Reader Comment – 02-13-09

Received a prompt and informative comment today from Michael Petty, whom I assume works with NovaTracker, manufacturer of GuardTrax. He makes the following point about my earlier blog today on that system: “I would like to clarify a point that you made in your blog posting. The GuardTrax SFL does have an encryption capability for those customers who have higher level security issues and needs. All data transmitted by the GuardTrax device can be encrypted if a customer desires such functionality. We encrypt the data for many of our customers. Thank you.” That certainly makes a lot of sense to me. Not all facilities would need the communications links encrypted. High-risk chemical facilities, however, would almost certainly want to have that added protection. NOTE: I did try to contact NovaTracker earlier by email (at info@novatracker.com), but each time their email server rejected my message “for security reasons”.

Tracking Security Guard Locations

I ran into an interesting article on HSDailyWire.com about a new service that allows security managers or guard force managers to track the location of security guards in real time. It is being touted by the manufacturer as a tool to manage and communicate with security forces. It tracks the guard location by GPS and transmits that data to a remote server by a wireless communication device. The server processes the data from the guard’s transceiver and provides information on the guard’s location, status and movement on a “a map-based (GIS) application that includes satellite imagery” according to the GuardTrax® product sheet. While it is certainly handy for a guard manager or security manager to be able to track the security force it would also be good information for anyone intending to penetrate facility security, either thieves or terrorists. There is nothing in the product literature that I have found that indicates that there is any encryption of the communications from the guard transceiver to the server or from the server to manager. Hacking into either communications channel would provide a serious tactical advantage to an adversary. Knowing where the guards were and where they were going makes it much easier to avoid them. Being able to provide bogus security status information to the manager will allow the penetration team to delay detection and misdirect any response forces. It sounds to me like a potentially good product that needs some additional work before it is ready for real world security.