Reader Comments – 01-14-09 Gasoline Two

Two more comments on gasoline and CFATS appeared yesterday in response to two separate blogs, both by Anonymous (probably separate writers though). Gasoline and IEDs From the blog on gasoline security, Anonymous wrote:

“Good point. Flammable liquids or gases are usually not used as the primary charge/ explosive device in Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). However, they are used to intensify the destructive nature. For example, when Iraqi insurgents were utilizing the IED on an everyday basis, they would place propane tanks and/or jugs of gasoline around the IED. So let's say the insurgents had two 155 mm artillery rounds rigged as the IED, they would also place the propane tanks right next to it to create a more intense fireball, thus increasing the effects.”

Typically IEDs are small so that they can be concealed to prevent detection; this would preclude the use of flammable liquids or gasses as the primary charge because of the volume necessary to form the vapor cloud necessary for an explosion as opposed to a fire. The type IED I was describing utilizes large volumes of flammable liquids like gasoline. To get a VCE that liquid must be discharged into a large semi-enclosed volume that allows for the formation of a vapor cloud. While the Army’s work in the seventies concentrated on employing the gasoline in a sewer system for large scale excavations, the same thing could be done by pumping the fuel into a large building like a shopping mall, church or sports arena. Gasoline Terminals as Targets From the blog on the revised DHS notice, Anonymous wrote, in part:

“In addition to what you wrote for Gasoline security comments, I would contribute the fact that these above ground storage tanks are "visible" targets for terrorists to strike at. If I had to put a terrorist's hat on, I'd say why not strike it if it is there and it will make news.”

Combine this with the fact that most of these facilities have little more apparent security than a fence and a locked gate and they appear to be easy targets to hit. Now, I haven’t taken a comprehensive survey of gasoline terminals across the country, but two of the three that I have driven past often don’t even have gate guards. One other point while I’m thinking about it, many of these terminals sit atop a gasoline pipeline. A successful attack on the terminal (successful defined as effecting a VCE) will certainly damage the pipeline; at least enough to interfere with deliveries for a while. How long before that interruption begins to have economic impacts in the service area of that pipeline?

Gasoline VCE

While we are discussing gasoline vapor cloud explosions and CFATS, it might be instructional to look at a smaller gasoline VCE explosion that happened in Idaho last month. According to news reports a gasoline tank truck was making a delivery to a gas station near Mud Lake, ID on December 17th when the incident happened. The storage tank apparently was overfilled forming a puddle of gasoline under the tanker. Some ignition source, perhaps the tractor’s engine, ignited the resulting vapor cloud causing an initial explosion and subsequent fire. Reports are confused as to whether there was one subsequent explosion or multiple explosions. Since no one was injured in this incident there is no investigation by the Chemical Safety Board, so it is unlikely that we will hear about what actually happened if the local investigation is able to determine that. It does go to show, though, that accidental gasoline vapor cloud explosions are not as rare as the gasoline transportation industry would like us to believe. And if a gasoline VCE can occur accidentally, they can certainly be initiated by a trained terrorist.

Gasoline Vapor Cloud Explosions

There is an interesting posting over at Risk-Safety.com about the recent history of gasoline vapor cloud explosions at gasoline storage facilities. Dr. Saraf lists three major gasoline VCE’s, the last two within a week of each other. Initial reports from the San Juan, PR fire and the Jaipur, India fire indicate that there was a large VCE that caused a number of fuel storage tanks to become fully involved.

Large fuel fires in multiple tanks are particularly difficult to fight. There are no current reports of any indications of terrorists being involved in either fire, though anti-government radical organizations have operated in both Puerto Rico and India.

The initial VCE could have been much larger if there had been a catastrophic failure of one or more storage tanks due to an explosive device. The very large vapor cloud resulting from that size spill would have effected a very large area and there would have been significantly more casualties.

 While gasoline may not be as explosive as propane or some of the other flammable liquids and gasses specifically covered in Appendix A to 6 CFR 27, the huge size of the tanks at these terminal facilities certainly makes them prime targets for terrorists. Combine that chemical hazard with the fact that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have sworn to target oil facilities as specific targets in their war against the West, and it is clear that these large terminals should be Tier I high-risk chemical facilities.

It is too bad that DHS has once again bowed to political pressure to exempt such facilities.