided a comment submission form (download .XLS) very similar to the format used by NIST to request comments during the development of the CSF. Comments can be emailed to  HQS-SMB-CG-FAC-CYBER@uscg.mil. Comments should be submitted by September 7th, 2017.

Commentary


I really do like the general format of this Profile document. The mission statement provides a general overview of what the affected organizations are supposed to be attempting to accomplish in the operations. Tying that back into the CSF matrix with a prioritization scheme provides a workable management tool for implementation of the CSF.

There are two specific areas where ‘process control systems’ (a very interesting substitute for the term ‘industrial control systems’ that I would typically use) are prominently discussed in the Mission Objective portion of the Profile. First in the description of ‘Maintaining Human Safety’ it starts: “Recognizing cybersecurity-effects on process control systems that impact personnel safety.” Similarly, in ‘Maintain environmental safety’ it addresses cybersecurity effects “on process control systems that impact environmental safety”. Additionally, there are at least two other mission objectives that include mention of “manage support systems security”, a clear reference to various process control systems.

I am more than a little surprised at the prioritization of these ‘process control systems’ in many areas of the CSF implementation matrix, but that may be more of reflection on my lack of familiarity with passenger vessel operations than anything else. I was pleased, however, to see both the human safety and environmental safety objectives receive ‘high profile’ rankings under two of the Risk Assessment subcategories:

ID.RA -3: Threats, both internal and external, are identified and documented; and
ID.RA - 5: Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to determine risk

Unfortunately, that pleasure was more than offset by the ‘other’ ranking across the board for the “ID.RA -2: Threat and vulnerability information is received from information sharing forums and sources” in the same Risk Assessment Category. That hardly supports the ‘high profile’ rankings noted above.


I really do recommend that everyone with an interest in maritime safety (not just passenger vessels) take a good look at this 16-page document. It provides an interesting perspective on CSF implementation in an often-overlooked area of operations. Likewise, the control system security community (particularly those with maritime experience) should also give the document a good review. The Coast Guard deserves a wide variety in the thoughtful comments it receives on this Profile.
 
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