While the Wall Street Journal is not exactly a security (in the physical not the financial sense) publication I was really surprised to see the gross error about the CFATS regulations that was mentioned in an
article today found on their on-line site. The article by Cam Simpson was about the recent terrorism story and the purchase of commercially available explosive precursors; “Chemical Purchases Enough for Big Bomb”.
Simpson writes: “In November 2007, the Department of Homeland Security published rules for regulating chemicals that can be used by terrorists to make explosive devices, including limits on products that include hydrogen peroxide.”
It is a gross misunderstanding of the intent of the regulation to say that the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS – 6 CFR part 27) were ‘rules for regulating chemicals’. While the November 27th date mentioned by Simpson was the publication of the list of the DHS Chemicals of Interest (Appendix A to 6 CFR part 27), neither that list nor the base regulations were ever designed to regulate chemicals. CFATS is strictly a regulations establishing minimal standards for the security of high-risk chemical facilities.
It is absolutely amazing to me that as prestigious a publication as the WSJ could allow such a fundamentally incorrect statement to appear in their publication.
The implied criticism of DHS found in the next paragraph is even more surprising. Simpson writes: “But the regulations make clear that DHS and the FBI were envisioning a large car or truck bomb, rather than smaller-style bombs like those used in the deadly July 2005 London transit attacks.”
In a modern society there are a number of readily available chemicals that can be used to make explosives. Trying to control access to hydrogen peroxide and acetone would be nearly impossible given their widespread use in commercial products. If controls were instituted on the 10-12% hydrogen peroxide found in the personal care products bought by Mr. Zazi, the chemically knowledgeable terrorist would just buy the 6% hydrogen peroxide solution found in any home and concentrate it to the necessary level using straightforward chemical laboratory techniques.
One last word from the WSJ article, it notes that the “threshold for reporting requirements is 400 pounds of hydrogen peroxide”. That is less than complete reporting of the facts. The Appendix A reporting requirements pertaining to hydrogen peroxide only pertain to concentrations of at least 35%. Even if there were storage tanks full of the products bought by Mr. Zazi they would not be regulated under CFATS.
DHS understood, even if the WSJ does not, that it is impossible to completely deny terrorists, or even just plain criminals, access to any and all dangerous chemicals that could be used to harm someone. What the CFATS regulations are designed to do is to ensure that the chemical facilities that present the highest risk to American society if attacked by terrorists are required to take reasonable security precautions to prevent such attacks. It was never designed to prevent access to dangerous chemicals; those are too ubiquitous in our industrial society.
DHS keeps getting caught in the public crossfire. They were pilloried when they tried to require security controls on facilities that had 10,000 pounds of explosive propane gas on site because it was too restrictive on farmers and home owners. Now the WSJ expects them to keep track of purchases of beauty products containing hydrogen peroxide. I do hope that our friends in the Department have thick hides, but they do not deserve the abuse.
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