Tuesday, February 2, 2010
HR 4061 Status 02-02-10
The House Rules Committee finished their rule development for the management of the floor debate on HR 4061. The rule (H Res 1051) calls for one hour of general debate followed by 10 minutes of debate on each of 25 Committee approved amendments. This debate could take place as early as the 3rd. With 25 amendments this bill could easily take two days to consider even with the relatively low level of controversy surrounding the bill.
None of the 25 amendments address cyber security issues associated with industrial control systems so this debate will be of little interest to the chemical security community. We’ll have to wait for possible Senate action to see any control systems issues addressed.
QHSR Report
I just received an email from the people that brought us the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) Dialogues this last summer. While I have seen in the news that DHS has delivered the QHSR to Congress, this is the first time that I have seen a link to the document.
Actually the email provides a link to the DHS QHSR web page. That page provides the link for the report and the executive summary. It also provides the following brief description of the next phases of the process:
“The next step, which is currently underway, is a bottom-up review of the Department which will align the programmatic activities and organizational structure of the Department with the strategic framework set out in the QHSR. The third and final step of this process will culminate in the Department's fiscal year 2012 budget submission.”Over the next day or so I’ll look at the report and see what information might be of interest to the chemical security community.
HR 4061 Status – 02-01-10
The Rules Committee will conduct their hearing on HR 4061 this evening at 5:00 pm. The deadline for submitting amendments was yesterday and there were 38 amendments submitted. The Committee web page provides a summary of each of the proposed amendments and a link to the amendment. According to the summaries provided by the sponsors, none of the amendments seems to address any issues related to industrial control system security.
This evening Committee meeting will result in a pared down list of amendments that will be considered during floor debate, probably later this week. When that list is provided I’ll take a more detailed look at the amendments that will make it to the floor.
One amendment that I predict will make it to the floor is the Flake (R, AZ) Amendment that would prohibit the use of earmarks to allocate the grants provided in the legislation. He proposes similar amendments to nearly every bill with grant programs; they almost always make it to the floor where they are usually approved. This certainly makes him a hero to his constituents; I’m not sure why other legislators don’t just include this language when they are drafting their bills.
Reader Comment – 02-01-10 IST and OSHA
Anonymous responded to my earlier blog about fertilizer facilities and the IST provisions of HR 2868. Anonymous wrote:
“I happen to agree that IST is largely a safety issue as it pertains to finding the safest way to manufacture goods. So I agree with Pam Guffain's statement there and I have been thinking that IST enforcement could possibly have a better fit under OSHA. Largely, US companies are familiar with OSHA regulations and if OSHA regulated a process as it pertains to safety it would be better for both companies and employees. OSHA should have enough of a big stick to enforce IST. Enforcement overlaps are already occurring with CFATS and other agencies. But I'll save that for a future comment. I'd also like to suggest Mr. Wegmeyer to look at the CFATS process and take note that it is largely an electronic process. I am unsure how they think it ads too much paperwork for a company to handle.”Safety or Security Proponents of the mandatory IST provisions of HR 2868 are quick to point out that there are no guaranteed security measures that will provide absolute protection against a successful terrorist attack. They note that the only sure way to protect against the effects of the release of toxic chemicals in a successful attack is for those chemicals not to be present. So they note that IST mandates are ultimately security measures. Opponents of the same provisions note that chemical engineering scientists came up with the concept of inherently safer technology as a safety technique. It was never intended to be a security measure. Neither is there an absolute measure of safety that can be used to evaluate the comparative safety of techniques. What both sides refuse to acknowledge is that while IST is a safety measure, when the safety of the community surrounding the plant is taken into account, especially in light of the most severe ‘worst case’ scenario associated with a terrorist attack, it may also be viewed as security measure. In these cases IST is a security measure for the community as well as the facility. But this is true of most security measures; they are also safety measures. DHS – OSHA – EPA There are three different government agencies that might be expected to supervise the application of IST measures; OSHA, EPA and DHS. OSHA regulations mainly deal with facility and employee safety issues; IST can certainly fall under that umbrella. EPA deals with the effects of chemical releases on the environment and off-site personnel; IST can also find shelter there. Finally, DHS deals with protecting the country from terrorist attacks and recovery from catastrophic events; IST could be regulated here as well. Both OSHA and the EPA have a long history of abdicating responsibility for chemical process safety. Both agencies have regulatory responsibility for watching over chemical manufacturing processes, but are only active in pursuing that responsibility after an accident or incident has occurred. They have repeatedly ignored calls for additional controls on process safety for such obvious problems as dust explosions and reactive process safety; responding only after large numbers of deaths occur. So, it looks like IST, if it is to be regulated, will have to fall under the purview of DHS. Actually, industry should be grateful that the only agency to regulate IST will apparently be DHS. The language of HR 2868 is relatively benign for the large majority of facilities; most facilities will only have to conduct an IST assessment. Only a small number of facilities will have to justify not implementing an IST technique using their own assessment data. Based upon the current wording of §2111 of HR 2868 it is unlikely that any facility will be forced to implement an IST methodology against its will. CFATS Paperwork Anonymous is correct in stating that all submissions to DHS are done electronically on-line using the Chemical Security Assessment Tool. This certainly reduces a great deal of the paperwork associated with the typical Washington regulatory scheme. Unfortunately, it far from eliminates paperwork. First, facilities will have to collect the data necessary for completing these assessment tools. While the Top Screen Tool will require little more than collecting inventory data, the SVA and SSP will require the collection of an increasing amount of data. Some of this data will never have been collected before by most facilities. As I have mentioned on a number of occasions, the Site Security Plan submitted to DHS via CSAT is badly misnamed. It is a collection of information about existing and planned security measures for the facility; it is not a security plan. Every facility will have to develop a written plan supporting that document, outlining a wide variety of security procedures that the facility will have to show to DHS inspectors to demonstrate compliance with their own SSP. The personnel surety program provides just one example. Facilities will have to have a written program describing their procedures for conducting background investigations for all personnel authorized unaccompanied access to critical areas of the facility. The procedure will also have to explain how the results those checks will be evaluated to allow or disallow that access. The appellate process for those decisions will also have to be outlined. Then there will be the record keeping necessary to document the implementation of those procedures. No, the CFATS regulations are far from paperwork free.
Monday, February 1, 2010
Reader Comment – 1-31-10 CIAS Info
D3 continued the conversation about responsibility for cyber security with a new comment. D3 wrote (in part):
“Fundamentally, I agree with your response. However, I should point out to you that there are several initiatives that fall into the category of helping "State and local governments...protect their own computer systems against cyber attack." One that comes to mind is the Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security (CIAS) [link added], a non-profit based at the University of Texas at San Antonio.”
D3’s comment provided additional details about CIAS, for whom he works. If you are interested in cyber protection efforts for non-control system applications at State or local levels, please read the remainder of D3’s comments. I am also providing a link to a listing of some of their training courses.
I was pretty sure that there would be programs out there that would address this issue and I am sure that they could use additional funding to expand their programs to allow for further work on cyber security issues for State and local government entities. I certainly think that this is valuable work, if perhaps not what I specifically follow on this blog.
Federal Responsibility
Of course, the main point that I was trying to make in the original post was that State and local governments need help in protecting their own systems, not to be made responsible for protecting the cyber systems of their residents. Individual system protection is the responsibility of the owner of the system.
What the Federal government should be responsible for is the protection of the network that is used extensively in this country, the Internet. A certain amount of that concern should be focused on providing individual users with information on how to protect their systems so that their machines are resistant to being hijacked to form botnet weapons that can be used to attack the larger infrastructure that we call the Internet. The bulk of the defense of the internet should be focused on strengthening the infrastructure of the Internet and responding to attacks.
Because there are a large number of non-governmental entities in this country that are critical to the smooth operation of our society (labeled Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources – CIKR under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan) the Federal Government has a responsibility to ensure that these entities meet minimum standards for their individual security, including cyber security. This is a key part of the underlying mission of strengthening the Internet.
Those two areas should be the focus of the Federal government’s action in the cyber security realm, protect the Internet and ensure that CIKR are adequately protecting themselves (and of course protect the computer systems that the government itself uses). Trying to push either responsibility off on the States, which is what HR 4507 appears to do, is not reasonable because they lack the funds, personnel, expertise and legal authority to accept that mission.
Improvised Manufacture of Explosives
There is an interesting article at HomeLandSecurityNewsWire.com that is the first place that I have seen the term ‘improvised manufacture of explosives’ (IME) used. As one would expect this deals with the process for making improvised explosives for IED’s and vehicle born IED’s (VBIED’s).
James Crippin, the author, makes the point that many improvised explosives are made from readily available chemicals that are impractical to tightly control. He then goes on to recommend that general awareness training programs need to be conducted so that the public can recognize the components of these improvised explosives. His proposed purpose of this training is to have the public detect the anomalous purchase of these materials.
As readers of this blog might remember, I have reported on the beginnings of such a training program being prepared by DHS. DHS has developed some basic training materials (including job aids to be posted in the workplace) for retailers to use with their employees to identify the odd purchase of chemicals used to manufacture IED’s. What is missing is the means of pushing this training down to all of the potential retailers. As I suggested in my earlier blog, manufacturers and distributors of these chemicals can perform a valuable societal service by requiring retailers to use these training materials.
Crippin makes another very valuable point in this article. He recommends that police officers across the country should receive training in IME techniques, similar to training widely available on the manufacture of methamphetamines. The purpose would not be to make explosives manufacturers of these officers, but to allow them to recognize the manufacture when they stumble upon it in the course of their normal duties. Not only should they be able to recognize these operations from a legal perspective, but from a safety perspective as well.
I would add that other first response type personnel should receive similar training. Firemen and emergency medical response personnel may be called to emergency scenes that contain such manufacturing operations. They need to be able to recognize the safety hazards associated with these facilities.
Crippin also suggests that similar training be made available to the general public to allow them to be aware of the odd behavior around the buying or use of this material so that they could report it to the appropriate authorities. I am not so sure that that is a real good idea. While this information is readily available on the internet, pushing this information at the public would inevitably result in an increase in the experimentation with explosives by too many people, particularly teenagers.
With the possible exception of this one area, I think that the Crippin article is well worth reading and deserves some serious discussion within both the law enforcement and chemical security communities. DHS should take the lead and determine how they can best head this effort.
Fertilizer and IST
I ran across an article on HossierAgToday.com that pointed out a basic misunderstanding of the inherently safer technology (IST) requirements of HR 2868. The article quotes an unnamed spokeswoman of the Fertilizer Institute as saying that “forcing makers of anhydrous ammonia for fertilizer to switch products would drive up costs and hurt quality”.
First off, the provisions of HR 2868 would not require any manufacturer of any chemical listed in Appendix A to 6 CFR part 27 (DHS chemicals of interest - COI) to stop manufacturing those chemicals. Since those products are what the manufacturer sells, it would not be economically feasible to stop them from selling those products; it would put them out of business.
Manufacturers of certain COI (mostly TIH chemicals) might have to be concerned that some of their customers might be required to switch to less hazardous chemicals because of the IST provisions of HR 2868 if the legislation were adopted. This concern would not be felt by fertilizer manufacturers.
The end users (farmers) of these dangerous chemicals (anhydrous ammonia and perhaps ammonium nitrate) would not be Tier 1 or Tier 2 facilities if they were covered by CFATS (farmers are currently temporarily exempted from the Top Screen submission requirements of CFATS). Only Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities could possibly be required by the Secretary to switch to safer chemicals. Thus anhydrous ammonia fertilizer end-point sales would not be affected by HR 2868 and the entire manufacture distribution system would be effectively exempted from the substitution requirements.
Where anhydrous ammonia is used to manufacture other fertilizers, it will be difficult to justify the switch to slightly less dangerous aqueous ammonia solutions simply on economic grounds. This would require the complete redesign of manufacturing processes and chemical handling equipment. It would significantly increase the number of hazardous materials shipments and the number of times that those chemicals would be handled. The capital costs for the switch and the increased operational costs would be hard to justify with the slim margins typically found on fertilizers used in large scale commercial farming.
It is always disheartening to see political discourse reduced exaggeration of the potential affects of legislation. There are a number of points of clear disagreement about many provisions of HR 2868. The discussion about whether or not to pass the bill should remain focused on those areas so that reasonable accommodations can be reached between the various affected groups. Resorting to exaggerated claims to garner wider support only poisons the political process.
First off, the provisions of HR 2868 would not require any manufacturer of any chemical listed in Appendix A to 6 CFR part 27 (DHS chemicals of interest - COI) to stop manufacturing those chemicals. Since those products are what the manufacturer sells, it would not be economically feasible to stop them from selling those products; it would put them out of business.
Manufacturers of certain COI (mostly TIH chemicals) might have to be concerned that some of their customers might be required to switch to less hazardous chemicals because of the IST provisions of HR 2868 if the legislation were adopted. This concern would not be felt by fertilizer manufacturers.
The end users (farmers) of these dangerous chemicals (anhydrous ammonia and perhaps ammonium nitrate) would not be Tier 1 or Tier 2 facilities if they were covered by CFATS (farmers are currently temporarily exempted from the Top Screen submission requirements of CFATS). Only Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities could possibly be required by the Secretary to switch to safer chemicals. Thus anhydrous ammonia fertilizer end-point sales would not be affected by HR 2868 and the entire manufacture distribution system would be effectively exempted from the substitution requirements.
Where anhydrous ammonia is used to manufacture other fertilizers, it will be difficult to justify the switch to slightly less dangerous aqueous ammonia solutions simply on economic grounds. This would require the complete redesign of manufacturing processes and chemical handling equipment. It would significantly increase the number of hazardous materials shipments and the number of times that those chemicals would be handled. The capital costs for the switch and the increased operational costs would be hard to justify with the slim margins typically found on fertilizers used in large scale commercial farming.
It is always disheartening to see political discourse reduced exaggeration of the potential affects of legislation. There are a number of points of clear disagreement about many provisions of HR 2868. The discussion about whether or not to pass the bill should remain focused on those areas so that reasonable accommodations can be reached between the various affected groups. Resorting to exaggerated claims to garner wider support only poisons the political process.
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