Thursday, January 14, 2010

CFATS Gasoline Notice Change

The Department of Homeland Security will be re-issuing the notice posted earlier this week in the Federal Register concerning their request for comments on the issue of gasoline terminals and the CFATS regulations. The footnotes were misplaced in the version published on January 12th. The new version to be published tomorrow will correct that issue and change the end of the comment period. The new date should be March 18th, 2010.

Gasoline VCE

While we are discussing gasoline vapor cloud explosions and CFATS, it might be instructional to look at a smaller gasoline VCE explosion that happened in Idaho last month. According to news reports a gasoline tank truck was making a delivery to a gas station near Mud Lake, ID on December 17th when the incident happened. The storage tank apparently was overfilled forming a puddle of gasoline under the tanker. Some ignition source, perhaps the tractor’s engine, ignited the resulting vapor cloud causing an initial explosion and subsequent fire. Reports are confused as to whether there was one subsequent explosion or multiple explosions. Since no one was injured in this incident there is no investigation by the Chemical Safety Board, so it is unlikely that we will hear about what actually happened if the local investigation is able to determine that. It does go to show, though, that accidental gasoline vapor cloud explosions are not as rare as the gasoline transportation industry would like us to believe. And if a gasoline VCE can occur accidentally, they can certainly be initiated by a trained terrorist.

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Gasoline Security Comments

Yesterday I posted a blog entry about the latest DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate request for public comments on the CFATS program. That posting was pretty much a straight news-type report on the posting in today’s Federal Register. Now it’s time to take a more opinionated look at the issues involved. Long time readers of this blog can guess where this is going as I have written on the topic a number of times, most recently in November of 2009.

Flammable Release COI 

The first thing that we have to remember is why DHS included the category of flammable release chemicals of interest (COI) in the list of chemicals that triggered the Top Screen reporting process when a screening threshold quantity of the chemical was present at a chemical facility. It wasn’t because of the threat of fire at the facilities in the event of a terrorist attack; large chemical fires have only a limited, short-term off-site affect making them of limited utility as a terrorist target. No the release-flammable COI were placed on the list of DHS Chemicals of Concern (Appendix A, 6 CFR 27) because of their potential to form large vapor clouds when released from storage tanks that could be detonated to form a vapor cloud explosion (VCE).

The blast (over pressure) affects of a VCE have the potential to be catastrophically effective over a wide area which makes a VCE a wonderful terrorist weapon. Now gasoline is not one of the 300+ chemicals listed in Appendix A. The reason is that DHS chose to only include ‘individually named’ chemicals in their list. This helped keep the list of chemicals to a manageable number. To account for the large number of chemicals in commerce that are mixtures of two or more chemicals, DHS amended the language of 6 CFR 27 to include a variety of mixture rules for the various types of chemicals of interest.

The basic release-flammable mixture rule {6 CFR 27.204(a)(2)} calls for chemicals containing at least 1% of a release-flammable COI and are rated as an NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) rating of 4 (their most dangerous flammability rating) to have their entire quantity counted as the amount of the COI on hand at the facility. Refined petroleum fuels such as gasoline, kerosene and diesel are very complex mixtures of a large number of chemical compounds. These fuels may contain a number of the listed release-flammable COI found in Appendix A; most typically pentane and butane. Gasoline has a typical NFPA rating of 3 which would normally exclude it from the §204 flammable mixture rule.

There is, however, a specific exception for these petroleum based fuels found at §203(b)(1)(v), allowing for coverage of fuels with an NFPA rating as low as 1 when they are stored in above ground tanks. The reason for this is two fold; first the NFPA rating is not a perfect predictor of VCE potential, and second is the fact that internal combustion engine fuels are, by design, optimized for their vapor explosion potential inside of those engines.

There is a third reason that petroleum based fuels should be considered a special case for the purposes of the flammable mixture rule; there is a special political dimension associated with these fuels that makes them more likely targets. First, a large portion of the oil used to make these fuels world wide comes from Muslim countries in the Middle East and this makes the fuel production and distribution systems in ‘infidel’ countries prime jihadist targets. Second, there have been ample public examples where disruptions of the fuel supply system in the United States in particular have led to widespread economic disruptions due to the rapid increase in gasoline prices, producing a potential target with an added snowball effect. Finally there is a technocrat class with a petroleum engineering background that is well represented in jihadist forces.

VCE Modeling

The flammable mixtures rule and its fuel addendum do not mean that all gasoline terminals (the generic term that DHS is applying to all facilities with above ground fuel storage tanks) will become covered facilities. It simply means that those facilities with more than 10,000 lbs of on-site fuel storage would have to complete a Top Screen submission. DHS would then evaluate that Top Screen information to make a determination if the submitting facility was at high-risk for a terrorist attack. According to the discussion in the request for comments, DHS reports that only 405 of the approximately 4,000 gasoline terminals that submitted Top Screens were preliminarily tiered as high-risk facilities.

To evaluate the potential risk level for a facility based on their Top Screen DHS will use a variety of tools that estimates the potential worst case consequences of an attack. The chemical industry has heard the EPA use the term ‘worst case scenario’ for years now. There is a difference however; EPA uses the term to describe an accidental release. For example they would consider a flow rate from a storage tank through a broken hose as the ‘worst case’ release from a storage tank. DHS, on the other hand bases their ‘worst case’ on a successful terrorist attack; probably using an IED to cause a catastrophic failure of the tank resulting in a near instantaneous release of the contents. Typically, the consequences of a DHS ‘worst case’ are more severe than an EPA ‘worst case’.

To evaluate the worst case consequence of a release-flammable COI release, DHS uses the Vapor Cloud Explosion model developed by EPA. This model takes into account a number of variables that would affect the formation of a vapor cloud to determine the distance from the point of release that there would be significant overpressure (blast) affects that would damage structures and injure/kill people. DHS then looks at the number of people and the number and types of other facilities within the potential danger area of a successful VCE.

One of the key elements of this model is determining the size of the potential vapor cloud. This is determined by a complex calculation that takes into account the physical properties of the COI (vapor pressure, flammability limits, etc), the amount of the COI and the surface area over which it might spread. According to the DHS filing in yesterday’s Federal Register, the EPA model assumes that 10% of the available (ie: spilled) liquid will evaporate and form an ignitable vapor cloud. DHS has changed that to 1% for the gasoline VCE model, reflecting the different physical characteristics for gasoline.

DHS asks in their request for comments if this assumption is reasonable. Well, while I am a trained chemist I am not an expert on models or physical chemistry. But I do know that the Chemical Safety Board is collecting a ton of information on a recent gasoline VCE that occurred in Puerto Rico last year. The information from that investigation should be used to verify the reasonableness of the VCE model assumptions.

If about 1% of the spilled fuel was involved in the initial explosion, the model assumptions are reasonable. If it was closer to 10% or 0.1% then the model needs to be adjusted as appropriate. The thing to remember about models is that they are theoretical constructs. When the results of a model accurately predict actual occurrences the model is a valuable tool. If the model cannot be used to make reliable predictions of real world conditions then it is a poor tool and should be modified or discarded. Models should be validated against new data on an ongoing basis.

Gasoline and IEDs 

Currently DHS does not include flammable liquids and gasses as theft/diversion chemicals in general and certainly not gasoline or any other petroleum based fuels. The basic reason is that the use of flammable liquids to create a VCE of any political consequence (the goal of any terrorist attack) requires a large volume of the liquid and is even difficult to set up when one has the chemicals in place.

Having said that, the Army did some work in the 1970s on using gasoline as an improvised explosive for making anti-tank ditches in built-up areas. It was inspired by a news story describing an accidental discharge of gasoline into a sewer line that was then detonated by some ignition source; a two block length of sewer line exploded making a nearly uniform trench the length of the street. While the use of this type ‘explosive’ would be significantly more complicated than the ‘underwear bomb’ of recent history it would be an effective technique to use against urban or suburban targets.

Since there is only minimal security at many fuel terminals and there are usually fuel transporters located nearby, the acquisition and transportation of the needed fuel a relative easy part of the fuel-IED process. Thus, it seems reasonable that DHS should consider adding a theft/diversion listing for gasoline because of its wide spread availability and its demonstrated utility as a raw material for an effective large scale IED.

DHS Laws & Regulations Web Page Updated 01-12-09

Yesterday the Department of Homeland Security updated the Laws & Regulations web page in the Counter-Terrorism section of their web site. They added the following information in the “Notices Posted in the Federal Register” section of the page:
“DHS request for comment on CFATS regulatory provisions for aboveground gasoline storage tanks. Published on January 12, 2010. The Department of Homeland Security invites public comment on issues related to certain regulatory provisions in the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) that apply to facilities that store gasoline in aboveground storage tanks. Written comments must be submitted on or before March 15, 2010.”
This change deals with the notice that I discussed in yesterday’s blog. I’m still more than a little surprised that DHS has not updated the Chemical Security “Statute” section of this page to reflect the extension of the CFATS authority that was included in the Homeland Security FY2010 budget bill.

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

DHS-CERT CSSP Web Page Update – 01-12-10

The DHS-CERT Control System Security Program (CCSP) web page was updated on Tuesday. There was a significant re-design of the page and a link to an updated page for the Industrial Control System Joint Working Group (ICSJWG). The two new pages have a lot of information that will be valuable for the chemical security community. CCSP Page The data portion of the CCSP page is now smaller than the previous design. To provide additional room for new information there is now a three-tabbed block in the center of the page that allows the CCSP to provide new information in the same space. The current tabs are “What’s New”, “Top Ten”, and “Reporting”. The Top Ten list provides links to the top ten accessed documents on the site. Unfortunately, the link to the ‘Calendar’ page is currently not operational. The current list includes, among other things:

Catalog of Control Systems Security: Recommendations for Standards Developers (pdf), Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems (pdf), Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability (pdf), and

Secure Architecture Design.

The “Reporting” tab includes links for reporting control systems incidents (this leads to a reporting form with a cursory description of what constitutes a ‘control system incident’. Actually, this brief and very inclusive description is probably very valuable in bringing in the widest volume of incidents that affect cyber control systems. This would allow CCSP to weed out the non-cyber incidents instead of pre-empting good reports that might not fall under a more specific description. ICSJWG Page The ICSJWG page provides updated information on the Spring 2010 Conference that I had briefly reported in a previous blog. The new information includes the actual location of the conference in Austin, TX (JW Marriott San Antonio Hill Country Hotel and Conference Center), a link to a one-page brochure about the conference, and a link to the conference registration page. There is also a ‘Call for Papers’ announcement on the page, though the link for the electronic submission of proposal abstracts has not yet been established. The program committee has provided a non-exhaustive list of topics that they are looking to have covered at the conference. These include:
Workforce Development, Control Systems Security Research, International Coordination, Standards Development, Incident Handling, Vulnerability Management, Emerging Technologies, Managing Vendor Relations, Integration of Cryptographic Technologies, Security Management Metrics, Wireless Integration in ICS environments, and Coordination of Threat Reporting.
I am always amazed (not really) when there is a noticeable lack of cross fertilization of ideas and topics in the various parts of the Department. Particularly amusing here is that the one regulatory program that is actively trying to deal with industrial control system issues is not mentioned in the program committee’s list of topics. I would have liked to see CFATS cyber security issues get some prominent mention in this forum. As more information becomes available on the ICSJWG Spring Conference, it will certainly be mentioned here in this blog.

PTC Final Rule to be Issued Friday

Last week I mentioned that I thought that the Positive Train Control (PTC) Final Rule was near to being issued. Today a Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) press release noted that the final PTC rule was being published today in the Federal Register. Actually, that is misleading as it was not published in today’s FR. It was released to the GPO today for publication in the January 15th issue of the FR. An advance copy of the final rule is available on the FRA web site. A quick review of the advance copy of the final rule shows that there is an extensive discussion about the issue of PIH re-routing decisions and their affects on which lines will be required to install PTC systems and how that might affect shipping costs. I will hold-off making any detailed comments on this until the legal version of the rule is published on Friday, but it looks like this rule is going to have a significant impact on shippers of PIH chemical via rail.

Gasoline Terminals under CFATS

On Tuesday, January 12th the Department of Homeland Security published a notice in the Federal Register requesting comments on “certain technical issues related to the applicability of CFATS to gasoline terminals”. These comments are being requested, in part, based upon a May 13, 2009 petition by the International Liquid Terminals Association (ILTA) requesting that DHS exempt gasoline from CFATS and remove all references to gasoline terminals from §27.203(b)(1)(v) and the CFATS flammable mixtures rule {§27.204(a)(2)}. The Problem The ITLA and other industry organizations have objected to the inclusion of facilities in CFATS coverage solely because of the presence of above ground storage tanks of gasoline or other fuels that contain release flammable chemicals of interest in the fuel mixture. They maintain that the physical characteristics of gasoline are such that a vapor cloud explosion (VCE) from a gasoline release is extremely rare and only occurs when there are multiple failures of safety procedures and devices. DHS has taken the position in their development of §27.203(b) and §27.204(a) that, while an accidental VCE is unusual, terrorists attacking a fuel terminal would be expected to structure their attack to take into account the necessary conditions to form an effective VCE. Instead of relying on a series of accidental conditions to cause a VCE, the terrorist would deliberately cause the necessary conditions. DHS has modified the Environmental Protection Agency model used to evaluate the potential consequences of a VCE for the purposes of determining if a facility is at high-risk of terrorist attack. Recognizing the added difficulties of initiating a VCE with gasoline, the DHS modified model reduces the amount of the released gasoline considered to take part in the VCE from the 10% that EPA uses for other flammable liquids to just 1%. The gasoline terminal industry has maintained that, if a consequence analysis of a terrorist attack on a fuel terminal is needed, that DHS ought to use the contained pool fire model for conducting that evaluation. Further, the industry claims that the use of that model would not result in fuel terminals being designated as high risk facilities; as such a fire would have minimal off-site consequences. DHS has countered that maintained that the contained pool fire scenario is inappropriate, because a terrorist attack would certainly seek to breach the secondary containment that that model relies upon to ‘contain’ the pooled gasoline fire. DHS does not yet have a viable model available for evaluating the uncontained pool fire scenario. The Questions In this notice DHS is requesting public comments on three issues relating to the inclusion of gasoline terminals in potential coverage under the CFATS regulations. Those issues are: Whether DHS should continue to include the rules for counting flammable release-COI {6 CFR 27.203(b)(1)(v)} in fuels stored in above ground storage tanks and the fuel provisions of the flammable mixtures rule {6 CFR 27.204(a)(2)} in the CFATS regulations; Whether the modified VCE model currently being used by DHS to evaluate gasoline terminals is the appropriate model for determining the risk of terrorist attack associated with those terminals that have no other COI present. Specifically, DHS wants to know if the 1% rule currently used in that model is the proper amount of fuel to include in the VCE calculations; and Whether a model currently exists or should be developed to evaluate the consequences of an uncontained pool fire at gasoline terminals. The public comments should be submitted to DHS via www.regulations.gov (docket # DHS-2009-0141) by March 15, 2010.
 
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