Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Port Truckers Exempted from TWIC?
Lots of people are taking notice of the recent Coast Guard advanced notice of proposed rule making (ANPRM) on potential requirements for electronic readers to verify the authenticity of Transportation Workers Identification Credentials (TWIC). I ran across an interesting article on the issue over on TTNews.com, a trucker related site.
The thing that makes this article interesting is the comment that: “In the March 27 proposal, truckers who carry shipments to or from container ships that carry consumer goods and manufactured products would not have to obtain the biometric card.” Now I certainly did not read that in the ANPRM, so I read the article a little more closely to see if I could determine how they came to this conclusion.
It quickly became evident that Mr. Rip Watson, the article author, misread section IV E (Facility and Vessel Risk Groups) of the ANPRM. In the article he describes the vessel conditions for being placed into categories, but fails to address the similar conditions for facilities covered by the MTSA. Apparently missing the facility descriptions, he assumed that TWIC would not be required for personnel servicing facilities.
The Coast Guard ANPRM does nothing to change the requirements for workers in MTSA covered facilities or vessels to have a TWIC to be able to have unescorted access to security areas. All it does is address how those facilities and vessels will have to incorporate the use of TWIC Readers to verify worker identities.
Mass Mailings for Chemical Security Legislation
In one of my blog postings yesterday I chided two activist organizations for using the same wording in their submissions to the Surface Transportation Board. I noted that such ‘duplicative submissions’ were counter productive and detracted from the legitimate message being submitted. There is, of course, an exception to this ‘rule’; if elected officials can be flooded with a very large number of identical letters from their constituents, it may cause a change in a weakly held position.
The three key words in that ‘if’ statement were ‘very large number’. Dozens of submission will not suffice. Multiple hundreds may effect a very weakly held position. For real effect, a letter/email campaign needs thousands copies to flood an office to make fence straddlers move one way or the other. And it might take tens of thousands to convince a Congressman to change a publicly held position.
Chemical Security Legislation Email Campaign
Yesterday while searching Twitter© for postings related to ‘chemical facility security’ I ran across two posts about people signing onto an email campaign directed at Congress to get passage of a ‘chemical security legislation’. I checked out the links provided in the Tweets© and found a very effective message tied into the current Bayer CropScience controversy. The message would be very familiar to anyone that has read the CAP Report, Chemical Security 101, or last fall’s letter writing campaign by coalition of public interest groups.
Bayer and CFATS Reauthorization
What was interesting about this letter is that it was tied into the Bayer issue. The form letter said:
“I recently learned about the explosion at Bayer CropScience's Institute West Virginia Plant that killed two workers and threatened local residents. I am shocked that despite this serious accident, which could have been much worse, the corporation responsible is attempting to suppress important information and oppose tighter regulations.”Readers of this blog will recognize what ‘suppress important information’ refers to. While I have not specifically heard that Bayer opposes ‘tighter regulations’, I would suspect that they would object to any serious attempt to impose inherently safer technology (IST) on their use of methyl isocyanate, a toxic inhalation hazard (TIH). They make and store large quantities of this material and then use it as a raw material for a number of products that they manufacture at the site. Many local groups in West Virginia have called on Bayer to stop using or at least stop storing large quantities of this material. Interestingly enough, this particular facility would probably not be covered by the legislation reauthorizing CFATS that was proposed last year. It is already covered under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and so exempted from CFATS coverage. It would take a major legislative change to include the Bayer facility in CFATS. Let’s ignore that for the moment, following the example of the email campaign writers. Behind the Scenes The web site is run by TrueMajority which was “founded by Ben Cohen, Co-founder, Ben and Jerry's” ice cream. According to the web site it “is a grassroots education and advocacy joint project of UsAction and UsAction Education Fund”. I am not interested in digging into the identity of these organizations. I assume that they are professionally run and funded. This web site certainly supports that supposition. Some one that wants to ‘follow President Obama’s example’ and support the passage of chemical security legislation simply has to fill in some contact information on the web page. They can then either make some personal edits to the message or accept the version shown on the site and hit the send button. The web site will then send the email to the appropriate Senators and Congressman. If there is an effective advertising campaign supporting this page (I have not seen one, but I would probably not be part of the target audience in any case) then this campaign could provide a large number of emails, particularly to Senators (since every voter has two Senators and there are only 100 Senators). The number may even be large enough to sway some of those fence sitters. If properly done, this could be sufficient to get a closure vote in the Senate to shut off debate and bring the legislation to an actual vote. To be effective this campaign is starting much too early. The legislation has not yet even been introduced. A campaign of this sort need to peak just as the legislation is moving towards actual consideration. That way the large volume of email is catching the short attention span of the politician just as he/she is beginning to make up their mind on how to vote.
Public Comments TWIC Reader ANPRM – 04-03-09
The first three comments on the TWIC Reader ANPRM came a lot quicker (within a week) than I would have expected. Two of these were private individual comments rather than company comments so they did not have to go through the normal corporate approval process. In fact, the comment from Mr. Ainsworth was more of a TWIC related comment not a TWIC Reader comment. The comments were received from:
Edwin Madura
John Ainsworth
Bayou Tugs
Edwin Madura Comments
Mr. Madura notes that there should be provisions made for facilities that only periodically fall under the high-risk category. He provides the example of “a facility [that] ships one container of small arms ammo every three years… should not be classified as a Risk Group A for the intervening 35 months”.
Bayou Tugs Comments
Mr. Naquin of Bayou Tugs has two question:
“Does the term "each entry" refer to each entry into a designated Restricted Area or each entry into the vessel?” “What technology will be used to download Hotlist data?”On the second question he notes that vessels frequently operate outside of wireless internet access zones. My Comments on Comments The problem of intermittent security status needs to be addressed in these regulations. I am afraid that some facilities are going to have to make a decision as to whether or not they feel that the cost of security requirements will be worth the intermittent business. Security plans will certainly have to address the transition between Risk Groups. The regulations will have to address the requirements for the transition; for example how long before and after the high-risk cargo leaves the facility will the security procedures need to be applied. As I understand things the ‘for each entry’ requirements are for each entry into an MTSA ‘secure area’. In some cases this will be an entire vessel, in other cases it will only be designated areas within the vessel. A large cruise line vessel would certainly not be a unitary ‘secure’ area. This definition will need to be made clear. Finally, the issue of ‘Hot List’ updates will need close attention. This will almost certainly be done via the internet, but provisions will have to be made for vessels out of contact with internet service. In most cases vessels will not need to have their ‘Hot List’ updated until just before they come into port, so this may not be a serious issue.
Monday, April 6, 2009
Reader Comments – 04-02-09 – Hazmat Truck Routing
Fred Millar posted a comment to last Thursday’s blog about hazmat truck security about a requirement “for hazmat trucks to avoid cities” and refers us to 49 CFR 397.71 for the source of that mandate. Well, it is not often that I get to say this, but I think that I caught Fred in a mistake. Section 397.71 sets the “Federal Standards” which any State or Indian Tribe must comply with to establish hazmat route restrictions. I can’t find anything in that extensive section that calls for hazmat trucks to avoid cities.
Actually, what I think Fred was referring to was § 397.67(b) which states that:
“A motor carrier carrying hazardous materials required to be placarded or marked in accordance with 49 CFR 177.823 and not subject to a NRHM [Non-Radiological Hazardous Material] routing designations pursuant to this subpart, shall operate the vehicle over routes which do not go through or near heavily populated areas, places where crowds are assembled, tunnels, narrow streets, or alleys” (emphasis added).As Fred noted there are a significant number of ‘except where’ provisions that follow that make a general prohibition of transiting urban areas essentially unenforceable. Additionally there is no definition of ‘heavily populated areas’, ‘places where crowds are assembled’, or ‘narrow streets’; the lack of definition makes these terms ‘vague’ and unenforceable. The sole exception is the transportation of “explosives in Class 1, Divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, as defined in 49 CFR 173.50” {§ 397.67 (d)}; these hazmat require a written route plan so these are subject to some sort of potential review. The one saving grace for this hazmat regulation is that is specifically allows States and Indian Tribes to establish/prohibit hazmat routes; § 397.71 provides details on how those routes can be set up. This is different from the railroad routing that provides a near blanket pre-emption for federal rules. The reason is that if a state were to make large portions of urban areas off-limits to hazmat trucks (except for local deliveries – the ultimate exception) there would be routes around those areas truckers could use that would not require shifting their load to another company. With the wide availability of electronic navigation aids and GPS devices, it might be time to re-look at the hazmat route selection issue for truck borne shipments of hazardous chemicals. Restricted routes could be programmed into these devices and could even be designed to alert local authorities if the hazmat truck entered certain restricted areas.
TWIC Reader ANPRM – Reader Use by Risk Groups
This is the second in a series of blogs about the advanced notice of proposed rule making (ANPRM) that the Coast Guard recently published about the potential regulation of transportation worker’s identification credential (TWIC) reading devices. These devices would be used to verify the identity of people working in ships and facilities covered under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The other blogs in this series include:
TWIC Reader ANPRM – Identification Techniques
TWIC Reader ANPRM – Risk Groups
The ANPRM expresses the Coast Guard’s current thinking about what types of requirements will be included in the regulations that will be formally proposed later this year. This post looks at the risk based deployment requirements that might govern the actual use of the TWIC Readers.
Validating Identity
Generally speaking, each time an individual enters a security area on an MTSA covered facility or vessel, the individual’s identity and authorization to enter such area unescorted will be verified using the TWIC. Whether this will be done by visually checking the card or using a TWIC Reader will depend on facility/vessel risk group rating and the Maritime Security (MARSEC) level at the time of the entry.
A summary of the validation requirements that the Coast Guard is currently considering is described below.
Risk Group A (highest risk) at all MARSEC levels. The individual’s identity will be verified by biometric match of fingerprint to the template stored in the TWIC. The TWIC will be authenticated by a successful challenge/response with the TWIC Reader. The TWIC FASC-N will be validated against the TSA supplied Hotlist. Under MARSEC Level 1 the Hotlist will be updated weekly; it will be updated daily at MARSEC Levels 2 and 3.
Risk Group B (middle risk) at MARSEC Level 1. The individual’s identity will be verified by biometric match of fingerprint to the template stored in the TWIC on one randomly selected day each month. On all other days the picture printed on the TWIC will be compared to the holder’s appearance. At MARSEC Levels 2 and 3 the individual’s identity will be verified by biometric match of fingerprint to the template stored in the TWIC every day. At all MARSEC Levels the TWIC will be authenticated by a successful challenge/response with the TWIC Reader. The TWIC FASC-N will be validated against the TSA supplied Hotlist. Under MARSEC Level 1 the Hotlist will be updated weekly; it will be updated daily at MARSEC Levels 2 and 3.
Risk Group C (lowest risk) at all MARSEC Levels. The individual’s identity will be verified by comparing the picture printed on the TWIC with the holder’s appearance. The TWIC will be authenticated by visually checking security features upon entry with electronic verification by a successful challenge and response during annual inspections and random spot checks by the Coast Guard. The TWIC validation will be done by checking the expiration date at each entry. The Coast Guard will perform electronic spot checks.
Replies to UP STB Petition – 04-03-09
There were four new replies for the Union Pacific petition posted to the Surface Transportation Board site. None of the replies were from people directly associated with specific petition, but all felt that they could be affected by precedent set by this action. The replies came from:
Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force
Old World Industries
Citizens for Rail Safety
National Association of Chemical Distributors
Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force Reply
The NNWTF opposes the UP petition and is concerned because of the precedents that could be established shipping other dangerous cargo. Their position is best stated by this statement from their filing:
“What is of great concern is that the petition by the UP suggests that it should have the power to decide when and where cargo is too risky to haul and, when it does so, that it has no duty to present facts supporting those conclusions to the public, public entities, and shippers.”
The NNWTF noted that UP failed to seek more appropriate remedies for this issue. If the shipment of chlorine over long distances or through HTUA were so unsafe, they should have requested an embargo on those shipments from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). If they felt that the rules and standards for such shipments were inadequate they should have made their appeal to FRA and DOT. Not having done either, the NNWTF maintains that UP has no standing to request this ruling from the STB.
Old World Industries Letter
As another manufacturer/shipper of TIH chemicals OWI feels that “inexplicable stance that the Union Pacific has taken, is detrimental to the industries that depend upon the manufacturing and sale of TIH commodities”. They request that “STB mandate that the rate proposal in question be provided by the Union Pacific and tendered to the company that has been unduly hindered in their attempt to conduct business as provided by the law”.
Citizens for Rail Safety Reply
The CRS reply, other than the address and signature, is a duplicate of the NNWTF reply.
National Association of Chemical Distributors Reply
The NACD feels that the “UP petition to limit, or provide an exception to, their obligation to transport chlorine m this particular case is a threat to-the entire common carrier obligation to transport TIH materials”. Given the near monopoly that railroads have, the NACD notes that the “common carrier obligation exists for the specific purpose of requiring the railroads to provide service to shippers when they would otherwise choose not to do so because it would be unprofitable or inconvenient”.
My Comments on Comments
It is always politically interesting to watch form letter campaigns take place. Organizations have a right to make their opinions known to legislators and executive branch agencies during the deliberations leading up to legislative or regulative actions. The individual members of those organizations also have that right. But, neither legislators nor executive branch agencies are swayed by duplicative mailings of identical comments. The only way such mass mailings can be anywhere near effective is for there to be politically significant numbers of identical mailings; two mailings are never politically significant.
For two different organizations, operating in two different issue subject areas, to use duplicate mailings makes one question the legitimacy of those organizations as independent political advocates. One does not have to be a conspiracy theorist to jump to the conclusion that these two organizations are tools of a single organization, individual or agency.
Sadly, these duplicative mailing cheapen the legitimate arguments made. The failure of UP to seek more appropriate redress to the situation raises substantive questions about the legitimacy of the petition.
CSB vs Bayer CropScience – Round 2
According to news reports on WVGazette.com on Friday, the Chemical Safety Board and the Coast Guard have come to an accommodation on information that will be released at a public meeting on April 23. The CSB will conduct that meeting in Institute, WV to review the explosion at the Bayer CropScience plant just outside of that town last summer. Bayer had tried to stop disclosure of some information in such public venues because it was considered Security Sensitive Information (SSI) under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).
The CSB had scheduled their normal public hearing last month to review the status of their current investigation into the explosion that killed two people at the site. There were concerns that the explosion could have damaged a nearby methyl isocyanate (MIC) tank that could have endangered the nearby community. The CSB had to cancel that planned meeting when Bayer claimed that some of the information that was going to be discussed was SSI and prohibited from public disclosure.
The CSB took their information to the Coast Guard, the agency that is responsible for the administration of the MTSA and determining what information is actually SSI for covered facilities. The Institute, WV facility is considered a ‘maritime’ facility because it is located on a navigable water way and ships and receives chemicals via river barges. The Coast Guard announced Friday that any ‘outstanding issues’ had been resolved.
An earlier blog by Ken Ward, Jr. on the same web site noted that Sen. Rockefeller (D, WV) had sent a letter to Admiral Thad W. Allen, commander of the Coast Guard, outlining his concerns about the CSB vs Bayer controversy. According to the blog Sen. Rockefeller’s letter objected to the perceived use of MTSA regulation to avoid public disclosure of important aspects about the safety and security of the facility.
Now, Sen. Rockefeller’s letter almost certainly had no affect on the resolution of the ‘outstanding issues’ between CSB and the Coast Guard. After all Sen. Rockefeller is just a United States Senator representing the good citizens of Institute, W.V. Oh yes, he is also a Committee Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. The fact that this committee has oversight responsibility for the Coast Guard would have had no effect on Admiral Allen.
Congress still needs to resolve the issue of the conflict between the CSB’s mission to discuss lessons learned from serious chemical accidents and the DHS (the Coast Guard is a part of DHS) mission to protect SSI from disclosure to protect MTSA covered facilities from potential terrorist attack. Similar problems could arise if there were a serious incident at any of the almost 7,000 high-risk chemical facilities covered under CFATS and the Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) rules that protect much of the information about the security of those facilities.
A subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee will meet the first day that Congress is due back from their Easter Recess to look at the relationship between the CSB and the potential release of SSI information. Perhaps that hearing should also look at the potential CVI issues at other facilities with a view to addressing the issues in the upcoming CFATS reauthorization legislation.
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